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I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 3, 1979, a Mexican exploratory well in the Bay of 
Campeche blew out, discharging crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico 
for months and creating the largest oil spill in history.l Although 
the well was situated five hundred miles from the Texas coast, 
three million gallons of oil are estimated to have hit Texas 
beaches, while unknown amounts have sunk to the ocean bottom.! 
The regional fishing industry and tourist trade have suffered sub-
stantial economic losses, cleanup efforts have been costly, and 
lawsuits have been filed seeking millions of dollars in damages.3 
Furthermore, while the extent of the ecological damage has not 
been determined, long-term adverse effects are likely.· Additional 
large oil slicks are expected to hit the Texas coast in the spring of 
1980.11 
The oil industry and the federal government claim that an inci-
dent like Campeche is highly unlikely in American offshore drill-
ing operations.6 Nevertheless, accounts show that it is only the 
1 Christian Science Monitor, Sep. 27, 1979, at 3, col. 2. A blowout occurs when a sudden 
surge of oil or gas pressure up the drill hole causes a loss of control over the well. 
2 Id. 
S Comment, Voyage Into Uncertainty: Assigning Liability for the Bay of Campeche Oil 
Spill, 9 ENVIR. L. REP. (ELI) 10218, 10218 (1979). 
• Christian Science Monitor, Sep. 27, 1979, at 3, col. 2. 
• 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1795 (1980). The Campeche blowout was finally capped on 
March 24, 1980, almost ten months after it had begun. Boston Globe, Mar. 25, 1980, at 3, 
col. 5. The total amount of oil spilled was at least twice as much as in the previous largest 
spill, from the grounding of the Amoco Cadiz in 1978. Id. 
o Brief for Intervenor-Appellees Atlantic Richfield, et al. at 56-57, Conservation Law 
Foundation of New England, Inc. v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049 
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latest of several similar accidents over the last decade. For exam-
ple, in April 1977, the Ekofisk Bravo drilling rig in the North Sea 
blew out during routine maintenance, raging out of control for 
eight days before it was capped7 on the fifth try in an area known 
for its difficult weather conditions. In 1969, a blowout in the 
Santa Barbara channel off the California coast caused significant 
damage to the coastline and to wildlife, thus bringing the danger 
of blowouts to national attention.8 In addition, there has been a 
long history of spills from oil tankers, the most spectacular of 
which, from the Amoco Cadiz in March 1978, devastated the 
shoreline of Brittany, France.9 These events demonstrate that the 
hazards of oil extraction and transportation are not of recent ori-
gin. Moreover, expanded exploration efforts in the waters of the 
Outer Continental Shelf/o resulting from the need to tap new en-
ergy sources, have increased the possibility of serious accidents. 11 
In reaction to the danger of oil spills, and under pressure from 
environmental groups, Congress has enacted measures to provide 
safeguards in the offshore drilling process, notably the Outer Con-
tinental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978.12 The nation's 
shortage of reliable energy sources, however, has spawned efforts 
(1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Intervenor Brief Ij; BUREAU OF LAND MAN-
AGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL SUPPLEMENT TO ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, 
PROPOSED 1979 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE OFFSHORE THE NORTH-
ATLANTIC STATES OCS SALE No. 42, at 296-97 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FSESj. See Bu-
REAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATE-
MENT, PROPOSED 1977 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE OFFSHORE THE 
NORTH ATLANTIC STATES OCS SALE No. 42, at 6 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FESj. 
7 New York Times, May 1, 1977, at 1, col. 1. 
• New York Times, Feb. 9, 1969, at 1, col. 2, 3. 
• New York Times, Mar. 26, 1978, § IV, at 1, col. 2. 
10 The Outer Continental Shelf is the gently sloping plain underlying the seas adjacent 
to the coastal United States, extending from the coastline seaward to the point at which 
the ocean bottom drops off sharply. W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 513 (1977). 
11 The danger of serious accidents has increased not only because exploration efforts 
have increased in number but also because activities have been extended from the Gulf of 
Mexico, where the weather and other environmental conditions are relatively moderate, to 
more hazardous environments such as the North Atlantic and the Beaufort Sea. According 
to the Department of the Interior, the most severe wind conditions in the North Atlantic 
are comparable to those in the Beaufort Sea and the North Sea, FES, supra note 6, at 761, 
and extreme storm conditions may result in more severe waves in the North Atlantic than 
in the North Sea or the Gulf of Alaska, id. at 763. In light of the recent accident in the 
North Sea, however, in which more than a hundred workers were killed when a "hotel" 
platform collapsed and capsized after being hit by a huge wave during a storm, Boston 
Globe, Mar. 28, 1980, at 1, col. 2, Interior's intent to rely on existing technology provides 
little assurance that a serious accident will not likely occur . 
.. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978) (amending 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976)). 
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to relax these environmental safeguards even before they have 
been fully implemented. The resulting tension between the con-
flicting demands for development and for protection has led, in 
turn, to increased litigation in order to resolve the disputes be-
tween the competing interests. That litigation has focused prima-
rily on the sale of oil and gas leases as the significant point at 
which the commitment to drilling in a particular region is made.18 
The latest major battle in this continuing series of legal con-
frontations over lease sales, Conservation Law Foundation of 
New England, Inc. v. Andrus/' involves the sale of drilling rights 
for tracts111 lying within Georges Bank, an area off the Massachu-
setts coast which is one of the most productive fishing grounds in 
the world as well as an unusual and fragile ecological habitat.16 In 
an attempt to prevent the lease sale, the plaintiffs, the Conserva-
tion Law Foundation of New England, Inc. (CLF)17 and the Com-
.. See text at notes 35-38, infra. Oil and gas leases are sold by the Interior Secretary to 
the highest qualified bidder. A lease entitles the lessee to explore, develop, and produce 
the oil and gas contained within the lease area. The lease is valid for an initial period of 
five to ten years and is extended for as long as the lease area continues to produce oil and 
gas in paying quantities. Outer Continental Shelf Land Act § 8, 43 V.S.C.A. § 1337 (West 
Supp. 1979) . 
.. The case involves companion suits tried jointly at all stages of the proceedings. The 
case name varies among the decisions because different courts have docketed them in dif-
ferent orders. The Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. is commonly 
known in the region as CLF. Throughout the article the case will be referred to as CLF v. 
Andrus. The history of the case is somewhat complex: Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. 
Rep. Cas. 1138 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 1978) (preliminary injunction granted), stay pending 
appeal denied, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1147 (1st Cir. Jan. 30, 1978), injunction dissolved, 594 
F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979), preliminary injunction denied, 481 F. Supp. 685 (D. Mass. Nov. 
5, 1979), preliminary injunction pending appeal denied sub nom. CLF v. Andrus, 617 
F.2d 296 (1st Cir. Nov. 6, 1979), aff'd, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1229 (1st 
Cir. Dec. 17, 1979), modified, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 
1980). 
After the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied plaintiffs' motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction pending appeal on November 6, 1979, Supreme Court Justice William 
Brennan, acting as Circuit Justice, stayed the court's decision later that day. Boston 
Globe, Nov. 7, 1979, at I, col. 1. On November 9, the Supreme Court vacated the stay. 
Massachusetts v. Andrus, 100 S.Ct. 417 (1979). After the court of appeals upheld the dis-
trict court's decision on December 17, 1979, Justice Brennan declined to stay the decision. 
Boston Globe, Dec. 19, 1979, at I, col. 5. 
1. Each area designated for a lease sale is divided into tracts of approximately nine 
square miles each. FES, supra note 6, at I, n.2. Bids to acquire leases conveying drilling 
rights are submitted for individual tracts. 43 V.S.C.A. § 1337(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979). 
,. See Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 6, 1979, at 13, col. 1. 
17 The Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. (CLF) is a regional non-
profit public-interest environmental law organization, providing a wide range of legal ser-
vices to private citizens, governmental agencies, environmental organizations, and mem-
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monwealth of Massachusetts,18 argued that the responsible fed-
eral agencies had failed to meet both their procedural and 
substantive obligations under several federal statutes, including 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,19 the Endangered Species 
Act,20 and the National Environmental Policy Act/lit After exten-
sive administrative maneuvering and several court decisions, the 
defendants-the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Com-
merce, and the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration, joined by several companies in the oil 
and gas industry22 -finally prevailed and the Secretary of Inte-
rior held the lease sale.23 
While the Georges Bank controversy remains open, with fur-
ther litigation possible, the litigation to date, involving requ~sts 
for preliminary injunctive relief, raises doubts concerning the ef-
fectiveness of federal environmental law in providing for the con-
sideration of environmental values during the development of 
Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas resources. This article will 
explore some of the issues involved in the case, focusing especially 
on the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act 
for the preparation of an environmental impact statement for the 
bers of the legal community. CLF concentrates on issues of primarily regional importance 
in the areas of land use, water resources, marine resources and energy. 
18 Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti filed a separate suit on behalf of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts. Both suits have been tried jointly at all stages of the proceed-
ings. The State of Maine later joined the case as an intervenor-plaintiff. State of Maine's 
Motion to Intervene as Plaintiff, allowed Oct. 10, 1979. 
,. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1356, 1801-1866 (West 1964 & Supp. 1979). I. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (amended 1979). The 1979 amend-
ments were enacted after the latest decision in the case. See text and notes at notes 406-
09, infra. 
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976) . 
•• The original defendants were Cecil Andrus, Secretary of the U.S. Department of the 
Interior, and Juanita Kreps, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Richard 
Frank, Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
(a branch of Commerce) was later added as a co-defendant, since NOAA exercises Com-
merce's authority to manage the marine sanctuary program, under which Georges Bank 
was nominated for designation as a sanctuary. See text at notes 91-95, infra. Juanita 
Kreps has since resigned from her position and has been succeeded by Philip Klutznick. 
The following groups have entered the case as intervenor-defendants: Atlantic Richfield 
Co., Chevron USA, Inc., Cities Service Co., Continental Oil Co., Exxon Corp., Gulf Oil 
Corp., Mobil Oil Corp., Murphy Oil Corp., Shell Oil Co., Transco Companies, Inc., and ten 
oil drilling service companies. Atlantic Richfield, et al. 's Motion to Intervene as Defen-
dants Pursuant to Rules 24(a) and 24(b), allowed Jan. 25, 1978. The State of Rhode Island 
has also intervened as a defendant. State of Rhode Island's Motion to Intervene as Defen-
dant, allowed Oct. 10, 1979 . 
•• Boston Globe, Dec. 19, 1979, at I, col. 5. 
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lease sale, the limits of the protection provided by the ~ndan­
gered Species Act, and the extent of the Interior Secretaryr~ duty 
to protect the Georges Bank fisheries while promoting oil and gas 
exploration, as well as the difficulties in seeking a preliminary in-
junction when challenging offshore drilling activities. Because the 
legal issues rest on a complicated historical and factual founda-
tion, the background of the case will first be examined. 
II. THE SETTING OF CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION OF NEW 
ENGLAND, INC. V. ANDRUS 
A. Lease Sales Conducted Under the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act 
Originally, lease salesu were held and subsequent drilling oc-
curred primarily in the Gulf of Mexico and in limited areas off 
the coast of California.211 In 1974, however, President Nixon di-
rected the Secretary of the Interior (the Secretary) to accelerate 
the leasing program in order to reduce the country's dependence 
on foreign oiP' In response, the Secretary scheduled lease sales in 
several previously undeveloped, or "frontier," areas such as the 
Gulf of Alaska, the Baltimore Canyon off the New Jersey coast, 
and Georges Banklll7 -areas where no exploration had previously 
been conducted and where, consequently, potential reserves are 
largely unproven but considered promising because of the pres-
ence of certain geological formations normally associated with the 
existence of extensive petroleum deposits.1S 
The Secretary's authority to conduct lease sales arises under 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act29 (the OCSLA), enacted in 
1953.30 Section 8 of the OCSLA permits the Secretary to lease 
tracts on the Outer Continental Shelf31 (OCS) that he has desig-
•• See note 13, supra . 
•• H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 [hereinafter cited as 1978 H.R. REP.], 
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1450, 1472 [hereinafter cited as 1978 
CONGo & AD. NEWS] . 
•• 10 WEEKLY COMPo OF PRES. Doc. 72, 83-84 (Jan. 28, 1974) . 
.. See 1978 H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 65,77, 1978 CONGo & AD. NEWS at 1472, 1484 . 
• a Boston Globe, Dec. 16, 1979, at 29, col. 2 . 
•• 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976) (amended 1978). 
8. Pub. L. No. 83-212,67 Stat. 462 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976) (amended 
1978». 
81 The OCSLA defines the term "outer Continental Shelf' to mean "all submerged 
lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters as defined 
in section 1301 of this title, and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United 
1979] GEORGES BANK 207 
nated for oil exploration.311 The statute originally contained de-
tailed provisions for the regulation of oes drilling activity'3 but 
expressed little concern for the environmental effects of such ac-
tivity until amended in 1978.34 
Legal challenges have been mounted against several individual 
lease sales as well as against the leasing program itself. In most 
cases, the plaintiffs have alleged that the Department of the Inte-
rior failed to satisfy the environmental impact statement (EIS) 
requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).16 
In one case, a citizens' group unsuccessfully challenged the ade-
quacy of the programmatic EIS issued for the decision to acceler-
ate the oes leasing program.38 Other cases have unsuccessfully 
challenged the EISs prepared for individual lease sales.37 Plain-
tiffs have had mixed success using other statutes to challenge 
lease sales in the last few years.38 
States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control." 43 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) (West Supp. 
1979). See note 10, supra. 
a. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337 (West Supp. 1979). 
aa See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1337 (1976). 
.. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 
629 (amending 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976». 
a. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). 
a. California ex rei. Younger v. Morton, 404 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1975). A program-
matic EIS is prepared when a long-range project will be divided into segments. The 
programmatic EIS is prepared at the beginning of the project to consider the total envi-
ronmental impact of the project. Shorter term EISs will then be prepared for each seg-
ment of the project, focusing on the environmental impacts of that particular segment. See 
W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 785-86 (1977). For example, the Department of the 
Interior prepared a programmatic EIS for the entire accelerated leasing program, and has 
subsequently prepared an EIS for each lease sale conducted under the leasing program. 
See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(b) (1979) . 
.. In Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the court found the EIS prepared 
for Lease Sale No. 39 in the Gulf of Alaska inadequate for its failure to consider alterna-
tive methods of conducting the lease sale, but refused to invalidate the lease sale because 
alternatives could still be analyzed and implemented before serious harm would occur. [d. 
at 485-86. In County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977), 
the court of appeals permitted Lease Sale No. 40 in the Baltimore Canyon to proceed after 
the district court had twice blocked the sale for the failure of the EIS to consider ade-
quately the use of pipelines as an alternative to tankers in transporting oil to shore . 
.. In North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 1979), the dis-
trict court initially refused to enjoin Lease Sale No. 49 in the Beaufort Sea even though 
the plaintiffs had shown that the lease sale would likely jeopardize the endangered bow-
head whale (Balaena mysticetus) and thereby violate the Endangered Species Act. Ulti-
mately, however, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and issued a 
permanent injunction against further activity until an adequate biological opinion had 
been issued. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 363-64 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 
1980), clarified, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1001 (D.D.C. Feb. I, 1980). The 
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B. Lease Sale No. 42 
Georges Bank is a shallow area on the OCS lying between fifty 
and two hundred miles offshore from Cape Cod at the conver-
gence of two major ocean currents, the Labrador Current and the 
Gulf Stream.88 These currents create a circular water flow or gyre 
over the Bank, which combines with ·constant turbulence to create 
an "upwelling" of nutrients that supports one of the most varied 
and productive fishing areas in the world. "0 Stocks of several spe-
cies of fishes, however, are stressed from overfishing,41 and many 
endangered species are found on Georges Bank, including six spe-
cies of whales"· and three species of turtles. "8 In addition, the geo-
logical characteristics of Georges Bank suggest that the area is a 
likely source of oil and gas, although the potential reserves are 
estimated to be comparatively small."" 
While offshore oil and gas exploration poses an obvious threat 
to the marine environment,411 the proposed exploration of Georges 
Bank is especially hazardous because of the threat posed by oil 
outcome was different in CLF v. Andrus, where Interior Secretary Cecil Andrus finally 
conducted Lease Sale No. 42 for Georges Bank on December 18, 1979, after a delay of 
almost two years due to legal challenges based on alleged violations of the Endangered 
Species Act, the OCSLA, and NEPA. See note 14, supra. 
a. Office of Coastal Zone Management, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, Georges Bank Marine Sanctuary Issue Paper at 11 (July 27, 1979) [hereinafter cited 
as Sanctuary Issue Paper], reprinted in FSES, supra note 6, at 491, 502 . 
•• [d . 
.. [d. at 39, FSES at 530. 
•• FES, supra note 6, at 389 . 
• a [d. at 397 . 
•• The most recent estimate of recoverable resources is 123 million barrels of oil and 
0.87 trillion cubic feet of gas. FSES, supra note 6, at 4. The oil estimate is equivalent to a 
six- to eight-day supply for the United States at current consumption rates, and the gas 
estimate is equal to approximately a two-week supply. Boston Globe, Dec. 19, 1979, at 1, 
col. 5 . 
•• In the litigation spawned by the Campeche blowout, the U.S. Department of Justice 
has filed suit against SEDCO, Inc., the owner of the drilling rig used at Campeche and an 
intervenor-defendant in CLF v. Andrus. In its complaint the Justice Department has char-
acterized offshore exploration operations as "ultrahazardous." Claim of the United States 
at 4, In the Matter of the Complaint of SEDCO, Inc., as Owner of the Mobile Drilling Unit 
SEDCO 135, Its Engines, Tackle, Apparel, Etc.,· in a Cause of Exoneration From or Limi-
tation of Liability, No. H-79-1880 (S.D. Tex. filed Oct. 23, 1979). At least one of the attOr-
neys representing the Justice Department in the SEDCO litigation was active in the de-
fense of the federal defendants in CLF v. Andrus. 
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drilling activities to the existing fishing industry.46 A major oil 
spill could destroy a generation of fish eggs or larvae for several 
species of fishes,47 and as a result not only destroy the short-term 
commercial value of those species but also significantly impair the 
future spawning potential of those species for ten to twenty 
years.48 Even the Department of the Interior predicts that at least 
one major oil spill is likely to occur during the development phase 
of activities, and another to occur during the transportation of 
oil. 49 Yet the strong winds and high waves resulting from the fre-
quently severe weather conditions in this area have been esti-
mated to make oil spill cleanup efforts impossible at least 50 per-
cent of the time.lio Thus the capabilities of the spill containment 
equipment on which the Interior Department relies in its assump-
tion that adequate safety precautions are available iiI may not be 
sufficient to prevent significant damage. Compounding the possi-
ble harm, the rotary current that prevails over the Bank for much 
of the year could keep a spill, or the chronic seepage that occurs 
during normal offshore operations, enclosed on the Bank, thus 
polluting the area for years. Ii! In addition, although the Georges 
Bank area has been studied extensively, scientists still possess 
only a rudimentary understanding of the complex ecological in-
teractions occurring there, and many questions concerning the 
potential long-term impact of oil pollution on the area remain 
unanswered.1iS 
Despite the environmental drawbacks of oil exploration on 
Georges Bank, in 1976 the Department of the Interior designated 
206 tracts in the area for potential sale of exploration rights. Ii. A 
long sequence of administrative actions and judicial decisions fol-
•• In 1978, Georges Bank yielded a catch worth approximately $168 million, about half 
of which was caught by U.S. fishermen. Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 6, 1979, at 12, col. 
1. The total economic impact of the catch is estimated at $712 million, obtained by using a 
multiplication factor of 4.24. See FES, supra note 6, at 871. 
47 Sanctuary Issue Paper, supra note 39, at 39, FSES at 530 . 
•• Id . 
•• FES, supra note 6, at 6; Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 876 (1st Cir. 1979) . 
•• Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 6, 1979, at 13, col. 1. See also FSES, supra note 6, at 
278-80. "Oil spill containment on the open sea then is severely limited. Any improvements 
in the near future will only be refinements of already existing techniques; some, as men-
tioned above, are already approaching their upper limits of effectiveness." Id. at 279 . 
• , See FSES, supra note 6, at 278-80; Boston Globe, Dec. 6, 1979, at 23, col. 5 . 
•• Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 6, 1979, at 13, col. 1. 
•• See Sanctuary Issue Paper, supra note 39, at 38, FSES at 529 . 
•• Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 874 (1st Cir. 1979). 
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lowed, bringing the case to its present form. The sequence is sig-
nificant because it shows the determination of Interior Secretary 
Cecil Andrus to conduct the lease sale expeditiously, the efforts of 
the plaintiffs to ensure adequate protection for the environment 
and the fishing industry, and the tradeoffs made by different fed-
eral agencies in order to overcome the judicially imposed obsta-
cles to the lease sale. 
After designating tracts for potential sale, the Department of 
the Interior published a draft environmental impact statement 
(EIS)1I11 for the sale in order to comply with the requirements of 
the National Environmental Policy Act,1I8 (NEPA). The draft EIS 
received critical comments from several parties, including the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, and the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts.1I7 After public hearings, Interior issued a final EIS in 
August, 1977.118 Secretary Andrus then published a notice of salelle 
announcing his decision to conduct the lease sale on January 31, 
1978. At the same time, though, he took several steps to provide 
greater environmental safeguards for offshore exploration. These 
steps included the promulgation of regulations requiring the 
preparation of a development-phase EIS80 and providing for the 
suspension of exploratory operations upon discovery of unfore-
seen environmental risks,81 as well as the addition of stipulations 
to the leases requiring additional protective measures.81 Doubting 
the capacity of the Secretary's safeguards to provide adequate en-
vironmental protection for Georges Bank, both the Conservation 
Law Foundation (CLF) and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
filed suit in the Federal District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts to enjoin the lease sale,8a thus initiating the first of what 
may be viewed as two rounds of litigation. 
In seeking the Round One injunction, the plaintiffs raised sev-
eral claims regarding the obligations of the Secretary of the Inte-
•• Id . 
•• 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976) . 
.. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 874-75 (1st Cir. 1979) . 
•• Id. at 875 . 
•• 42 Fed. Reg. 65,285 (1977) . 
•• 30 C.F.R. § 250.34-3(b) (1979). 
81 Id. § 250.12(c)(I) . 
•• Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 879 (1st cir. 1979). Stipulations are regula-
tions imposed upon a specific lease by incorporation into that lease . 
•• Id. at 880. 
212 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 8:201 
rior under NEP A and his duty to protect the fisheries within his 
jurisdiction. The plaintiffs argued that, although the primary pur-
pose of the OCSLA is to authorize the exploration and develop-
ment of the mineral resources of the OCS, nevertheless the Secre-
tary of the Interior has a duty under the statute to protect the 
Georges Bank fisheries because of a provision in the statute" au-
thorizing the promulgation of rules and regulations necessary to 
conserve the natural resources of the OCS.811 In addition, the 
plaintiffs contended that other statutes and the common law pub-
lic trust doctrine indirectly reinforce that duty." The plaintiffs 
alleged that Secretary Andrus had breached his duty by failing to 
provide adequate safeguards for the Georges Bank environment, 
such as liability funds and tanker standards,87 by refusing to de-
lay the lease sale pending congressional action on proposed 
amendments to the OCSLA that would add significant safe-
guards,88 and by conducting the lease sale so as to preclude the 
possibility of designating Georges Bank a marine sanctuary under 
the Marine Sanctuaries Act.88 In addition, the plaintiffs argued 
that the EIS prepared for the lease sale was inadequate, therefore 
putting the Interior Department in violation of NEP A, because it 
failed to analyze the costs and benefits of delaying the sale until 
Congress had acted on the proposed OCSLA amendments,70 the 
impact of the sale on the consideration of Georges Bank for desig-
•• OCSLA § 5(a)(l) reads in part: "[t)he Secretary may at any time prescribe and 
amend such rules and regulations as he determines to be necessary and proper in order to 
provide for the prevention of waste and conservation of the natural resources of the outer 
Continental Shelf .... " 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(l) (1976) . 
•• Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellees Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. at 9-11, 
Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Mass. Brief I) . 
.. 1d. at 11-22; Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellees [CLF et al.) at 16-18, Massachusetts v. 
Andrus, 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as CLF Brief I). See text at notes 
454-76, infra. 
87 Mass. Brief I, supra note 65, at 27-28. An oil spill liability fund would provide com-
pensation for environmental damage and economic losses caused by oil spills from OCS 
drilling activities. FES, supra note 6, at 1321-22. Tanker standards could be established to 
regulate the operations of tankers used to transport oil to shore. 1d. at 1252 . 
.. CLF Brief I, supra note 66, at 19 . 
•• 1d. at 35. The Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434 (1976), as part of the 
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976), autho-
rizes the Secretary of Commerce to designate as a marine sanctuary any area of the OCS, 
coastal waters, or the Great Lakes if necessary to preserve or restore the area for conserva· 
tion, recreational, ecological, or esthetic values. 1d. § 1432(a). See 44 Fed. Reg. 44,831 
(1979) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 922). 
70 Mass. Brief I, supra note 65, at 37, 41. 
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nation as a marine sanctuary,71 and the possible effects of an oil 
spill on Cape Cod and Martha's Vineyard,71 and because the EIS 
failed to respond to the criticisms of certain parties.78 The plain-
tiffs alleged that as a result of these defects in the EIS the Secre-
tary's decision to proceed with the sale was arbitrary and capri-
cious,74 and that they would suffer irreparable harm because the 
sale of the leases would vest property rights in the lessees that 
could frustrate subsequent attempts to implement additional 
safeguards.76 
On January 28, 1978, District Judge W. Arthur Garrity granted 
a preliminary injunction,76 based on his findings that the EIS was 
inadequate and that holding the lease sale would violate the Sec-
retary's duty to protect the fisheries. 77 The Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit heard arguments on appeal.7' Before the court of 
appeals had announced its decision, however, Congress enacted 
amendments79 to the OCSLA providing for increased environ-
mental protection. The amendments' provisions included require-
ments for the establishment of an oil spill liability fund'o and a 
fishermen's gear compensation fund,'1 requirements for the use of 
best available and safest technology'll and for compensation to 
lessees whose leases are revoked because of a threat of environ-
mental harm,'3 and authorization for cancellation of leases where 
severe and long-lasting environmental harm is likely." The court 
of appeals then dissolved the injunction," reasoning that with the 
passage of the OCSLA Amendments the most important issues 
raised by the district court had been mooted" and that, with the 
lease sale no longer pending, the threat of imminent harm on 
71 [d. at 34. 
7. [d. at 38. 
7. [d. at 39-40. 
74 [d. at 42-46; CLF Brief I, supra note 66, at 24-27. 
7. Mass. Brief I, supra note 65, at 52-53; CLF Brief I, supra note 66, at 33-34. 7. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1138 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 1978). 
77 [d. at 1139. 
7. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 881 (1st Cir. 1979). 
7. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 
Stat. 629 (amending 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976» . 
• 0 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1811-1824 (West Supp. 1979) . 
• , [d. §§ 1841-1847 . 
• 2 [d. § 1347(b) . 
• a [d. § 1334(a)(2)(C) . 
• 4 [d. § 1334(a)(2)(A) . 
•• Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 887 (1st Cir. 1979) . 
•• [d. at 882-83. 
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which the injunction had been premised no longer existed.·" 
Therefore the remaining issues could be considered without the 
necessity of continuing the injunction." 
The decision of the court of appeals dissolving the injunction 
brought Round One of the litigation to a close and at the same 
time set the stage for Round Two, since the court's decision to lift 
the injunction meant that the process of rescheduling the lease 
sale could begin. In response to the court of appeals' suggestion in 
Round One that a sanctuary analysis would be worthwhile,·s Sec-
retary Andrus published a draft supplemental EIS to consider the 
sanctuary alternative for Georges Bank." In the meantime, after 
CLF filed with NOAA a proposal to designate Georges Bank a 
marine sanctuary,81 NOAA published an issue paper on the nomi-
nation,81 declared Georges Bank to be an Active Candidate for 
designationS' and held public hearings on the proposal." Unex-
pectedly, however, NOAA announced that it had decided to drop 
the sanctuary nomination for Georges Bank as part of an agree-
ment that it had reached with Interior. 911 In exchange, Interior 
would provide additional safeguards for Georges Bank, including 
the deletion of environmentally sensitive tracts from the lease 
sale and the establishment of a Biological Task Force to monitor 
OCS activities and make recommendations to the Secretary." 
Shortly thereafter, having published a final supplemental EIS,s" 
I' Id. at 887. 
·"Id. 
I. See id. at 885. 
10 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DRAFT SUPPLEMENT TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, PROPOSED 1979 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS 
LEASE SALE OFFSHORE THE NORTH ATLANTIC STATES OCS SALE No. 42 (1979). 
11 CLF, Nomination of the Area Known as the Georges Bank as a Marine Sanctuary 
Pursuant to Title III of the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 
(May 10, 1979) . 
• 1 Sanctuary Issue Paper, supra note 39 . 
•• 44 Fed. Reg. 47,132 (1979). The proceBS of designating a marine sanctuary involves 
several steps. First an area must be recommended for designation. If the area meets cer-
tain criteria, it may be placed on a List of Recommended Areas. Additional factors will 
then be considered in determining whether to select the area as an Active Candidate. For 
active candidates a public workshop is held, after which an EIS may be prepared and the 
area then designated a sanctuary, subject to the approval of the President. See 44 Fed. 
Reg. 44,831, 44,837-39 (1979) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. §§ 922.20-922.26) . 
.. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 481 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D. Mass. Nov. 5, 1979). 
•• Boston Globe, Sep. 22, 1979, at 15, col. 5. 
OIId . 
.. FSES, supra note 6. 
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Interior scheduled the lease sale for November 6, 1979.88 
The plaintiffs immediately returned to federal district court 
seeking another preliminary injunction," thus initiating Round 
Two of the litigation. The plaintiffs modified their arguments 
from Round One, claiming that the additional safeguards pro-
vided by the OCSLA Amendments confirmed their suggestion 
that Secretary Andrus had a duty under the statute to protect the 
fisheries,loo but that while the amendments provided safeguards, 
they were not self-enforcing-that is, they did not become effec-
tive until implemented by promulgation of the necessary regula-
tions.10l The plaintiffs argued that by failing to promulgate all of 
the implementing regulations Secretary Andrus had violated his 
duty to protect the fisheries. lOll In addition, they claimed that the 
Secretary's failure to insure that the lease sale would not jeopard-
ize the endangered right and humpback whales on Georges Bank 
violated the Endangered Species Act,108 and that the supplemen-
tal EIS's failure to consider the significance for Georges Bank of 
the Campeche blowout, to evaluate the sanctuary alternative ade-
quately/o. and to respond to critical comments from other parties 
made the EIS inadequate under the requirements of NEPA.lo, 
On November 5, 1979, with District Judge John McNaught pre-
siding, the district court denied the request for an injunction,l" 
reasoning that, even assuming that the lease sale would cause ir-
reparable harm to the plaintiffs, it was unlikely that the plaintiffs 
would prevail on the merits. l07 On November 6, 1979, the court 
of appeals refused to issue a preliminary injunction pending ap-
peal of the district court's decision,l08 but allowed time for the 
II 44 Fed. Reg. 57,512 (1979) . 
.. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 481 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D. Mass. Nov. 5, 1979). 
I •• Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' CLF, et al., Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion at 65-66, Massachusetts v. Andrus, 481 F. Supp. 685 (D. Mass. Nov. 5, 1979) [herein-
after cited as CLF Memo I]. 
,., See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants CLF et al. at 47-51, CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. 
(Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049 (1st Cir. Dec. 17,1979) [hereinafter cited as CLF Brief II]. 
,.1 Id. at 48. 
'.3 CLF Memo I, supra note 100, at 55-63. 
,.< Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Commonwealth of Massachusetts at 26, CLF v. Andrus, 
14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1979) [hereinafter cited as 
Mass. Brief II]. 
'.1 CLF Brief II, supra note 101, at 21-35. 
106 Massachusetts v. Andrus, 481 F. Supp. 685, 692 (D. Mass. Nov. 5, 1979). I., Id. 
'.8 CLF v. Andrus, 617 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. Nov. 6, 1979). 
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plaintiffs to appeal to the Supreme Court. lOS Acting as Circuit 
Justice, Justice Brennan granted a temporary stay that same 
day. no On N~vember 9, 1979, the Supreme Court denied plain-
tiffs' petition for certiorari and vacated Justice Brennan's or-
der,111 but since the scheduled day of the lease sale had passed, 
the lease sale had to be rescheduled with thirty days notice.11I 
Interior rescheduled the lease sale for December 18, 1979U8 and 
on December 17, 1979 the court of appeals, after hearing an expe-
dited appeal of the district court's decision, upheld the district 
court's denial of an injunction,11' reasoning that the plaintiffs had 
not shown either irreparable harmu, or a likelihood of success on 
the merits, U8 but declaring that the plaintiffs were still free to 
argue, at a later trial on the merits of their allegations, that the 
Secretary had violated his duty to protect the fisheries.ll7 Acting 
again as Circuit Justice, Justice Brennan refused to stay the deci-
sion of the court of appeals,U8 bringing Round Two of the litiga-
tion to an end, and the lease sale was finally held on December 18 
in Providence, Rhode Island, with oil and gas companies bidding 
a total of $827 million for seventy-three tracts. us On January 4, 
1980 Interior announced its acceptance of bids on sixty-three 
tracts, rejecting bids on ten others because the bids were too 
low.llIO 
Because Rounds One and Two of the litigation were concerned 
only with motions for preliminary injunctions, the plaintiffs have 
1 .. Boston Globe, Nov. 7, 1979, at 1, col. 1. 
110 [d. 
111 Massachusetts v. Andrus, 100 S.Ct. 417 (1979). 
111 See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337 (l) (West Supp. 1979). 
111 44 Fed. Reg. 66,150 (1979). 
, 
114 CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REp. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979). 
111 [d. at 1054. 
118 [d. at 1055. 
117 CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1055 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979). Appellate review of a trial court decision on a motion for a preliminary injunction is 
limited· in scope, and is normally not a final decision on the validity of the arguments put 
forth by the parties. See text at notes 564-67, infra. 
118 Boston Globe, Dec. 19, 1979, at 1, col. 5. 
118 [d. Of the 206 tracts originally designated for sale, ll6 tracts were finally offered for 
sale. The remaining 90 tracts were deleted prior to the sale-55 because of a boundary 
dispute with Canada, and 35 because of potential threats to the environment or to fishing 
activities. See FSES, supra note 6, at 17-19; Boston Globe; Sep. 22, 1979, at 15, col. 5. 
110 See Boston Globe, Jan. 6, 1980, at 34, col. 1. Interior has also begun the process of 
scheduling another lease sale in the Georges Bank area, to be held in 1982. [d. 
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not had an opportunity to obtain a definitive ruling on the merits 
of many of their claims, and therefore questions remain as to how 
much weight the rulings of the court of appeals in those rounds 
will ultimately carry. Nevertheless, the court of appeals has 
stated that its decision in Round Two on at least two issues is 
conclusive.121 In addition, the court of appeals' refusal to overturn 
the district court suggests that the plaintiffs will have difficulty 
convincing a court that the Secretary has violated NEPA, the En-
dangered Species Act, and his duty under the OCSLA to protect 
the fisheries. Consequently, the decision of the court of appeals in 
Round Two raises questions about the usefulness of the statutes 
involved in the case as grounds for environmental challenges, and 
about the difficulties in seeking preliminary injunctive relief 
under those statutes. Each of these issues will be examined in 
turn. 
III. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND THE 
GEORGES BANK ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS 
NEP A establishes certain requirements for federal agencies 
planning to undertake major activities that will affect the envi-
ronment.122 The primary requirement is the preparation of an en-
vironmental impact statement (EIS). The plaintiffs in Conserva-
tion Law Foundation of New England, Inc. v. Andrus raised 
NEPA questions in both rounds of the Georges Bank litigation, 
challenging the adequacy of both the EIS and the supplemental 
EIS prepared by the Department of the Interior for the Georges 
Bank lease sale. Although the NEP A analysis performed by the 
court of appeals in Round One is consistent with the established 
standards of judicial review under NEP A, the court's decision in 
Round Two raises questions about the court's adherence to its 
previously articulated standards and· to NEP A's purposes . 
... The court held on the merits that the lease sale would not constitute an irretrievable 
commitment of resources in violation of section 7(d) of the Endangered Species Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 1536(d) (Supp. II 1978) (amended 1979), and that Secretary Andrus was not re-
quired to promulgate, prior to conducting the lease sale, regulations defining the best 
available and safest technology to be used on OCS oil and gas operations. CLF v. Andrus, 
14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1055 n.7 (1st Cir: Dec. 17, 1979) . 
••• See generally Deutsch, The National Environmental Policy Act's First Five Years, 
4 ENV. AFr. 3 (1975). 
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A. NEPA Requirements for the Preparation of an EIS 
In passing NEP A, Congress established a national goal of pro-
tecting and restoring the quality of the environment,11l8 and re-
quired federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of 
their actions.11l4 In order to insure that federal agencies adhere to 
this policy, NEP A imposes several procedural obligations on the 
agencies. Section 102(2)(C) requires that federal agencies prepare 
an EIS for every recommendation or report on proposals for ma-
jor federal actions that will significantly affect the human envi-
ronment.llla The EIS must discuss the environmental impactill• 
and any unavoidable adverse environmental effects 11., of the pro-
posed action, alternativeslll8 to the proposed action, and any irre-
versible and irretrievable commitments of resources1ll8 involved in 
the action. In addition, section 102(2)(E) requires agencies to 
study and develop alternatives to any proposed action that in-
volves "unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of availa-
ble resources. "180 
These NEPA requirements, and particularly the requirements 
of section 102(2)(C), have been the subject of much litigation dur-
ing the last decade and consequently have been well defined. In 
Silva v. Lynn,18l in which the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit invalidated the EIS prepared for the construction of a feder-
ally funded housing project because it lacked a sufficient discus-
sion of alternatives and a reasoned basis for the choices made by 
the federal agency, the court set forth three purposes served by 
the requirement for the preparation of an EIS.1811 First, because 
the EIS requires the agency to explicate fully its course of in-
quiry, analysis, and reasoning, the EIS permits the court to deter-
mine whether the agency has made a good faith effort to consider 
environmental values.U8 Second, the requirements for an EIS 
serve as an environmental full disclosure law by providing infor-
"8 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976) . 
.. 4 Id. § 4332 . 
... Id. § 4332(2)(C) . 
.. 8 Id. § 4332(2)(C)(i). 
II' Id. § 4332(2)(C)(ii) . 
.. 8 Id. § 4332(2)(C)(iii). 
II. Id. § 4332(2)(C)(v). 
la. Id. § 4332(2)(E). 
181 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973). 
la. Id. at 1284. 
lIa Id. 
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mation to the public.13' Third, the requirements help to insure 
the integrity of the decision-making process by precluding stub-
born problems from "being swept under the rug."136 In order to 
fulfill these purposes, the agency must take a "hard look" at the 
environmental consequences of its proposed action,188 consider all 
reasonable alternatives,187 and generate enough information to 
permit the agency to make a reasoned decision.1s8 
Subsequent to NEP A's enactment, it was quickly established in 
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Com-
mission1s9 that the statute requires a strict standard of compli-
ance.1'0 In that case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia held that the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC's) 
procedural rules restricting consideration of environmental values 
in its review of applications for nuclear reactor construction per-
mits or operating licenses violated the requirements of NEPA.1fl 
The court reasoned that NEP A established environmental protec-
tion as an integral part of the AEC's responsibilities, and that the 
statute placed the primary burden for considering environmental 
factors on the agency, so that the AEC could not use its procedu-
ral rules to escape its obligation to consider the environmental 
impacts of its actions. I'll Furthermore, the court interpreted the 
statutory requirement of compliance with NEPA "to the fullest 
extent possible"l's as setting a high standard for agencies, under 
which the AEC could not cite administrative difficulty or eco-
nomic cost as grounds for excusing its non-compliance. 1" Rather, 
the agency must weigh the relevant environmental factors at 
every important stage in the decision-making process.146 
Section 102(2)(C)(iii) requires that an EIS include a discussion 
of alternatives to the proposed federal action.146 In NRDC v. Mor-
13' [d. at 1285. 
13. [d. 
136 NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
137 [d. at 834. 
13' [d. at 836. 
139 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
". [d. at 1112. 
,., [d. at 1117-19. 
, •• [d. at 1119. 
H. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976), 
'" Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
'" Id. at 1118. 
H. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (1976). 
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ton,147 in which the EIS for a proposed OCS lease sale off the 
Louisiana coast was challenged for its failure to consider alterna-
tives to the sale, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia found the EIS inadequate for failing to give detailed consider-
ation to reasonable alternatives. as The court indicated that 
reasonable alternatives would include the elimination of oil im-
port quotas, increased onshore drilling, additional nuclear energy 
development, and changes in natural gas pricing policies. l48 The 
court stressed that the alternatives required for discussion are not 
limited to those within the power of the agency to adopt,IIIO and 
could even include alternatives that require legislative implemen-
tation.1II1 The requirement to consider reasonable alternatives, 
however, does not require "crystal ball" inquiry,11I2 and therefore 
does not apply to alternatives whose effects cannot be readily as-
certained, or to alternatives that are only remote possibilities. 1118 
Consequently a detailed discussion was not required for such re-
mote alternatives as the development of oil shale and coal lique-
faction or gasification. III. Nevertheless, the EIS must consider in 
detail the effects of all reasonable alternatives; I 1111 since the consid-
eration of alternatives is the "linchpin of the entire impact 
statement. "1116 
In spite of the strong language in early interpretations of 
NEP A, however, judicial evaluation of the EIS requirement has 
since been tempered by a "rule of reason."11I7 NEPA does not re-
quire perfection in the preparation of an EIS;IIIS the statement 
need only be sufficient to insure a fully informed and well-consid-
ered decision, and therefore need not be exhaustive. lilt For exam-
ple, in Sierra Club v. Morton160 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
147 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
14. [d. at 833-38 . 
••• [d. at 834, 837. 
11. [d. at 834 . 
••• [d. at 837. 
11. [d. 
11' [d. at 837-38 . 
... [d. at 837 . 
••• [d. at 834. 
11. Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697-98 (2d Cir. 
1972) . 
... NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
11. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 820 (5th Cir. 1975). 
11. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) . 
••• 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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Circuit upheld the adequacy of an EIS prepared for a lease sale in 
the eastern Gulf of Mexico, reasoning that although the EIS was 
inadequate in some specific areas, the significant environmental 
effects of the lease sale had been recognized, affording the deci-
sionmaker an opportunity to consider them properly. 111 Further-
more, according to the court, post-EIS developments that might 
have altered the EIS analysis of oil spill cleanup procedures could 
not retroactively affect the sufficiency of the analysis.18S In addi-
tion, alternatives that would result in similar or greater environ-
mental harm did not require discussionlla and, where the stages 
of a project are easily divisible, the EIS is not inadequate where 
the agency has deferred its analysis of possible future action to be 
taken at a later stage of the project.114 Thus, under the "rule of 
reason," the reviewing court determines whether the agency has 
considered the environmental consequences of the proposed ac-
tion and has made a reasoned decision based on a careful weigh-
ing of the competing factors. III The plaintiff has the burden of 
proving by a prepond~rance of the evidence that an EIS fails to 
comply with NEPA, III and although the reviewing court must en-
force NEPA requirements rigorously/I? it may not use minor 
lapses in the EIS to overturn the agency's decisionlla and may not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency just because it 
would have made the decision differently!l. Consequently the 
EIS should be upheld as adequate if it is compiled in good faith 
and sets forth sufficient information to enable the agency to make 
a fully informed decision. 170 
'8' Id. at 821. 
'8' Id. at 822. The court did not indicate what these post-EIS developments were, but 
stated that they contradicted as unrealistic the EIS's suggestion that oil spill cleanup op-
erations could begin within twelve hours of a spill at any location in the lease sale area. Id. 
'8, Id. at 825. The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the EIS should have 
discussed the alternative of exploration conducted by the federal government because it 
would present substantially the same environmental hazards. Id. 
, •• Id. at 824. The EIS stated that, if official pipeline corridors for transporting oil to 
shore were established and were viewed as a major federal action requiring an EIS, then 
an EIS could later be prepared for that action. Id. 
, •• NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
'.8 Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 818 (5th Cir. 1975). 
'67 See Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
'8, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); Massa-
chusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 884 (1st Cir. 1979). 
'8. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 555 (1978); Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 829 (5th Cir. 1975). 
'70 County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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In Rounds One and Two of CLF v. Andrus,171 the Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit evaluated the adequacy of the Georges 
Bank EISs i~consistently. In reviewing the original EIS prepared 
by Interior for the Georges Bank lease sale, the court of appeals 
in Round One applied the NEPA requirements in accordance 
with established standards.17I The court's decision in Round Two 
upholding the supplemental EIS's evaluation of the Georges Bank 
sanctuary alternative,t78 however, suggests a departure from its 
prior rigorous approach. In reaching its decision, the court may 
have permitted the form of the statement to substitute for con-
tent and allowed a presumption of regularity to overcome the 
agency's failure to meet its NEP A obligations. 
B. Round One 
In Round One of CLF v. Andrus, the district court found four 
deficiencies in the EIS prepared for the Georges Bank lease sale. 
First, the EIS inadequately analyzed the alternative of delaying 
the lease sale pending congressional action on the proposed OC-
SLA amendments.174 Second, the EIS failed to discuss the alter-
native of designating Georges Bank a marine sanctuary.1711 Third, 
it failed to provide cost estimates for the possible fouling of Cape 
Cod beaches by an oilspill.178 Fourth, the EIS contained an inad-
equate response to the Environmental Protection Agency's criti-
cism of the sufficiency of the EIS's oil spill risk model.177 
The court of appeals, however, citing the "rule of reason" stan-
dard for compliance with NEPA,178 overturned the district court's 
ruling on the latter two points and considered the other points 
from a perspective altered by Congress' passage of the 1978 OC-
SLA amendments178 subsequent to the district court's ruling.180 
The court found Interior's response to EPA criticism of the oil 
171 See text at notes 63-120, supra. 
'71 Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 883-87 (1st Cir. 1979). 
'7. CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049,1052 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979). 
"4 Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1138, 1141 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 1978). 
'7. [d. at 1142 . 
.. 8 [d . 
.. 7 [d. 
'78 Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 884 (1st Cir. 1979). 
'7' Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 
Stat. 629 (amending 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976». 
'80 Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 884-87 (1st Cir. 1979). 
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spill risk model to be sufficient,l8l and the lack of a damage esti-
mate for Cape Cod beaches not a fatal defect.182 The court rea-
soned that, although more extensive consideration of the two is-
sues might have been desirable, there was no showing of 
obviously incorrect results or methodology, and the general analy-
sis was satisfactory.183 The court of appeals' decision on these two 
issues demonstrates that an EIS need not be exhaustive or per-
fect, and that a court should not "fly speck" the EIS.18. Rather, 
the court should look for substantial compliance with NEPA,181 
as it did here, and determine whether the EIS presents sufficient 
information to allow a fully informed decision in light of available 
information.188 
The court of appeals did not examine the adequacy of the EIS 
analysis for the alternative of delaying the lease sale until Con-
gress had acted on the proposed OCSLA amendments, since the 
court considered the question mooted by the amendments' enact-
ment during the pendency of the appeal.187 The district court's 
ruling ordering an analysis of this alternative, however, followed 
the principle established by previous NEP A cases of requiring 
that an EIS consider the costs and benefits of any reasonable al-
ternative, even alternatives beyond the agency's authority to im-
plement or dependent on legislative action.188 In this case, the 
proposed amendments would significantly enhance Interior's abil-
ity to provide the environmental safeguards that Secretary An-
drus had declared to be essential in order to provide adequate 
protection for the fisheries.18e Although the Secretary could not 
be certain whether the pending legislation would actually pass, he 
should easily have been able to evaluate the relatively slight cost 
of a few months delay compared to the admittedly significant 
benefits potentially resulting from passage of the amendments. leo 
181 [d. at 886. 
,., [d. at 884. 
, •• [d. at 884, 886. 
, •• Brooks v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1975). 
, •• See Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 820 (5th Cir. 1975). 
, •• See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 554-55, 558 
(1978); County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375 (2d Cir. 1978). 
,., Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 883-84 (1st Cir. 1979). 
188 NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
, •• See Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1138, 1143 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 
1978). 
, •• See id. at 1145-46. 
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Therefore, according to the district court, NEP A's goal of assur-
ing full consideration of the environmental effects of all reasona-
ble alternatives could only be satisfied by the Secretary's inclu-
sion in the EIS of a cost/benefit analysis for the delay.191 
The court of appeals again followed established NEPA stan-
dards in holding that the EIS should have discussed the alterna-
tive of designating Georges Bank a marine sanctuary/92 qualify-
ing its holding only to the extent that passage of the OCSLA 
amendments might preclude the alternative.193 The court of ap-
peals considered this discussion necessary because the Marine 
Sanctuaries Act194 arguably gives the Secretary of Commerce the 
power to exclude drilling operations or to take other protective 
steps in a sanctuary area,1911 and because the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration, a branch of Commerce, was 
considering Georges Bank for sanctuary status at the time of the 
appea}.196 Consequently, designating the area a marine sanctuary 
would vest in Commerce control over the use of the area. The 
court of appeals noted that the two possible controlling agencies 
would have different interests.197 Under the sanctuary program, 
the controlling agency, Commerce, would consider environmental 
protection its top priority, whereas in the absence of sanctuary 
designation Interior would consider oil and gas development to be 
its chief concern.198 Such a difference in priorities could mean 
that when the controlling agency is faced with a particular threat 
to the environment, its decision on which of the competing inter-
ests should give way could depend on which agency is in con-
tro}.199 Therefore sanctuary designation was a reasonable and sig-
nificant alternative, and the EIS should have considered its costs 
and benefits.20o 
Thus in Round One the court of appeals adhered to the spirit 
of NEP A, overlooking two minor lapses in the EIS but requiring 
••• Id. at 1141. 
••• Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 885 (1st Cir. 1979) . 
••• Id. 
'94 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434 (1976). See note 69, supra . 
. 8. See 44 Fed. Reg. 44,831, 44,839 (1979) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 992.26(b)-(d» . 
... See Reply Memorandum of Plaintiffs CLF et al. at 13, Massachusetts v. Andrus, 481 
F. Supp. 685 (D. Mass. Nov. 5, 1979) [hereinafter cited as CLF Memo II]. 
'87 Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 885 (1st Cir. 1979). 
"·Id. 
'8. Id. 
I •• Id. 
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an evaluation of the sanctuary possibility as a reasonable alterna-
tive to the lease sale. In Round Two, however, the court of ap-
peals applied NEP A less strictly by failing to insist that the sup-
plemental EIS prepared for the lease sale fulfill the three NEP A 
purposes of full explication, full disclosure, and protection of the 
integrity of the decision-making process, purposes firmly en-
dorsed by the court in the earlier case of Silva v. Lynn201 and 
again in Round One of CLF v. Andrus. 202 
C. Round Two 
The plaintiffs raised additional claims of NEPA violations in 
Round Two based essentially on three grounds. First, according 
to the plaintiffs, the evaluation of the sanctuary alternative in the 
supplemental EIS was superficial and unresponsive.208 Second, 
the supplemental EIS failed to consider the possible impact of 
the Campeche blowout on prior estimates of the likelihood of an 
oil spill during the exploratory drilling phase.2M Third, the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) failed to 
prepare an EIS for its decision to halt consideration of the 
Georges Bank sanctuary proposal. 2011 Since the district court was 
not persuaded that the plaintiffs would prevail on the merits of 
their claims, it denied their motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion,2oe a decision that the court of appeals upheld/.I07 The plain-
tiffs' claims, however, have merit. In rejecting those claims, the 
court of appeals has joined the trend toward a softer application 
of the "hard look" doctrine by applying the "rule of reason" limi-
tation very flexibly and showing substantial deference to federal 
agencIes. 
The Supreme Court has recently emphasized that, although 
NEPA establishes some substantive goals for the protection of 
the environment, nevertheless it imposes essentially procedural 
obligations on the federal agencies.208 Under NEPA, the reviewing 
court is not to determine whether the agency's final decision in a 
1.1 482 F.2d 1282, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1973). See text at notes 131-35, supra. 
1.1 Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 883-84 (1st Cir. 1979). 
I.a CLF Brief II, supra note 101, at 33. 
I.' Mass. Brief II, supra note 104, at 26-29. 
I.a I d. at 42-48. 
1.8 Massachusetts v. Andrus, 481 F. Supp. 685, 692 (D. Mass. Nov. 5, 1979). 
1.7 CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1055 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979). 
I •• Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). 
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proposed action was proper,209 but rather whether the agency 
made a rational and well-informed decision. no The Supreme 
Court has stressed that the court's role under NEP A is a limited 
one.211 As a result, lower courts have become understandably 
hesitant to scrutinize closely an agency's efforts to comply with 
NEPA.m 
Reviewing courts, however, should distinguish between the 
breadth of review under NEPA, which is narrow, and the depth 
of inquiry, which should be searching. NEPA establishes certain 
requirements for considering environmental factors in preparing 
an EIS.213 A court must limit its review of an EIS to determining 
whether the agency has fulfilled those requirements, and may not 
extend the scope of review to determine whether it approves of 
the agency's decision.214 Yet, if the court's review of an EIS is to 
have significance, the court must conduct a searching inquiry, 
taking a "hard look"2111 at the contents of the EIS to determine 
whether the agency has considered the relevant factors, examined 
the reasonable alternatives, and set forth the basis for its reason-
ing.us The court should not view its limited scope of review as 
requiring undue deference to the agency's efforts. Even under the 
Supreme Court's limitation, the court should scrutinize the EIS 
closely to determine whether the agency has adequately consid-
ered environmental factors and made a fully informed and well-
considered decision. m These standards must be enforced if 
NEPA is "to do more than regulate the flow of papers in the fed-
eral bureaucracy."21B 
In upholding the adequacy of the sanctuary alternative analysis 
... [d. at 555. 
"0 [d. at 558. 
111 [d. at 555. 
III In CLF v. Andrus, the First Circuit's deferential approach to Interior's supplemental 
EIS, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1051-53 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1979), 
stands in marked contrast to the same court's close scrutiny of the original EIS in Massa-
chusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 883-87 (1st Cir. 1979). See also Bennett Hills Grazing 
Ass'n v. United States, 600 F.2d 1308, 1309 (9th Cir. 1979) (refusal to enjoin preparation 
of final EIS before expiration of OO-day comment period on draft EIS); Seacoast Anti-
Pollution League v. NRC, 598 F.2d 1221 (1st Cir. 1979) (no EIS required for decision to 
terminate late-stage inquiry into alternative sites for nuclear power plant). 
"3 See text at notes 123-30, supra . 
... Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 429 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976). 
II. [d . 
... Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1973). 
21. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). 
21. Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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in the supplemental EIS,218 the court of appeals in Round Two 
appears to have adopted a very deferential standard of review. 
The opinion did not consider whether the agency had set forth its 
reasoning or fully explained its course of analysis, but instead 
referred only to superficial characteristics of the EIS, such as 
length and chapter headings, and to events external to, and not 
documented in, the record as demonstrating compliance with 
NEPA requirements.22o Nowhere did the court of appeals indicate 
that it gave any consideration to the substance of the sanctuary 
analysis, even though the plaintiffs had strongly questioned its 
quality.221 The plaintiffs argued that the analysis failed to address 
the questions about different management schemes raised by the 
court of appeals in Round One,1I2 and characterized the analysis 
as meaningless, irrelevant and repetitive.lls 
The quality of Interior's sanctuary analysis in the supplemental 
EIS suggests that Interior did not make a "good faith" effort to 
consider the environmental value of the sanctuary alternative. II. 
One purpose of NEPA's requirement that the agency fully ex-
"" CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1052 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979) . 
••• First, the court of appeals cited the length of the supplemental EIS, CLF v. Andrus, 
14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1051, 1052 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1979), and 
referred to the chapter headings as suggesting the broad scope of Interior's analysis. [d. at 
1051. Second, the court related the assurance contained in the supplemental EIS itself 
that Interior had analyzed all comments submitted in response to the draft EIS and that 
the document reflected that consideration "wherever possible," id., rather than insisting 
that the agency include its analysis of those comments in the EIS itself. Third, the court 
referred to the consultations between Interior and NOAA on the adequacy of safeguards as 
demonstrating that NEPA's objective of identifying and seriously considering reasonable 
alternatives had been achieved, id. at 1052, even though the administrative record con-
tained no documentation of those deliberations. Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants CLF 
et al. at 13, 14 n.13, CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049 (1st 
Cir. Dec. 17, 1979) [hereinafter cited as CLF Brief III]. Finally, the court discounted plain-
tiffs' argument that the final supplemental EIS had been published with unacceptable 
haste, reasoning that the supplemental nature of the document excused this alleged defect. 
CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1051 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979) . 
... See CLF Brief II, supra note 101, at 28-35 . 
••• [d. at 30-31. 
••• [d. at 33. For example, the statement "[w]hile mortality of turtles has not been di-
rectly associated with oil spills, dead olive ridley turtles covered with oil have been ob-
served on a beach in Ecuador" appears in the EIS three times in virtually identical form. 
FSES, supra note 6, at 136, 250, 257. In addition, within the approximately fifty pages 
that discuss the Georges Bank sanctuary alternative, entire paragraphs are mechanically 
reproduced in different sections. [d. at 250-51, 256-57; id. at 260-61, 264 . 
••• See Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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plain its course of inquiry and analysis is to permit a court to 
determine whether the agency has made such an effort.221 It is 
impossible for the court to ascertain whether the agency has pro-
vided that full explanation without examining the substance of 
the document.226 The court cannot adequately review the EIS to 
determine whether the agency has fulfilled its NEP A obligations 
by examining the length and chapter headings of the EIS and by 
accepting blanket assurances that all relevant information has 
been considered. The First Circuit's reliance on the superficial 
characteristics and conclusory statements of the supplemental 
EIS for Georges Bank carries judicial deference to an extreme, 
because the foundation of its reliance is a presumption of admin-
istrative regularity;227 this approach bypasses the court's obliga-
tion to insure the agency's compliance with the basic NEPA re-
quirements, a function for which the presumption of 
administrative regularity was not intended.228 Such an approach 
to judicial review puts a premium on appearance, allowing the 
agency to avoid its statutory responsibility to explain fully its 
analysis of environmental factors.229 
••• Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284 (1st Cir. 1973) . 
••• North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 344-49 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1980), is a 
good example of a court thoroughly reviewing the substance of an EIS. While the First 
Circuit's decision in Round Two of CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) 
(BNA) 1049 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1979), was a decision on appeal of the district court's denial 
of preliminary injunctive relief rather than a review of the lower court's decision on the 
merits, and therefore the appellate court's standard of review was theoretically less de-
manding, nevertheless the First Circuit decided at least two of the central issues on the 
merits, and its long if somewhat superficial analysis of the supplemental EIS, id. at 1051-
53, suggests that the court was exercising a more extensive review than the nature of the 
appeal required. Therefore the court's effort should be evaluated according to a more de-
manding standard . 
.., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) . 
••• See id. (presumption of regularity under the Administrative Procedure Act is not to 
shield agency action from in-depth review to determine whether the agency was within the 
scope of its authority and whether its decision was arbitrary or capricious). While the 
reviewing court should not substitute its views for those of the agency, the court must 
engage in a searching review of the EIS to determine whether Interior has complied with 
its NEP A obligations . 
••• Furthermore, evaluating the supplemental EIS under a less demanding standard of 
review simply because of its supplemental nature, CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. 
Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1051 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1979), allows the agency to subvert that 
same obligation of full explication, because the necessity of preparing the supplemental 
EIS arose from the shortcomings of the original EIS, Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 
872, 884-86 (lst Cir. 1979), which thereby remain uncorrected. If the purposes of an EIS, 
as defined in Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1973), are to be fulfilled, the 
supplement to an EIS must meet the same standards as the original EIS. Sierra Club v. 
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The court of appeals also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that 
Callaway, 499 F.2d 982, 994 (5th Cir. 1974). See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(4) (1979) (agencies 
must prepare a supplement in the same manner as a draft or final statement). Therefore 
where, as here, a deficiency has been found in the original EIS, see text at notes 192-200, 
supra, the supplemental statement prepared by the agency must be adequate to remedy 
the deficiency. See NRDC v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1975) (information in 
the supplement to a draft EIS must be adequate to remedy the original deficiency). For 
the reviewing court to demand less is to permit the agency to circumvent the original EIS 
requirements. 
Another weakness of the court's reasoning in upholding the adequacy of the supplemen-
tal EIS is the court's reliance on the discussions between Interior and NOAA as fulfilling 
the Secretary's obligation to consider alternatives. CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. 
Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1052 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1979). Those discussions apparently in-
volved negotiations for the provision of additional safeguards for the Georges Bank envi-
ronment, and resulted in an agreement that Interior would provide certain safeguards and 
NOAA would drop its consideration of the Georges Bank sanctuary nomination. See Bos-
ton Globe, Sep. 22, 1979, at 15, col. 5. 
A reviewing court should not base its evaluation of the agency's decision-making process 
on evidence external to the EIS. EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1130 (5th Cir. 
1974); Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 420-21 (2d Cir. 1972). The court 
should consider only evidence contained in the administrative record and therefore open 
to view. See Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284 (1st Cir. 1973) ("[t]he objective should be 
to develop an administrative record which is self-sufficient for adequate judicial review"). 
Even if the reviewing court is content to look beyond the EIS, however, these discussions 
are inadequate, because the nature of the discussions between the two agencies has never 
been made public. CLF Brief III, supra note 220, at 13. Without publication of the content 
of those. discussions, they cannot substitute adequately for the EIS, since they cannot 
serve any of NEPA's intended purposes of informing the public and the courts of the 
agency's analysis and protecting the honesty of the decision-making process, Silva v. Lynn, 
482 F.2d 1282, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1973), purposes repeatedly endorsed by the First Circuit. 
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 883-84 (1st Cir. 1979). Furthermore the 
discussions should not be allowed to substitute for the EIS because they occurred well 
after the final supplemental EIS was published, and post hoc rationalizations are not an 
allowable substitute for an adequate EIS. Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 794 (9th Cir. 
1975). 
In this case the problem is particularly actue. The Department of the Interior is a mis-
sion-oriented agency, intent on expediting the development of OCS oil and gas resources. 
(While oil and gas development is not Interior's sole function, and therefore the agency is 
not like other agencies created for a single purpose, such as the ICC or the FTC, neverthe-
less Interior is under a clear directive to expedite OCS development pursuant to the OC-
SLA and a Presidential Order, and therefore can be considered a mission-oriented agency 
in the context of this case.) A major consideration under NEPA is to counter the "tunnel 
vision" that blinds such agencies to environmental concerns. Allowing closed-door discus-
sion of the critical issues as a substitute for the full and open analysis required in an EIS 
invites such tunnel vision. 
The plaintiffs have alleged that NOAA's decision to drop the Georges Bank sanctuary 
nomination was politically motivated. CLF Brief II, supra note 101, at 36. The plaintiffs 
pointed out that NOAA's agreement with Interior contradicted both its own evaluation 
and public statements before and after the agreement. [d. See NOAA, Comments on the 
Final Environmental Statement and Draft Supplemental Environmental Statement Pre-
pared by the Department of the Interior for Proposed OCS Sale No. 42 (July 16, 1979) 
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the supplemental EIS should have evaluated the possible impact 
of the Campeche blowout on Interior's estimate that the 
probability of an oil spill during the exploratory phase of drilling 
operations was minima~. 2S0 The court cited the continuing nature 
of the information-gathering process,2S1 and summarily dismissed 
the argument.2S2 The issue, however, deserved more careful con-
sideration by the court. 
NEP A does not generally require an agency to consider infor-
mation that becomes available subsequent to the preparation of 
[hereinafter cited as NOAA Comments], reprinted in FSES, supra note 6, at 316; Letter 
from Richard A. Frank, Administrator of NOAA, to James A. Joseph, Under Secretary of 
the Interior (Sep. 21, 1979), reprinted in CLF Memo II, supra note 196, at app. ("I still do 
not favor leasing on Georges Bank and would prefer that lease sale 42 not be held at this 
time"). The contradiction between NOAA's statements and its acts, according to plaintiffs, 
suggested that political arm-twisting had occurred. CLF Brief II, supra note 101, at 42. 
Because agency action should be set aside if it is based on extraneous considerations, such 
as political pressures, D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 
1972), plaintiffs argued that the inter-agency agreement was arbitrary. CLF Brief II, supra 
note 101, at 42. 
In addition, the plaintiffs argued that Interior had decided to proceed with the lease sale 
long before the final supplemental EIS had been completed, and therefore had acted in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner. CLF Memo I, supra note 100, at 48-55. They pointed out 
that Secretary Andrus had requested the governors of states affected by the lease sale to 
waive their statutory 60-day comment period, and that the Secretary's public comments 
suggested that a decision to proceed had been made well before the official decisional pro-
cess was complete. [d. 
That political considerations may have been controlling was no surprise to one veteran 
politician, Francis W. Sargent, formerly the Governor of Massachusetts and the Commis-
sioner of the Massachusetts Department of Natural Resources, and currently a member of 
CLF's Board of Directors. Conversation with Francis W. Sargent (Dec. 12, 1979). The 
court of appeals, however, did not discuss the plaintiffs' contentions in its Round Two 
decision. 
In addition to their claim that Interior's sanctuary analysis violated NEPA, the plain-
tiffs also argued that, because Interior's sanctuary analysis was inadequate, NOAA should 
have prepared its own EIS for its decision to drop the Georges Bank sanctuary proposal. 
Mass. Brief II, supra note 104, at 42-48. The failure to prepare an EIS is subject to strict 
judicial scrutiny that looks to whether the agency's decision was reasonable, Minnesota 
Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1974), since the 
failure to prepare an EIS precludes the full consideration of environmental factors re-
quired by NEPA. When a proposal involves joint agency action, however, the "lead 
agency" may assume responsibility for the preparation of the EIS. CEQ Guidelines, 40 
C.F.R. § 1501.5(a) (1979). And since the court of appeals considered Interior's sanctuary 
analysis adequate, CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1052 
(1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1979) the plaintiffs' argument was doomed to failure . 
••• CLF; v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049,1054 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979) . 
... CLF v.Andrus, 617 F.2d 296, 299 (1st Cir. Nov. 6, 1979) . 
••• CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1054 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979). 
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an EIS, since such a requirement could extend the NEPA process 
indefinitely.laa In Sierra Club v. Morton,la4 for example, the 
plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of the EIS prepared for a Gulf 
of Mexico lease sale, which stated that the lessees might be able 
to begin oil spill cleanup operations within twelve hours of a spill. 
The court rejected the challenge, reasoning that although post-
EIS information indicating that the twelve-hour figure was un-
realistic suggested the need for Interior to consider other ap-
proaches, it could not retroactively render the EIS inadequate.281 
Even the need for finality in the NEP A process, however, does 
not excuse Interior's failure to analyze the Campeche incident, for 
several reasons. First, the Campeche blowout occurred well before 
preparation of the final version of the supplemental EIS,2a8 so 
that Interior could easily have made an effort at least to consider 
the relevance of the event to Georges Bank. More importantly, 
Interior's predictions of the likelihood of an oil spill during the 
exploratory phase of operations was based on a five-year period of 
only minor spills.287 Since the Campeche spill was far larger than 
any other spill over that period of time,2a8 it is possible that 
Campeche could alter Interior's predictions and perhaps affect 
the Secretary's decision whether to proceed with the lease sale. 
Although Interior suggested that the event was not particularly 
relevant to the Georges Bank lease sale,2a8 the significance of the 
event cannot be known until at least a preliminary evaluation to 
"s Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 554-55 (1978) . 
... 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975) . 
••• [d. at 822. 
••• The Campeche blowout occurred on June 3, 1979, two months prior to Interior's 
publication of the supplemental EIS on August 3, 1979 . 
•• 7 FES, supra note 6, at 674 . 
... From 1971 to 1975, no spills of more than fifty barrels (about 2100 gallons) occurred 
in the Gulf of Mexico. [d. The Campeche blowout initially was spilling 30,000 barrels daily 
and, prior to being capped in late March 1980, spilled an estimated 160 million gallons of 
crude oil altogether. Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 21, 1980, at 3, col. 1. 
Interior's original analysis of the probability of an exploratory phase oil spill, included 
in the original EIS, was published in 1977, just after the North Sea blowout and before the 
Campeche blowout. In the supplemental EIS, Interior did not revise its analysis to include 
either incident. Instead, Interior attributed the two incidents to inexperienced operating 
crews, and found the experience of American crews and the availability of various mitigat-
ing measures to provide adequate assurance against a similar event in American opera-
tions, even though Interior indicated that the cause of the Campeche incident was un-
known. FSES, supra note 6, at 296-97 . 
••• [d. 
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determine the cause of the blowout has been performed.140 
A major purpose of an EIS is to allow an agency to make an 
informed decision,l41 but that purpose has been frustrated here 
because an informed decision is impossible when information es-
sential to that decision is missing. As one court has noted, NEP A 
does not answer the question, "how much information is 
enough?"141 Yet, unless NEPA is to be a "paper tiger,"148 review-
ing courts should insist that agencies gather and use critical infor-
mation. Here, the Interior Department did not attempt to evalu-
ate Campeche, when the only cost of doing so would have been a 
relatively short delay.144 While reviewing courts generally defer to 
agency expertise,1411 a court does not need technical competence to 
realize that Campeche could have a significant impact on Inte-
rior's analysis of oil spill probabilities, so that requiring at least a 
preliminary evaluation of the event should pose no problem of 
expertise for the court of appeals. While the court has expressed 
sympathy for Interior's efforts to expedite the development of 
OCS oil and gas resources in light of the country's energy 
needs,148 Congress has also given strong support to protecting the 
environment from unnecessary harm.14? Allowing the country's 
••• In addition, NOAA has questioned the accuracy of Interior's oil spill analysis. NOAA 
Comments, supra note 229, at 28-29, FSES at 324. NEPA requires a "good faith, reasoned 
analysis in response" to comments from sister agencies disclosing new or conflicting data 
that cast doubts on the agency's analysis. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 884 (1st 
Cir. 1979) (quoting Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1973». While NOAA 
did not base its criticism of the oil spill analysis on the Campeche incident, its criticism is 
certainly reinforced by Campeche. A consideration of NEP A's purposes (see text at notes 
132-35, supra) would suggest that a response to NOAA's criticism would be appropriate in 
light of Campeche. For Interior to state that an event whose causes are unknown has little 
relevance, but that in any event the agency will take appropriate corrective measures if it 
finds existing OCS operating practices to have been a contributing cause, FSES, supra 
note 6, at 296-97, suggests that the problem is being "swept under the rug," Silva v. Lynn, 
482 F.2d 1282, 1285 (1st Cir. 1973) . 
... Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) . 
••• Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1978) . 
••• Appalachian Mountain Club v. Brinegar, 394 F. Supp. 105, 113 (D.N.H. 1975). 
••• Delay is a natural element of the NEP A process, and should not be used to justify a 
failure to consider environmental factors adequately. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 
455 F.2d 412, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1972). See text at notes 683-87, infra . 
••• See, e.g., NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1049-50 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Ethyl Corp. v. 
EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1976) . 
••• CLF v. Andrus, 617 F.2d 296, 298 (1st Cir. Nov. 6, 1979) . 
••• NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 
(West Pamph. 1978); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West 1978 & Supp. 
1979); and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6987 (West 
1977 & Supp. 1979). 
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energy demands to sweep aside environmental concerns ignores 
the requirement of informed balancing by the agency that is the 
essence of NEP A.U8 
In concluding its discussion of NEPA issues in Round Two the 
court of appeals suggested that litigants seeking to reverse the 
district court's denial of a preliminary injunction on NEP A 
grounds must overcome "formidable hurdles," including NEPA's 
reasonableness standard, the court's obligation to balance com-
peting considerations, and the scope of the district court's discre-
tion in ruling on a request for a preliminary injunction.u8 While 
the willingness of the court of appeals to defer to the agency on 
NEP A issues is consistent with the refusal of many courts in re-
cent years to take a "hard look" at the content of an EIS, the 
court's approach can be criticized on two grounds. First, NEP A 
litigation has often focused on requests for interlocutory relief,lao 
a focus that has not prevented reviewing courts, including the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, from overturning lower 
courts and demanding that agencies comply with the require-
ments of NEPA.I81 Therefore the court of appeals should not now 
rely on the trial court's discretion as a bar to an appellate court's 
insistence on compliance with statutory requirements. Second, 
while a reviewing court's authority to balance competing consid-
... A final NEP A argument raised by the plaintiffs in Round Two was Interior's alleged 
failure to respond to numerous comments from sister agencies and responsible experts on 
the original EIS and the draft supplemental EIS. CLF Brief II, supra note 101, at 21-28. 
The court of appeals condensed the points of contention into eight separate alleged defi-
ciencies, and found that either the deficiencies did not exist, or they were not sufficiently 
major to render the EIS inadequate. CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REp. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) 
(BNA) 1049, 1052-53 (1st Cir. Dec. 17,1979). In discussing each point, the court showed a 
willingness to accept the slightest justification for Interior's analysis, as, for example, when 
the court excused the lack of a response to NOAA's comment that the unusual hydrogra-
phy of Georges Bank might increase the damage from chronic discharges of pollutants 
because "NOAA itself attributed no special significance to this issue in mentioning it." Id. 
at 1053. While the court's analysis suggests undue deference to the agency, see text at 
notes 219-29, supra, the court appeared to consider the allegations insignificant, referring 
to the ever-narrowing focus of the litigation. CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. 
Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1054 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1979). Furthermore, the allegations were based 
on questions involving highly technical data, and courts often consider themselves lacking 
in the expertise necessary to deal with such issues adequately. Therefore it is not surpris-
ing that the court rejected plaintiffs' argument . 
... CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REp. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1053-54 (1st Cir. Dec. 
17, 1979). 
110 See Leshy, Interlocutory Injunctive Relief in Environmental Cases: A Primer for 
the Practitioner, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 639 (1977); see text at notes 613-14, infra . 
•• , See, e.g., Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973). 
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erations is unquestioned,ulI that authority should not be used to 
balance away an agency's obligation to meet the NEPA require-
ments for preparation of an EIS.u3 Although the test of reasona-
bleness allows a reviewing court to overlook minor flaws in an 
EIS,1I154 the court should ~ot use the "rule of reason" to frustrate 
NEPA's purpose of insuring a fully informed and well-considered 
decisionllllll by failing to scrutinize carefully the content of the 
EIS. For if NEP A's standards are not going to be enforced, the 
courts are in effect overriding the mandate of Congress that agen-
cies give full consideration to environmental factors in their deci-
sion-making,1I116 the same mandate that courts so often cited as 
authority for their. original interpretations of NEP A as requiring 
strict compliance. m 
In Round Two of CLF v. Andrus, the court of appeals mar-
shalled the principle of limited scope of review to uphold the sup-
plemental EIS prepared by Interior. The court's failure to con-
duct a thorough analysis of the EIS is consistent with the use by 
reviewing courts in recent years of the "rule of reason" to over-
look agency noncompliance with NEPA requirements. Yet the 
court has used its limited scope of review to lower its standard of 
review and to justify a superficial examination of the supplemen-
tal EIS. The court had ample grounds for finding deficiencies in 
the supplemental EIS, according to the standard of review that 
the court had established in Round One, and at the least the 
court should have attempted a thorough analysis of the document 
to determine whether the EIS fulfilled the purposes of NEPA 
which the court had previously articulated. 
IV. THE LEASE SALE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
In Round Two of CLF v. Andrus, in addition to their NEPA 
claims, the plaintiffs alleged violations by Secretary Andrus of the 
Endangered Species Act,1I118 challenging the lease sale on the 
ground that it would jeopardize two endangered species of whales, 
••• Essex County Preservation Ass'n v. Campbell, 536 F.2d 956, 962-63 (1st Cir. 1976) . 
••• See Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) . 
••• Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) . 
••• Id . 
••• 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976) . 
... See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 
NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1972) . 
••• 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. II 1978), as amended by Act of Dec. 28, 1979, 
Pub. L. No. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225. 
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the right and the humpback, which frequent the Georges Bank 
area. The plaintiffs' claims raise questions under the Endangered 
Species Act not previously addressed by the courts, including the 
extent to which a lease sale can be considered an irretrievable 
commitment of resources, the allocation between contending par-
ties of the burden of proof in demonstrating compliance with the 
statute, and the directness of the harm required to constitute 
jeopardy to an endangered species. While the answers to these 
questions are still not clear, the outcome of Round Two suggests 
that the Endangered Species Act (ESA) may be traveling the 
same road as NEPA, with courts shifting from an early require-
ment of strict compliance to a subsequent relaxation of standards. 
A. The Background of the Statute 
A review of the language and history of· the ESA shows that it 
was passed in 1973 in an effort to slow the disappearance of spe-
cies as much as possible.2GS At the time eLF v. Andrus was de-
cided, section 7(a) of the statute required that "[e]ach Federal 
agency shall . . . insure that any action authorized, funded, or 
carried out by such agency. . . does not jeopardize the continued 
existence of any endangered species" or destroy the critical 
habitat of any endangered species.260 Section 7(d) further re-
quired that if the action agency has begun consultation with the 
Secretary of Commerce or the Interior261 in order to determine 
whether jeopardy to an endangered species exists, the agency 
"shall not make any irfeversible or irretrievable commitment of 
resources" that would preclude the use of any reasonable alterna-
tives to avoid jeopardy to an endangered species.262 
"Jeopardy" is not defined by the statute. An "endangered spe-
... Section 2(b) of the ESA declares that a purpose of the statute is "to provide a means 
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend 
may be conserved [and] to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered 
species and threatened species .... " 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1976). See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153, 174-88 (1978), for a review of the history of the statute . 
••• 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. II 1978). The language of section 7(a) was changed 
slightly after CLF v. Andrus was decided, but the requirement remains essentially un-
changed. See text and notes at notes 406-09, infra . 
••• The ESA is jointly administered by the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior. 16 
U.S.C.A. § 1532(15) (West Supp. 1979). Supervisory responsibilities for particular species 
are divided between the two - Commerce's jurisdiction includes primarily whales and sea 
turtles, 50 C.F.R. § 222.23 (1978), while Interior is responsible for all other species. See 50 
C.F.R. § 17.2(b) (1978) . 
••• 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (Supp. II 1978). 
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cies" is defined by section 3(6) of the ESA to mean "any species 
which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant 
portion of its range. "283 Section 4 authorizes the Secretary of the 
Interior to designate as endangered any species found to meet 
that definition.2u Section 9 of the ESA makes it unlawful for any 
person to "take" an endangered species,2811 with "take" defined by 
section 3(19) to mean "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, 
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such 
conduct. "288 Section 11 imposes civil287 and criminal288 penalties 
for violations of the Act, and section l1(g) allows any person to 
file a civil suit in federal district court to enjoin any person or 
agency from violating the statute.289 The effect of these provisions 
is to establish a high standard of protection for endangered spe-
cies, including a positive mandate to federal agencies to carry out 
programs for the conservation of endangered species,no a man-
date that has been interpreted by one court as requiring an 
agency not only to avoid the elimination of protected species, but 
also to use all methods to bring species "back from the brink" 
and remove them from the protected class.271 
The Supreme Court in 1978 provided the seminal interpreta-
tion of the ESA in TVA v. Hill,272 a case in which the almost 
completed Tellico Dam project was halted because its completion 
would eradicate the only known habitat of the endangered snail 
darter fish (Percina Imostoma tanasi).273 The Supreme Court up-
••• [d. § 1532(6) . 
••• [d. § 1533(a)(1) . 
••• 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1976) . 
••• 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (Supp. II 1978) . 
... [d. § 1540(a)(1) . 
••• [d. § 1540(b) . 
••• 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1976). 
17. Section 2(c) of the ESA declares it to be the policy of Congress that "all Federal 
departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species." [d. § 1531(c). Sec-
tion 3(3) defines "conserve" as using "all methods and procedures which are necessary to 
bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures 
provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(3) (West 
Supp. 1979). 
171 Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D.D.C. 1977). 
no 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
173 Construction of the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River began in 1967. In 
1973, the snail darter, a previously unknown species of perch, was discovered to inhabit a 
portion of the river just upstream from the dam. Four months later Congress passed the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973. The snail darter, one of more than a hundred known 
species of darters, was subsequently declared endangered by the Secretary of the Interior, 
since its only known habitat would be inundated once the dam was completed". [d. at 156-
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held the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit274 
overturning the district court2711 and permanently enjoining com-
pletion of the dam, reasoning that the terms of the ESA were 
plain and that the language of the statute provided no exceptions 
to the Tennessee Valley Authority's obligation to insure against 
jeopardy to an endangered species.276 The Court found it "beyond 
doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded 
the highest of priorities,"277 and that "[t]he plain intent of Con-
gress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend 
toward species extinction, whatever the cost."278 Thus the Court 
interpreted the statute to require that, even where a project such 
as the Tellico Dam was substantially complete and Congress had 
continued to provide funds for it, the absolute terms of the stat-
ute required that it be halted in order to avoid jeopardizing an 
endangered species.279 
The Supreme Court decided TVA v. Hill not long before the 
authorization of funds for the ESA was due to expire.280 In the 
process of renewing the funding, Congress did not react to the 
Supreme Court's decision by watering down the essential man-
date to avoid jeopardy contained in section 7(a).281 Instead Con-
gress left that mandate intact,282 adding separate provisions to 
authorize exemptions in narrowly confined situations288 for 
projects that are unable to comply with the strict requirements of 
section 7(a). At the same time, Congress added the additional re-
striction in section 7(d) prohibiting any irretrievable commitment 
of resources during the consultation process.284 
62 . 
... Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977) . 
.,. Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). 
178 TVA v. Hill, 437 V.S. 153, 173 (1978) . 
... [d. at 174. 
27. [d. at 184. 
m [d. at 187-88. 
2.0 16 V.S.C. § 1542 (1976). 
2., 16 V.S.C.A. § 1536(a) (West Supp. 1979). 
2.2 In the original statute, section 7 was not divided into subsections. The 1978 amend-
ments lengthened section 7 considerably, and the resulting subsection (a) contained the 
original mandate with its language unchanged. The 1979 amendments further divided sub-
section (a) and changed the wording of the mandate slightly, but without changing its 
basic import. See text and notes at notes 406-09, infra . 
... See 16 V.S.C. § 1536(e), (g), (h) (Supp. II 1978) . 
••• 16 V.S.C.A. § 1536(d) (West Supp. 1979). The discussion focuses on the version of 
the ESA prior to its amendment in 1979 because CLF v. Andrus was decided prior to the 
amendments and was therefore controlled by the former version of the statute. For a dis-
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There has been very little litigation under the ESA other than 
TVA v. Hill, so the limits of the statute's coverage remain largely 
undefined. For example, although the Supreme Court made it 
clear in TV Av. Hill that an element of reason could not be read 
into the statute in order to allow the completion of projects al-
ready under way or even almost completed, no matter how sub-
stantial the investment of resources that had occurred,28t1 the 
Court was confronted in that case with the certain extinction of 
an endangered species. In contrast, in CLF v. Andrus, although 
the project had not yet begun and was therefore easier to halt, 
the jeopardy to endangered species was far harder to determine 
because, even though OCS oil activities would generate substan-
tial amounts of chronic pollution and posed the threat of a signifi-
cant oil spill, the effect of that pollution on the endangered spe-
cies was difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain.1I86 Therefore the 
case presented for the first time the issue of how direct and de-
monstrable the jeopardy would have to be in order for the provi-
sions of the ESA to apply. In addition, even if the provisions of 
the ESA were applicable, the additional question arose as to 
whether the lease sale itself was enjoinable as an "irreversible or 
irretrievable commitment of resources" in violation of section 
7(d), since holding a lease sale would not, of itself, appear to con-
stitute an irretrievable commitment of resources. 
B. The Lease Sale as an Irretrievable Commitment 
The issue of whether the lease sale in CLF v. Andrus consti-
tuted an "irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources" 
in violation of section 7(d) of the ESA arose because of the pres-
ence in the Georges Bank area of two endangered species of 
whales, the right (Eubalaena glacialis) and the humpback 
(Megaptera novaeangliae).1187 The Department of Commerce has 
jurisdiction over these two species;1I88 its authority is exercised by 
cussion of the 1979 amendments and their effect on the nature of the statute's require-
ments, see text and notes at notes 406-09, infra. For a discussion of the history of the ESA 
and the 1978 amendments, see Stromberg, The Endangered Species Act of 1973: Is the 
Statute Itself Endangered?, 6 ENV. AFF. 511 (1978), and Stromberg, The Endangered Spe-
cies Act Amendments of 1978: A Step Backwards?, 7 B.C. ENV. AFF. L. REV. 33 (1978). 
2.& TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) . 
... Sanctuary Issue Paper, supra note 39, at 51-53, FSES at 542-44. 
2.7 FSES, supra note 6, at 657 . 
•• 8 The Department of Commerce has jurisdiction primarily over whales and sea turtles. 
See 50 C.F.R. § 222.23(a) (1978). 
1979] GEORGES BANK 239 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA),IIS9 a branch of Commerce. On January 20, 1978 Interior 
initiated consultation with NOAA to determine whether the 
Georges Bank lease sale would jeopardize certain endangered spe-
cies, including the right and humpback whales.1I90 NOAA consid-
ered the right and the humpback vulnerable because they are sur-
face feeders and would therefore be exposed to the surface 
pollution inevitably resulting from an oil spill, and because the 
populations of both species are quite low.1I91 NOAA first con-
cluded that the lease sale would jeopardize the right whale,191 
since it had been depleted to near extinction and "[a]ny effect on 
individual animals could have an effect on the entire population 
due to their low numbers."1I9S Subsequently, however, NOAA 
withdrew its conclusion of jeopardy and declared that insufficient 
information was available to determine whether the lease sale 
would jeopardize either the right or the humpback. III. Therefore 
the consultation process continued, and was still in progress at 
the time of the lease sale.1I91 
The consultation process required under section 7 of the ESA 
involves several steps. In order to insure that a project will not 
jeopardize any endangered species, as required by section 7(a),I" 
an agency must first request a biological assessment from the Sec-
retary of either Commerce or the Interior, as appropriate, pursu-
••• The National Marine Fisheries Service is the subdivision of NOAA that carries out 
NOAA's responsibilities under the ESA. 
••• FSES, supra note 6, at 633. 
'Ol Sanctuary Issue Paper, supra note 39, at 52, FSES at 543. The regional population of 
humpbacks is estimated at 1200, and of right whales, at low tens to low hundreds. [d. at 
23, FSES at 514. 
••• FSES, supra note 6, at 637-39 . 
••• [d. at 638 . 
••• [d. at 652. NOAA's focus on the lease sale as the step creating jeopardy to the whales 
presumes that the lease sale is the first step of the overall project and is the time at which 
the project should be halted until a lack of jeopardy can be insured. The court of appeals, 
however, seeing no possibility of physical harm from the lease sale itself, did not appear to 
view the lease sale as a point at which jeopardy could occur. See text at notes 329-77, 
infra. 
••• Regulations promulgated jointly by Interior and Commerce require that, when a bio-
logical opinion is issued based on inadequate information, consultation shall continue until 
concluded by issuance of an opinion based on adequate information. 50 C.F.R. § 402.04(f) 
(1978). One court has held that under the terms of the ESA, the duty to consult continues 
until such an opinion is issued. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 354 
(D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1980) . 
... 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. II 1978). 
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ant to section 7(c),le7 in order to determine whether any endan-
gered species are present in the area of the contemplated project. 
If no such species are present, the agency is free to proceed with 
the project. Otherwise, the agency must begin consultation with 
the Secretary under section 7 (b) in order "to determine whether 
any of the species would be jeopardized by the project, and the 
Secretary is required to issue a written statement including his 
opinion on whether jeopardy will occur, a summary of the infor-
mation on which the opinion is based, and a suggestion of reason-
able and prudent alternatives that would avoid jeopardy.lBs Sec-
tion 7(d) requires that, during consultation, the agency and the 
license applicant (in this case, the lessees) not make any irreversi-
ble or irretrievable commitment of resources having the effect of 
foreclosing alternatives that would avoid jeopardy.lee Once con-
sultation has concluded, the project can proceed if no jeopardy 
will occur, but the project cannot proceed if jeopardy is found 
unless an exemption is first obtained under sections 7(g)800 and 
(h).sol 
The court of appeals held that the lease sale would not violate 
section 7(d) as an irretrievable commitment of resources made 
during consultation,80I and therefore upheld the district court's 
refusal to issue a preliminary injunction. 80S The plaintiffs had ar-
gued that the lease sale would constitute an irretrievable com-
mitment of resources for two reasons. First, the lessees would be 
entitled to compensation if the Secretary were subsequently to 
disapprove their exploration plans and cancel their leases based 
on a threatened ESA violation.804 Second, because the OCSLA 
authorizes the Secretary to disapprove exploration plans only 
under certain limited conditions,80I1 the endangered whales would 
... [d. § 1536(c) . 
••• [d. § 1536(b) . 
... [d. § 1536(d) . 
••• [d. § 1536(g) . 
•• , [d. § 1536(h). The nature of the consultation process is unchanged by the 1979 
amendments. See text at notes 406-09, infra . 
••• CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1055 n.7 (1st Cir. 
Dec. 17, 1979). 
a •• [d. at 1054 . 
... CLF Brief II, supra note 101, at 13. 
a.. Section 5(a)(2)(A) permits the Secretary to cancel a lease if he determines that: 
(i) continued activity pursuant to such lease or permit would probably cause serious 
harm or damage to life (including fish and other aquatic life), to property, to any min-
eral (in areas leased or not leased), to the national security or defense, or to the marine, 
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receive less protection following the lease sale than the ESA 
would otherwise provide.308 The court rejected the plaintiffs' ar-
guments, however, reasoning that the leases would be issued sub-
ject to an implied condition that the Secretary would act law-
fully,307 and that the provisions of the ESA would therefore 
continue to apply in full force, so that the Secretary could refuse 
to approve exploration plans in order to avoid jeopardizing the 
whales in violation of the ESA.308 The court first disputed, then 
accepted, the argument that the lessees would be entitled to com-
pensation if the Secretary were to disapprove exploration plans.8oe 
Despite its ultimate recognition of the compensation requirement, 
however, the court refused to regard the lease sale as an irretriev-
able commitment in violation of section 7(d).310 
The court's reasoning is suspect on two grounds. First, the 
court overlooked the fact that, because the lease sale creates an 
obligation to pay compensation to the lessees if the Secretary dis-
approves their exploration plans in order to avoid jeopardizing 
the endangered whales, the lease sale is the type of agency action 
that Congress intended to prevent by establishing the section 7(d) 
prohibition and therefore should be considered an irretrievable 
commitment of resources in violation of section 7(d). Second, the 
court failed to consider adequately other aspects of the lease sale 
that should require it to be viewed as an irretrievable commit-
ment of resources. 
The OCSLA contains detailed provisions defining the circum-
stances under which lessees will be entitled to compensation. The 
statute distinguishes three phases of activity: the lease sale and 
coastal, or human environment; 
(ii) the threat of harm or damage will not disappear or decrease to an acceptable 
extent within a reasonable period of time; and 
(iii) the advantages of cancellation outweigh the advantages of continuing such lease 
or permit in force .... 
43 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1979) . 
.... CLF Brief II, supra note 101, at 14-16 . 
•• 7 CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1050 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979). Under the law of contracts, a contract will not be construed to require a party to 
the contract to violate existing law in order to perform its obligations under the contract. 
See Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624, 638 (1945); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 512 (1932); 
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 22-1 (2d ed. 1977) . 
•• 8 CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1050 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979) . 
•• 9 See note 328, infra. 
81. CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1055 n.7 (lst Cir. 
Dec. 17, 1979). 
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pre-exploratory operations,81l exploratory drilling activities, all 
and production and development operations.a18 Prior to the sec-
ond and third phases, lessees are required to submit plans for 
their activities to the Secretary for approval. a14 If the Secretary 
disapproves the lessees' plans under certain conditions,a16 the les-
sees may be entitled to compensational. equal to the lesser of 1) 
the fair value of the cancelled lease rights at the date of cancella-
tion, or 2) the cost of the lease plus all direct expenditures of the 
lessee pursuant to the lease minus any revenues derived from the 
lease.a17 
The conditions under which the lessees are entitled to compen-
sation, however, will differ depending on whether the plans sub-
mitted are for the exploration phase or the production phase of 
activities. Section 25(h) of the OCSLA requires that the Secretary 
disapprove a production plan if the lessee cannot comply with the 
terms of the OCSLA or other applicable law,a18 and further states 
that the lessee shall not be entitled to compensation based on 
that disapproval. a19 Therefore, if the lessee cannot comply with 
the terms of the ESA, the Secretary must disapprove the lessee's 
production plan and cancel the lease without compensating the 
lessee.aso In contrast, OCSLA section 11(c)(1) specifically provides 
that the lessee shall be entitled to compensation if the Secretary 
disapproves an exploration plan in order to prevent long-term 
harm to life, including aquatic life,8I1 so that the lessee would re-
81J See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337 (West Supp. 1979). 
81' [d. § 1340 . 
... [d. § 1351. 
81. [d. §§ 1340(c)(1), 1351(a)(1). 
au [d. § 1334(a)(2)(A) . 
• ,. [d. § 1340(c)(1). 
8 .. [d. § 1334(a)(2)(C). 
81. Section 25(h)(1) states in part that "[t]he Secretary shall disapprove a plan - (A) if 
the lessee fails to demonstrate that he can comply with the requirements of this sub-
chapter or other applicable Federal law .... " 43 U.S.C.A. § 1351(h)(1) (West Supp. 1979) 
(emphasis added) . 
... Section 25(h)(2)(A) states that "[i]f a plan is disapproved - (i) under subparagraph 
(A) of paragraph (1) ... the lessee shall not be entitled to compensation because of such 
disapproval." 43 U.S.C.A. § 1351(h)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1979) . 
• 1. [d. Under section 7(d) of the ESA, the lessee as well as the federal agency is prohib-
ited from making any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources during consul-
tation. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (Supp. II 1978) . 
... Section U(c)(l) provides, in part, that: 
the Secretary shall disapprove such plan if he determines that (A) any proposed activ-
ity under such plan would result in any condition described in section 1334(a)(2)(A)(i) 
of this title [a long-term threat of serious harm to life, including aquatic life], and (B) 
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ceive compensation even if the Secretary's disapproval were based 
on a threatened ESA violation. 
Because the compensation which the OCSLA requires the Sec-
retary to pay is not simply equal to the purchase price of the 
lease, but rather is based on either the current value of the lease 
or the original cost of the lease plus all subsequent expenditures 
of the lessee under that lease, S22 the amount of compensation re-
quired could substantially exceed the price paid by the lessee to 
acquire the exploration and development rights.s2s Therefore the 
compensation provisions of the OCSLA establish the lease sale as 
an irretrievable commitment of resources. In addition, the lease 
sale has the effect of foreclosing the implementation of prudent 
alternative measures, such as refusing to lease and explore the 
area, that would avoid jeopardizing the endangered whales. Since 
the Secretary had not completed the consultation process and 
therefore had not insured that post-lease sale activities would not 
jeopardize the endangered whales, conducting the lease sale vio-
lated section 7(d) of the ESA as an irretrievable commitment of 
resources which had the effect of foreclosing reasonable alterna-
tives that would avoid jeopardy. su 
The OCSLA's compensation requirements make the lease sale 
exactly the type of action that Congress intended to stop by es-
tablishing the section 7 (d) prohibition. S2& By failing to find an 
ESA violation, the court of appeals has allowed the Secretary to 
proceed with steps that could result in a significant and irretriev-
able loss of resources,S2S and could create strong pressures to con-
tinue with the project even if it were found to jeopardize an en-
dangered species.827 In doing so, the court has bypassed the 
such proposed activity cannot be modified to avoid such condition. If the Secretary 
disapproves a plan under the preceding sentence, he may. . . cancel such lease and the 
lessee shall be entitled to compensation . ... 
43 V.S.C.A. § 1340(c)(l) (West Supp. 1979) (emphasis added) . 
••• See text at notes 315-17, supra. 
32. The cost of pre-exploration activities is extremely high. See note 344, infra. If pre-
exploration testing were to indicate that the lease area was likely to contain large petro-
leum reserves, the value of the lease could become substantially greater than the original 
cost of the lease. Consequently, the amount of compensation required for the Secretary's 
disapproval of exploration plans could be significant . 
••• See 16 V.S.C. § 1536(d) (Supp. II 1978) . 
••• See text at notes 340-42, infra . 
••• See note 323, supra. 
"7 See text at notes 337-38, infra. 
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congressional mandate established in section 7(d).828 
••• There are two versions to the court's analysis of the applicability of the ESA to the 
facts of CLF v. Andrus. The court initially published its slip opinion on Dec. 17, 1979. At 
that time, relying on arguments set forth by the defendants, the court concluded that the 
Secretary could disapprove exploration plans based on a threatened ESA violation without 
having to compensate the lessees. 14 ENvIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1050 (1st 
Cir. Dec. 17, 1979). The court reasoned that the leases contained an implied condition of 
legality, see note 307, supra, that would justify disapproval without compensation. The 
difficulty with the court's analysis was that it contained a fundamental contradiction -
the Secretary, by refusing to violate the provisions of the ESA, would have to cancel the 
lease to avoid jeopardizing an endangered species, but his refusal to compensate the lessee 
would violate section l1(c)(l) of the OCSLA. 
After the court published its slip opinion, counsel for the federal defendants wrote a 
letter informing the court that its reasoning contradicted the explicit requirement of the 
OCSLA that the lessee be compensated if exploration plans are disapproved, and asking 
the court to correct the "error" before official publication of its decision. Letter from 
Maryann Walsh, Attorney for the Federal Defendants, to Dana H. Gallup, Clerk of the 
United States Court of Appeals (Jan. 9, 1980). The plaintiffs countered by pointing out to 
the court that the "error" referred to by the government was the fundamental premise 
upon which the court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments concerning the ESA, and that if 
the defendants wanted to abandon their former argument that compensation would not be 
required, the proper procedure would be for the defendants to request a rehearing. Letter 
from Douglas I. Foy, Attorney for Plaintiffs CLF, et al., to Dana H. Gallup, Clerk of the 
United States Court of Appeals (Jan. 16, 1980). 
The court of appeals responded by issuing a Memorandum and Order, CLF v. Andrus, 
14 ENvIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1229 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 1980) [hereinafter cited as 
Memo], adopting the defendants' suggestion and deleting the references to the court's con-
clusion that compensation would not be required for disapproval of exploration plans. [d. 
at 1230. In doing so, the court chided the defendants for their "possibly disingenuous 
claim" that they had not advocated the position originally adopted by the court, but ac-
knowledged that the OCSLA explicitly provided for compensation and that its use of an 
implied condition of legality was not intended to contradict explicit statutory language. [d. 
The court stated, however, that the change did not alter the court's holding, id., in spite of 
the fact that it had based its conclusion that the lease sale would not constitute an irre-
trievable commitment in violation of ESA section 7(d) on its interpretation that compen-
sation would not be required for disapproval of exploration plans. See CLF v. Andrus, 14 
ENvIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1050-51 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Decision]. 
In attempting to justify its continued adherence to the position that the lease sale did 
not violate the ESA, the court directly contradicted its original opinion on two points. 
First, the court stated that "CLF in fact never contended that the possibility that compen-
sation would be paid in the event of disapproval of the exploration plans rendered the 
lease sale an irreversible commitment of resources." Memo, supra, at 1230. In its original 
decision, however, the court had characterized the plaintiffs as arguing that "the resource 
which will forever be lost once the sale is held is the ability of the Secretary to conform his 
actions to the strict standards of the ESA without being forced to compensate the lesaees 
for violating the terms of the lease." Decision, supra, at 1050. Second, the court stated 
that plaintiffs' failure to raise this argument "does not itself foreclose appellants from 
raising it in the future." Memo, supra, at 1230. In its original opinion, however, the court 
had stated that its decision was intended to resolve finally (against the plaintiffs) the issue 
of whether the lease sale violated the ESA. Decision, supra, at 1055 n.7. 
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Not only does the OCSLA's compensation requirement suggest 
that the lease sale is an irretrievable commitment of resources in 
violation of section 7(d) of the ESA, but also the historical con-
text of section 7 (d) suggests that the lease sale, as the first in a 
series of steps leading toward the single overriding objective of oil 
and gas exploitation,829 is the point at which Congress intended to 
halt such a project until the agency could insure a lack of jeop-
ardy to endangered species. The Supreme Court decided TVA v. 
Hill880 before section 7(d) was added to the ESA.881 Although the 
Court was interpreting the statute in a context in which the en-
dangered species was threatened with certain extinction, the 
Court's interpretation of the statute was sweeping. The Court re-
jected any effort to read an element of reasonableness into the 
ESA's absolute requirement that the agency insure that no en-
dangered species would be jeopardized by the agency action.881 
The Court stressed that the statutory language "admits of no ex-
ception,"888 and that it "reveals a conscious decision by Congress 
to give endangered species priority over the 'primary missions' of 
federal agencies. "884 
When Congress renewed the ESA 88& shortly after the Court's 
decision in TVA v. Hill, it did not alter the Court's interpretation 
of the statute by weakening the requirement to insure against 
jeopardy.88s Instead, Congress added the section 7(g) and (h) ex-
emption provisions and the section 7(d) prohibition against irre-
The court's contradictory statements suggest that the court has had a difficult time rec-
onciling the compensation requirement with its conclusion that the lease sale did not vio-
late the ESA, and that it may be attempting to give the plaintiffs a second chance to 
present their argument. Nevertheless, when the plaintiffs sought to petition for a rehearing 
on the matter, their motion to file the petition late was denied. 
It is not clear at this time whether the court's Dec. 17 opinion, when officially published, 
will reflect the changes contained in the Court's Memorandum and Order of Feb. 22, 1980. 
The original opinion, however, has been unofficially published at 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. 
Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1979), and the Memorandum and Order at 14 
ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1229 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 1980) . 
••• See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 352 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1980) . 
••• 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
a., The Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 
3751, were enacted on Nov. 10, 1978. TVA v. Hill was decided June 15, 1978 . 
... TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) . 
••• Id. at 173. 
"old. at 185. The court's interpretation of the ESA is not altered by the 1979 ESA 
amendments. See text and notes at notes 406-09, infra. 
a.. See note 331, supra . 
• as See text at notes 281-82, supra. 
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trievable commitments during consultation. Section 7(d) was en-
acted in order to prevent the type of situation presented in TV A 
v. Hill, where a project would continue to consume substantial 
resources until a determination of jeopardy is finally made, by re-
quiring the determination of jeopardy at the beginning of the pro-
ject.88? Explaining the importance of section 7(d), Senator John 
Culver emphasized that "[i]t is also clear that the earlier in the 
progress of a project a conflict is recognized, the easier it is to 
design an alternative consistent with the requirements of the act, 
or to abandon the proposed action."88s Thus section 7(d) is in-
tended to stop projects at their inception until a lack of jeopardy 
is insured. This precautionary aspect of the statute can only be 
given full force by viewing the project as a whole888 and consider-
ing the lease sale as the appropriate point at which to halt Inte-
rior's Georges Bank project pending a determination of whether 
jeopardy will occur. 
One court has recently recognized that an OCS lease sale is 
conducted in order to encourage subsequent exploration and de-
velopment activities,8.o that a massive amount of resources must 
be invested to facilitate these activities,8U and that such an in-
vestment before the safety of an endangered species is insured is 
exactly what Congress intended to prevent by enacting section 
7(d).842 Pre-exploration activities, such as sonar testing, bottom 
sampling, seismic testing, and the preparation of exploration 
plans based on that testing,848 that immediately follow the lease· 
sale are extremely expensive, costing hundreds of millions of dol-
lars.u • The court of appeals in eLF v. Andrus did not appear to 
••• See 124 CONGo REc. S1O,893-97 (daily ed. July 17, 1978), (remarks of Sen. Culver); H. 
R. CONF. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Se88. 13 [hereinafter cited as 1979 H.R. CONF. 
REP.), reprinted in (1979) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4776, 4781 [hereinafter cited as 
1979 CONGo & AD. NEWS) . 
... 124 CONGo REC. S10,896 (daily ed. July 17, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Culver) . 
••• See North Slope Borough V. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 350 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1980) 
(the ESA gives agency action a very broad scope, and for OCS oil activities, agency action 
includes the lease sale and all resulting activities). 
M. [d. at 352. 
14' [d. at 357 . 
••• [d. at 356. The North Slope court reached the contradictory conclusion, however, 
that conducting the lease sale did not constitute the making of an irretrievable commit-
ment of resources. See text at notes 347-64, infra. M. See North Slope Borough V. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 326, 330 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 1979). See 
also 30 C.F.R. § 250.34-1 (1979) (lessee must prepare exploration plan before commencing 
exploration activities). 
••• The estimated cost of pre-exploration activities for the Beaufort Sea lease sale is 
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be aware of that cost, and the parties did not raise the point in 
their arguments or briefs.3411 Yet such a sizable investment would 
have to be considered "massive" according to any reasonable defi-
nition of the term, and is the type of investment that Congress 
intended to prevent. Thus, even prior to the Secretary's decision 
whether to approve exploration plans, which the court of appeals 
appeared to consider as the critical point after which an irretriev-
able commitment of resources would occur,34e the size of the in-
vestment that will have been made meets the "massive invest-
ment" test envisioned by Congress and should be sufficient to 
justify a finding of an irretrievable commitment of resources in 
violation of section 7(d). 
In a very similar case, North Slope Borough v. Andrus,847 in-
volving a challenge to Lease Sale No. 49 in the Beaufort Sea 
north of Alaska based on alleged jeopardy to the endangered bow-
head whale,348 the Federal District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia acknowledged the significant cost of pre-exploration activ-
ities34e and yet refused to find that the lease sale violated section 
7(d).3I10 The court reasoned that money invested in research could 
$157 million. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 357 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 
1980). 
••• Plaintiffs were unaware of the nature or cost of pre-exploration activities because 
they had not engaged in any pre-trial discovery. Conversation with Douglas I. Foy, Attor-
ney for Plaintiffs CLF, et al. (Feb. 20, 1980). See text at notes 632-38, infra . 
••• Once the Secretary of the Interior has conducted a lease sale and accepted the bids, 
the next step in the project over which he has control is his decision whether to approve 
exploration plans submitted by the lessees. See 1978 H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 64, 1978 
CONGo & AD. NEWS at 1471; 43 V.S.C.A. § 1340(c)(l) (West Supp. 1979). If the plans are 
approved, exploratory drilling activities can begin. The court of appeals based its decision 
that the lease sale does not constitute an irretrievable commitment of resources in viola-
tion of section 7(d) of the ESA on the Secretary's ability to disapprove exploration plans if 
threatened with a section 7(d) violation. CLF V. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) 
(BNA) 1049, 1050 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1979). The court's focus on this step of the project 
suggests that the court would consider approval of exploration plans to be an irretrievable 
commitment of resources . 
... 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1980), clarified, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) 
(BNA) 1001 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 1980). 
••• The plaintiffs challenged the lease sale on several grounds, alleging that the EIS 
prepared for the sale violated NEP A requirements, that the safeguards established in the 
OCSLA had been violated, that the lease sale would jeopardize the endangered bowhead 
whale, and that the Secretary of the Interior had violated his trust responsibility to the 
Inupiat native Alaskans, who subsist on the bowhead, by jeopardizing the whales. The 
bowhead whales migrate spring and fall through the Beaufort Sea and the lease sale area. 
North Slope Borough V. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 340 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1980). 
••• See note 344, supra . 
••• North Slope Borough V. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 351 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1980). AI-
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not be considered wasteful, since it is valuable in its own right, all 
and that the cost must be considered in light of the high risk gen-
erally present in the industry as a risk that the industry is willing 
to accept, knowing that a subsequent ESA violation might be 
found.all In reaching its conclusion, however, the district court re-
lied on a notion of reasonableness to justify the expense, ala an 
approach explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in TVA v. 
Hill.al" 
The North Slope court initially recognized that the purpose of 
section 7(d) is to prevent the agency from "steamrolling" an ac-
tivity in order· to secure completion of a project, all since the 
agency may be tempted to commit significant' resources to a pro-
ject as a means of encouraging continuation of the project if jeop-
ardy is subsequently found to exist. aM Yet allowing the lessees to 
make the pre-exploration investment prior to determining 
whether jeopardy will occur creates just such a steamrolling 
temptation, especially where the lessees would be unlikely to con-
sider the pre-exploration research a reasonable investment in its 
own right if they knew beforehand that no exploration would be 
allowed. Thus the North Slope court's conclusion that the lease 
sale does not violate section 7(d)al7 is inconsistent with its initial 
premise that section 7(d) was intended to prevent the type of 
massive investments involved in pre-exploration activities.8M 
The North Slope court's conclusion is also inconsistent with its 
second iDitial premise, that the ESA intends agency action to be 
given an expansive scope in determining compliance with the 
though the court found no section 7(d) violation, it did find a violation of section 7(b) 
since no satisfactory biological opinion had been obtained. [d. at 354. The court also found 
that the Secretary has a trust responsibility to the Inupiata, and that he violated that 
responsibility by failing to comply with the ESA. [d. at 344. The court also found a NEPA 
violation based on the failure of the EIS prepared for the lease sale to discuss the alterna-
tive of management under marine sanctuary status. [d. at 349. Consequently, although the 
lease sale had been held, the court enjoined further activities subsequent to the lease sale 
until the EIS deficiency has been remedied, and until a satisfactory biological opinion has 
been obtained. [d. at 363-64. 
III [d. at 357. 
II. [d. 
II. See id . 
... 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). 
II. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 356 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1980) . 
... See 1979 H.R. CONP. REP., supra note 337, at 13, 1979 CONGo & An. NEWS at 4781. 
II. North Slope Borough V. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 357 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1980) . 
... [d. at 355. 
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statute.3119 According to the court's premise, the precautionary na-
ture of the ESA can be effectively implemented only by requiring 
the agency to look at all ramifications of the agency action.880 In 
order to do so, the agency should view the three phases of the 
exploration process (the lease sale, exploration, and production) 
as a series of related steps to be taken toward the ultimate objec-
tive of exploiting the OCS resources.381 Accordingly, the court de-
termined that agency action constitutes "the lease sale and all re-
sulting activities."88s In rejecting the claim that the lease sale 
violated section 7(d), however, the North Slope court considered 
only the pre-exploration activities883 rather than all resulting ac-
tivities, such as exploration and development, and found the cost 
of those activities acceptable.884 The court's refusal to find a sec-
tion 7(d) violation therefore ignored not only its premise that the 
intent of Congress was to prevent such massive investments, but 
also its premise that the reviewable agency action involved all 
steps of the project. 
If the North Slope court's initial premises are accepted, and 
the TVA u. Hill mandate that the agency insure that endangered 
species are not jeopardized is enforced, the lease sale is the most 
appropriate point to grant an injunction in order to avoid massive 
investments and thus prevent an irretrievable commitment of re-
sources during consultation. Support for this approach exists in 
the case of Nebraska u. Rural Electrification Administration.8811 
Nebraska involved a challenge to a proposed dam project that 
would possibly threaten the critical habitat of endangered whoop-
ing cranes.888 The Rural Electrification Administration (REA) 
had made loan guarantee commitments to the sponsors of the 
project, and the Army Corps of Engineers had issued a permit for 
dredging and filling operations.887 The court held that the actions 
... Id. at 350-51. 
... Id. at 351. 
... Id. at 352 . 
... Id. at 351. 
... Id. at 357. 
-Id . 
••• 12 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1156 (D. Neb. Oct. 2, 1978). 
••• The project included the construction of an electric generating station and a dam 
and reservoir on the Laramie River in Wyoming. Id. at 1157. The Laramie is a tributary of 
the North Platte River, which contains a critical habitat of the endangered whooping 
cranes. The REA had refused to initiate consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service to 
determine whether the cranes would be jeopardized by the project. Id. at 1170 . 
... Id. at 1157. 
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of the REA and the Corps of Engineers constituted an irretriev-
able commitment in violation of agency regulations containing a 
consultation requirement virtually identical to the subsequently 
enacted section 7(d),S66 even though construction had not begun, 
and therefore issued a preliminary injunction.s6t The court rea-
soned that the two agencies had not met their burden of insuring 
that no jeopardy would existS70 and that their actions would cre-
ate pressures to continue the project in the face of later informa-
tion that the project might be detrimental. S71 
Making a loan guarantee commitment or issuing a permit is 
analogous to conducting a lease sale. It is the essential first step 
in a project that quickly involves the commitment of massive 
amounts of resources. The court in Nebraska recognized that that 
first step would lead directly to the type of commitment that sec-
tion 7(d) and its precursor were intended to prohibit S72 and, ac-
knowledging the Supreme Court's strict interpretation of the 
ESA's absolute language,S7S stopped the project at that point.874 
In contrast to Nebraska, the court of appeals in eLF v. Andrus 
has not acknowledged the importance of the lease sale itself as 
the initial step of the Georges Bank project. This step is likely to 
generate pressure to continue the project at later stages, a pres-
sure that Congress sought to avoid and which will lead directly to 
sizable investments prior to the Secretary's decision whether to 
approve exploration plans. The court has adopted a narrow view 
of the scope of agency action under the ESA, looking only at an 
individual segment of the project, rather than taking a broad view 
of the project as a whole, a view that is essential if the preventive 
purpose of the statute is to be achieved. If the project can be jus-
tified, Congress has provided a means for the Secretary to avoid 
the strictures of the ESA's provisions. For at the same time that 
8O. [d. at 1180. At the time Nebraska v. REA was decided, the ESA had not yet been 
amended to include the section 7(d) prohibition against irretrievable commitments of re-
sources during consultation. The Fish and Wildlife Service, however, as the branch of In-
terior administering the ESA, had promulgated regulations containing a consultation re-
quirement virtually identical to the language of section 7(d). 50 C.F.R. § 402.04(a)(3) 
(1978). See Nebraska v. REA, 12 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1156, 1172 (D. Neb. Oct. 2, 1978) . 
••• Nebraska v. REA, 12 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1156, 1180 (D. Neb. Oct. 2, 1978) . 
••• [d. at 1171, 1173. 
871 [d. at 1172 . 
••• [d . 
.. a [d. at 1171. 
... [d. at 1181. 
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Congress added section 7(d)8'111 to prevent a premature investment 
of resources, it also provided for exemptions from the statute's 
provisions in situations where jeopardy cannot be insured against 
and where the project will provide important benefits.878 There-
fore, if the Secretary is unable to insure a lack of jeopardy, the 
appropriate course of action is to apply for an exemption.177 The 
court of appeals should have encouraged the Secretary to use the 
exemption procedure rather than restricting the focus of section 
7(d) so as to frustrate the intent of Congress. 
C. The Burden of Proof 
An additional consequence of the court's decision in CLF v. 
Andrus is that the court has effectively placed on the plaintiffs 
the burden of demonstrating whether the Secretary has complied 
with the ESA. The court of appeals did not specifically address 
the burden of proof issue, and the issue has not been resolved 
consistently by other courts. Yet the burden of proof is an impor-
tant issue in any litigation based on alleged ESA violations, be-
cause the plaintiffs' chances of success in challenging agency ac-
tion are much greater if the burden of demonstrating compliance 
falls on the agency. 
The ESA is an unusual statute. Its purpose is prophylactic'71 
and its requirements are strict.878 Section 7(a) requires agencies 
to insure that their actions will not jeopardize any endangered 
... 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (Supp. II 1978). 
I •• [d. §§ 1536(e), (g), (h). 
n. An exemption may be granted if 1) there are no reasonable alternatives to the agency 
action, 2) the benefits of the action clearly outweigh the benefits of alternatives that would 
conserve the species and the action is in the public interest, 3) the action is of regional or 
national significance, and 4) the adverse effects of the action on the species are minimized 
through reasonable mitigation measures. [d. § 1536(h)(I). 
Following the enactment of the 1978 ESA amendments, exemptions were requested for 
two projects - the Tellico Dam and the Grayrocks Dam. The Grayrocks Dam project, 
which was the focus of the controversy in Nebraska v. REA, was granted an exemption. 9 
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1776 (1979). The Tellico Dam, however, which was at issue in TVA v. 
Hill, was denied an exemption by a unanimous vote of the Endangered Species Commit-
tee, because a balancing of the costs and benefits demonstrated a negative net benefit, 
even after the project was 95 percent complete. [d. Congress subsequently amended an 
appropriations bill to exempt the Tellico Dam project from any law that might hinder its 
completion. Act of Sep. 25, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437, 449-50, reprinted in 
[1979] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS . 
••• See TVA V. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). 
n. See id. at 173. 
252 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 8:201 
species.s80 In TVA v. Hill the Supreme Court found the meaning 
of the provision plain and its language absolute.881 The Court re-
jected any attempt to add a judicial gloss of "reasonableness" to 
the ESA's requirements,882 reasoning that the intent of Congress 
was to reverse the trend toward the extinction of species, 
"whatever the cost,"888 and that any attempt to balance the inter-
ests of the species against the value or cost of a project was there-
fore inappropriate. 884 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)8811 presents a 
useful contrast to the ESA. While the language of the ESA is 
strict, NEPA merely requires agencies to give "appropriate con-
sideration" to environmental values in the decision-making pro-
cess.886 The agencies are not required to give environmental val-
ues paramount importance. 88'7 NEP A's requirements are 
essentially procedural888 -so long as the agency has considered 
all reasonable factors, courts are not to question the agency's final 
decision.889 Furthermore, under NEPA the burden of demonstrat-
ing a lack of compliance with the statute's requirements always 
remains on the plaintiffs.890 If they cannot demonstrate that the 
agency has violated the terms of NEP A, the agency is free to pro-
ceed with the project. 
The burden of demonstrating an agency's compliance with the 
ESA, however, must rest on the agency if the precautionary pur-
poses891 of the statute are to be effective. Placing the burden on 
the agency will insure that the agency fully accepts its statutory 
obligation to give endangered species top priority.892 If the agency 
has insured that no jeopardy exists, then the agency should easily 
be able to demonstrate to a reviewing court that the required 
••• 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. II 1978). While the language of section 7(a) has been 
modified slightly by the 1979 ESA amendments, its import remains unchanged. See text 
and notes at notes 406-09, infra . 
•• , TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) . 
••• Id. at 194 . 
••• Id. at 184 . 
••• Id. at 187 . 
••• 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976) . 
••• Id. § 4332(2)(B) (1976). See text at notes 123-70, supra . 
... Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 100 S.Ct 497, 500 (1980) . 
••• Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). 
"·Id . 
••• Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 818 (5th Cir. 1975) . 
•• , See text at notes 258-79, supra . 
••• See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978). 
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measures have been taken.393 On the other hand, if the challeng-
ing party must bear the burden of demonstrating a lack of com-
pliance, the agency will be free to proceed with a project until 
non-compliance can be positively shown. If a lack of compliance 
were not provable in court, the agency would be free to place en-
dangered species in jeopardy. In difficult situations the agency 
might be tempted to compromise its duty under the ESA, hoping 
that the challenging party would not be able to present sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate a statutory violation. Such a result 
would be inconsistent with the prophylactic purposes of the ESA. 
In Nebraska v. REA,"· where a dam project threatened the 
habitat of endangered whooping cranes, the court placed the bur-
den of demonstrating compliance on the agency.891i Relying on the 
Supreme Court's uncompromising interpretation of the ESA in 
TVA v. Hill,396 the court reasoned that while the agency may 
have been justified in concluding that no adverse impact would 
occur, the question was whether the agency had met its burden of 
insuring that there would be no jeopardy, and that the agency 
had not complied with the statute until it had provided that in-
surance.397 In refusing to place the burden on the parties chal-
lenging the agencies,898 the Nebraska court adopted an approach 
that gave full effect to the precautionary purposes of the ESA.899 
The nature of the consultation process established by section 7 
lends itself to a requirement that the agency demonstrate its 
••• The conference report on the 1979 ESA amendments states in reference to section 7 
of the ESA that "[t)his language continues to give the benefit of the doubt to the species, 
and it would continue to place the burden on the action agency to demonstrate to the 
consulting agency that its action will not violate [the new version of section 7(a)]." 1979 
H.R. CONF. REP., supra note 337, at 12, 1979 CONGo & AD. NEWS at 4780. If the action 
agency has the burden of demonstrating compliance to the consulting agency, then the 
action agency should carry the same burden before a reviewing court . 
••• 12 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1156 (D. Neb. Oct. 2, 1978) . 
••• Id. at 1171 . 
••• 437 U.S. 153 (1978). See text at notes 272-79, supra. 
S07 Nebraska v. REA, 12 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1156, 1171 (D. Neb. Oct. 2, 1978) . 
••• Id . 
••• Although the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion 
in National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 372 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 
sub nom. Boteler v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 429 U.S. 979 (1976), the case is questionable 
precedent. In that case, where the construction of an interstate highway threatened the 
habitat of the endangered sandhill crane, the court placed the burden of demonstrating 
agency non-compliance on the plaintiffs. Id. Coleman, however, was decided before the 
Supreme Court's strict interpretation of the ESA in TVA v. Hill and therefore before the 
absolute nature of the agency's obligation was judicially established. 
~-------------------
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compliance.40o Section 7(c) requires that, for any agency action, 
the agency must request a biological assessment from the appro-
priate consulting agency in order to identify any endangered spe-
cies present in the area and likely to be affected by the action.401 
Therefore, if the agency has not requested such an assessment, 
the agency has not insured against jeopardy and is not in compli-
ance with the statute. If an assessment has been obtained and no 
species is likely to be affected, the agency is free to proceed; but if 
any species is likely to be affected, section 7(b) requires the 
agency to obtain a biological opinion stating whether jeopardy 
will occur.401 If the agency has not obtained a biological opinion, 
it has not insured that jeopardy is not likely', and the agency is 
therefore not in compliance with the statute. If a biological opin-
ion has been issued based on information insufficient to deter-
mine whether jeopardy will occur, the agency likewise has not in-
sured that jeopardy is unlikely, and the agency is not in 
compliance with the statute.408 If a biological opinion is issued 
and states that jeopardy is likely to occur, the agency demonstra-
bly cannot insure that jeopardy is unlikely and can only comply 
with the statute by seeking an exemption under section 7(g).4H 
Only if the agency has obtained both a biological assessment and, 
if required, a biological opinion based on sufficient information to 
determine that jeopardy is unlikely has the agency complied with 
the statute. 
Thus the structure of the section 7 consultation process pro-
vides agencies with a simple mechanism for demonstrating that 
they have insured that their actions are not likely to jeopardize 
any endangered species. If the agency has not completed the con-
sultation process, then the challenging party should be entitled to 
an injunction against the agency action until the process has been 
completed and an opinion based on information sufficient to sup-
••• The following description of the consultation process reflects the changes in section 7 
included in the 1979 ESA amendments, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4, 93 Stat. 1226 (1979). 
While the language of section 7(a) has been altered slightly, the change does not alter the 
essential requirements, and the consultation process remains intact. See text and notes at 
notes 406-09, infra. 
"1 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c) (Supp. II 1978) . 
... [d. § 1536(b) . 
... Contra, North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 356-57 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 
1980). In North Slope, however, the district court's conclusion contradicted its initial 
premises. See text at notes 347-64, supra . 
... 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g) (Supp. II 1978). 
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port a conclusion that jeopardy is unlikely has been obtained. 
This mechanism places the burden on the agency, with the coop-
eration and the expertise of the consulting agency available to fa-
cilitate compliance with the statute, and furthers the intent of 
Congress to protect endangered species regardless of the cost. 
D. What Level of Harm Constitutes Jeopardy? 
A final issue raised in CLF v. Andrus, which the court of ap-
peals did not need to address because of its ruling that the lease 
sale is not an irretrievable commitment of resources, is the ques-
tion of the threshold for jeopardy.foll At what point does a threat 
to a species become so significant that it is deemed to jeopardize 
the species? 
The 1979 ESA Amendmentsf08 have made the question more 
complicated by altering slightly the critical language of section 
7(a). Whereas section 7(a) previously required each federal 
agency to "insure that any action . . . does not jeopardize the 
continued existence of any endangered species,"fo7 section 7(a)(2) 
now requires each federal agency to "insure that any action ... 
is not likely to jeopardize" endangered species.foB The legislative 
history of the 1979 amendments, however, suggests that, rather 
than watering down the strict requirements of the statute, Con-
gress simply intended to clarify the language of section 7 by con-
••• No physical threat to endangered species would occur until exploration activities be-
gin, because no chronic pollution or threat of an oil spill would exist beforehand. There-
fore the lease sale would violate the ESA only if it constituted an irretrievable commit-
ment of resources in violation of section 7(d). Since the court of appeals found no section 
7(d) violation, and looked only at the lease sale itself, rather than all resulting activities, 
the court did not consider whether the exploration activities would jeopardize the whales • 
... Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225 (amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-
1543 (Supp. II 1978» . 
••• 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. II 1978) (emphasis added) . 
... Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4, 93 Stat. 1226 (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. II 1978» 
(emphasis added). In its entirety, section 7(a)(2) reads: 
[d. 
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secre-
tary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency (herein-
after in this section referred to as an 'agency action') is not likely to jeopardize the 
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the 
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by 
the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical, un-
leBS such agency has been granted an exemption for such action by the Committee 
pursuant to subsection (h) of this section. In fulfilling the requirements of this para-
graph each agency shall use the best scientific and commercial data available. 
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forming it to existing interpretations,.o9 Therefore TVA v. Hill,no 
still stands as the authoritative interpretation of section 7, and 
the strictness of that interpretation has not been diluted. 
Nevertheless, the situation presented in CLF v. Andrus tests 
the limits of the ESA's requirements. In TVA v. Hill the jeopardy 
was clear-if the dam were completed, the snail darter would be 
eradicated. CLF v. Andrus, however, presents the opposite end of 
the spectrum. At the time of the court's decision in Round Two, 
the work on the Georges Bank project had not begun and no re-
sources had been committed,.n Furthermore, oil drilling acitivity 
in the Georges Bank area conceivably may never harm even a sin-
gle member of an endangered species. Yet the ESA should still 
apply, because its terms are strict, requiring agencies to insure 
that jeopardy is not likely and providing for no exceptions.411 
Since Congress did not define the terms "insure" and "jeopard-
ize", their ordinary meaning applies,.13 To insure is "to make cer-
tain,"4H and to jeopardize is to "expose to danger."4111 Therefore 
to insure that an agency action is not likely to jeopardize the con-
tinued existence of any endangered species is to make certain 
that members of an endangered species will not likely be exposed 
to danger of death or injury, so that the continued existence of 
•• 8 See 1979 H.R. CONF. REP., supra note 337, at 12, 1979 CONGo & AD. NEWS at 4780. 
Rather remarkably, the report does not specifically discuss the reasons for the change in 
the critical language of section 7(a), except to indicate that it brings the language into 
conformity with existing decisions. [d. Thus the legislative history indicates that the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the statute in TVA V. Hill still controls. The report goes 
on to state that the statute "continues to give the benefit of the doubt to the species," and 
continues to place on the action agency the burden of demonstrating compliance with sec-
tion 7(a)(2). [d, See text at notes 379-404, supra. 
The practical effect of the 1979 amendments is to recognize that it is impossible to 
demonstrate conclusively that a project does not jeopardize any endangered species, and 
therefore it should be sufficient for the agency to demonstrate that it has insured that no 
endangered species are likely to be jeopardized. That recognition, however, should not be 
used to dilute the essential requirements of section 7. Congress has given its approval to 
the Supreme Court's strict interpretation of the statute, and continues to place primary 
emphasis on the preservation of endangered species. 
41. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
... Since the lease sale had not been conducted at the time of the court's decision on 
Dec. 17, 1979, the potential lessees had' not acquired any rights to begin post-lease sale 
activities . 
... If the agency cannot comply with the requirements of section 7, the agency should 
request an exemption under section 7(g). See text and notes at notes 375-77, supra . 
... See Old Colony R.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1932) . 
... WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 439 (1967 ed.) . 
... [d. at 455. 
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the species is not threatened. In practical terms, then, the 
agency's obligation is to make certain that the species' chances 
for survival are not impaired. Any likely threat of harm to a criti-
cal portion of the species must be avoided. 
Many. endangered species can be found in the Georges Bank 
area,418 but the most significant threat posed by drilling activities 
is to the right whale and the humpback whale. Both species are 
present on Georges Bank for a large part of the year,·17 both are 
surface feeders and therefore particularly susceptible to oil 
spills,·18 and the populations of each remain critically low, so that 
the loss, including the loss of reproductive potential, of even a few 
members could impair the species' chances of survival .• 18 Because 
whales are by their nature virtually impossible to study thor-
oughly,.20 the potential adverse effects of spilled petroleum and of 
the pollutants contained in chronic drilling discharges is not 
known.m Consequently it is impossible to say with certainty that 
drilling activities on Georges Bank will not impair the whales' 
chances of survival. 
In claiming that the harm to the whales is speculative and re-
mote,422 the defendants in eLF v. Andrus have missed the point. 
The ESA is precautionary - the emphasis is not on the relative 
remoteness of the threatened harm, but rather on the agency's 
obligation to insure that jeopardy is not likely to occur, so long as 
the potential harm is to a critical portion of the species. To argue 
that the terms of the ESA should not apply because the 
threatened harm is remote. is to adopt an element of reasonable-
ness, an approach explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in 
.,. FES, supra note 6, at 389, 397. 
m Sanctuary Issue Paper, supra note 39, at 23, FSES at 514; FSES at 657 . 
... FSES, supra note 6, at 657-59 . 
• ,. Id. at 658. 
••• Whales are among the largest of living creatures. They range over wide areas of the 
ocean, migrating thousands of miles each year. Many species of whales are endangered 
because their populations have been reduced severely as a result of widespread commercial 
hunting. These factors make it difficult to study whales carefully, and because oil pollution 
is so unpredictable, it is impossible to study its effects on whales with any degree of con-
trol. Therefore the effects of oil pollution on whales are likely to remain poorly under-
stood. For more information on whales, see Scarff, The International Management of 
Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary Assessment (pt. 1), 6 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 323 (1977). 
... FSES, supra note 6, at 655 . 
••• Federal Defendants' Third Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment and in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motions for Preliminary Injunction at 13-14, Massachusetts v. 
Andrus, 481 F. Supp. 685 (D. Mass. Nov. 5, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Fed. Memo III]. 
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TVA v. Hill .. m While the Supreme Court was confronted with a 
situation where the threatened harm was certain and immediate, 
the Court did not limit its interpretation of the statute.424 Ac-
cording to the Court, the intent of Congress was to reverse the 
trend toward the extinction of species, regardless of the cost.4211 
Congress has not rejected that interpretation. In subsequent 
amendments to the ESA,426 the requirement continues to be ex-
acting. Instead, Congress has added the consultation requirement 
of section 7(d)427 in order to avoid the TVA v. Hill type of situa-
tion, m where the jeopardy is not discovered until after the pro-
ject is well under way, and added the exemption provisions of sec-
tions 7(g)429 and (h)430 in order to overcome the prohibitions of 
section 7(a)(2)431 for any project that can justify such an exemp-
tion.432 Therefore the Supreme Court's sweeping interpretation of 
the ESA's requirements stands and its rigid quality remains 
unbending. 
While the precise nature of the threat to the whales from drill-
ing activities is not known, the existence of the threat is not dis-
puted.433 There is no question that drilling activity will generate 
significant amounts of pollution, both from chronic discharges434 
and from oil spills.4311 The question is the extent of that pollu-
tion's impact on the endangered whales. The Georges Bank envi-
ronmental impact statement (EIS) says that the "existence and 
extent of this danger [of whale mortality caused by oil spills] re-
mains unanswered."436 Nevertheless the EIS states that oil spills 
may force the whales to shift their migration patterns, forcing 
them to feed in less desirable habitats that "probably cannot sup-
••• 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) . 
... Id. at 173. 
mId. at 184 . 
••• Act of Nov. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751; Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. 
No. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225 . 
... 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (Supp. II 1978) (amended 1979) . 
••• See 124 CONGo REC. S1O,896 (daily ed. July 17, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Culver); 1979 
H.R. CONF. REP., supra note 337, at 13, 1979 CONGo & AD. NEWS at 4781. 
••• 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g) (Supp. II 1978) (amended 1979) . 
••• Id. § 1536(h) . 
•• , Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4, 93 Stat. 1226 (1979) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. II 
1978» . 
••• See note 377, supra, for exemption requirements . 
••• FES, supra note 6, at 917-22. 
••• I d. at 1255-56 . 
••• Id. at 1256-57 . 
... Id. at 917. 
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port their foraging,"·37 which in turn "will add additional stress to 
populations and can be particularly harmful to calves and 
juveniles."·38 Furthermore, there is "some circumstantial evidence 
of the detrimental effects of increasing pollution levels."u8 Fi-
nally, the EIS states that "the potential for impact [to the hump-
back] is present in all phases" of development activity,"o and 
that if the population of the right whale is as low as is estimated, 
"the loss of any individuals as a direct or indirect effect of oil and 
gas development can be considered a significant 10ss."··1 The de-
fendants' own documents therefore indicate that a critical portion 
of these species is threatened. The defendants simply cannot in-
sure that these species are not likely to be jeopardized, since in-
formation is not available to establish that the whales will not 
likely be harmed, and since what information is available suggests 
just the opposite .•• 2 
Because the threat of harm is to a critical portion of the two 
species, the threshold of jeopardy has been crossed. Since the de-
fendants cannot insure that no endangered species is likely to be 
jeopardized, they may not make any irretrievable commitment of 
resources until they demonstrate that jeopardy is unlikely or ob-
tain an exemption under section 7(h). The information necessary 
to determine whether the whales will be harmed may take years 
to accumulate. Yet the resulting delay in exploiting oil and gas 
resources is a factor that a reviewing court must not consider. 
The Supreme Court has concluded that courts are not empowered 
to balance the cost of such a delay, no matter how significant, 
against the threat to the endangered species,.·3 because Congress 
has already balanced the conflicting interests and has tipped the 
scales decisively in favor of the species.··· Georges Bank presents 
... [d. at 918 . 
•• 8 [d . 
••• [d. at 920 . 
••• [d. at 921. 
•• , [d. at 922 . 
••• In North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332 (D. D.C. Jan. 22, 1980), the 
court interpreted section 7(a)(2) to create a presumption in favor of continuing the project 
unless a negative biological opinion (indicating that jeopardy will likely occur) is issued. 
[d. at 356. The court's interpretation, however, contradicts the intent of Congress to "give 
the benefit of the doubt to the species." 1979 H.R. CONF. REp., supra note 337, at 12, 1979 
CONGo & An. NEWS at 4780. See note 409, supra; see text at notes 347-64, supra. 
44. See TVA V. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 (1978) . 
••• [d. at 194. The legislative history of the 1979 ESA amendments reaffirms the Su-
preme Court's interpretation. See note 409, supra. 
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precisely the type of situation in which the ESA has its most far-
reaching effect. Congress has provided a method for exempting a 
sufficiently important project from the statute's coverage. Be-
cause Congress has explicitly provided one method of exemption, 
other methods are implicitly excluded.4411 Neither the agency nor 
the courts should attempt to circumvent the established statutory 
framework in order to impose their notions of reasonableness on 
the provisions of the ESA. Reliance on an element of reasonable-
ness is precisely what the Supreme Court and Congress have em-
phatically rejected.44' Until there is a clear indication that the 
strict requirements of the ESA have been tempered, they should 
remain in full force.447 
The court of appeals' handling of the ESA issues in eLF v. An-
drus may represent the beginning of a process of erosion for the 
ESA's strict requirements, similar to the gradual decline of 
NEPA's effectiveness.448 The court refused to regard the lease 
sale as an irretrievable commitment of resources in violation of 
section 7(d), even though the compensation requirements of the 
OCSLA and the expense of pre-exploration activities provided 
ample grounds for doing so. At the same time, the court has effec-
tively placed the burden of demonstrating the agency's lack of 
compliance on the challenging party, a result that may frustrate 
the purposes of the statute by encouraging agencies to proceed 
with projects until forced to take notice of demonstrable viola-
tions. The court's approach also suggests that the threat to the 
whales on Georges Bank may be considered too remote to consti-
tute "jeopardy" under the terms of the ESA. 
The effect of the court's decision is already apparent. The 
••• According to the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that which is ex-
pressed in a statute implies the exclusion of that which is not expressed. Under this 
maxim, the fact that Congress has provided one means of avoiding the strict requirements 
of section 7(a) implies that Congress did not intend reviewing courts to construe other 
means of skirting those requirements. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978) . 
••• [d. at 194, See H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1978] U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 9453, 9453 (the purpose of the 1978 amendments is to introduce 
some flexibility into the act by establishing an exemption process); 1979 H.R. CONF. REP., 
supra note 337, at 12, 1979 CONGo & AD. NEWS at 4780 (1979 amendments are intended to 
bring the language of the Act into conformity with existing interpretations). 
••• Congress has indicated its satisfaction with the existing interpretations of the ESA. 
See 1979 H.R. CONF. REp., supra note 337, at 12, 1979 CONGo & AD. NEWS at 4780. Review-
ing courts should not interpret the altered language of section 7(a)(2) as moderating the 
statutory requirements until Congress gives some positive indication of a change of heart . 
••• See text at notes 208-12, supra. 
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North Slope court relied on the CLF v. Andrus decision while 
interpreting the ESA.449 The lease sale situation presents a litmus 
test for the statute-if a lease sale is not considered an irretriev-
able commitment and the threatened harm to the whales is not 
sufficient to constitute jeopardy, then the ESA will not be applied 
in the situations such as Georges Bank where its effect would be 
the most significant-where the danger to a species is not fully 
appreciated until the harm has occurred. In TVA v. Hill the Su-
preme Court strictly construed the ESA, and that construction 
suggests that lease sales should fall within the coverage of the 
statute. The ESA requires a precautionary approach, because if 
the courts "were to err on the side of permissiveness . . . the 
most eloquent argument would be of little consequence to an ex-
tinct species. "4110 
V. THE SECRETARY'S DUTY TO PROTECT THE FISHERIES 
While the court of appeals had an opportunity under the En-
dangered Species Act to consider previously uninterpreted as-
pects of a relatively new statute, in reviewing the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)Ul the court relied on a single 
phrase in an old statute intended to regulate the development of 
mineral resources to give the statute a potentially expansive envi-
ronmental scope. In Round One of CLF v. Andrus, the court of 
appeals held that the OCSLA impos_ed upon the Secretary of the 
Interior a duty to protect the Georges Bank fisheries while per-
forming his other obligations under the statute.UII At the same 
time, however, the court defined the Secretary's duty in conflict-
ing terms, so that in Round Two the parties could plausibly argue 
contradictory interpretations of the Secretary's duty. Unfortu-
nately, the court did little in Round Two to dispel the confusion 
it had generated. Consequently, although the court has clearly de-
lineated the sources of the Secretary's duty and given a general 
description of the nature of the duty, the extent of the judicially 
••• North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 353 & n. 69 (D. D.C. Jan. 22, 
1980). The court cited CLF v. Andrus to support its conclusion that the section 7(d) con-
sultation requirement applies independently to each discrete step of the project, and that 
therefore the first step of the project may proceed even if the agency has not insured that 
jeopardy is unlikely at later stages of the project. Id . 
••• Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1072 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) . 
•• , 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1356, 1801-1866 (West Supp. 1979) . 
••• Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 889 (1st Cir. 1979). 
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reviewable substantive obligations which that duty imposes upon 
the Secretary remains unclear. If the Secretary's duty is broad 
and the question of his compliance with the duty is fully review-
able, the court of appeals may have recognized a potentially pow-
erful new weapon for environmental litigation. 
A. The Nature and Sources of the Secretary's Duty 
In Round One of the litigation, the court of appeals examined 
the grounds for the preliminary injunction issued by the district 
court and held that those grounds were no longer sufficient to jus-
tify continuing the injunction.4113 The court, however, also went 
beyond the immediate issue of whether to continue the injunction 
in order to recognize that the Secretary has a duty to protect the 
Georges Bank fisheries while overseeing the development of OCS 
oil and gas resources,4114 and that his duty attaches at the time of 
the lease sale.41111 In considering the nature and sources of the Sec-
retary's duty, the court found that the duty arises not only from 
the terms of the OCSLA, but also from the provisions of NEP A 4116 
and the Fishery Conservation and Management Act,4117 as well as 
the common law public trust doctrine.4118 The court's definition of 
the nature of that duty, however, supports conflicting interpreta-
tions of the extent of the Secretary's duty. 
The court of appeals found the primary source of the Secre-
tary's duty to protect the fisheries to be in the terms of the OC-
SLA,4119 even prior to its amendment in 1978.480 Section 5(a)(1) of 
the statute, as originally written, provided in relevant part that 
"[t]he Secretary may at any time prescribe and amend such 'rules 
and regulations as he determines to be necessary and proper in 
order to provide for the prevention of waste and conservation of 
the natural resources of the outer Continental Shelf . . .. "461 The 
court of appeals interpreted that language as requiring the Secre-
••• Id. at 887. See text at notes 64-88, supra . 
••• Id. at 889 . 
••• Id . 
••• 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976) . 
... 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) . 
••• Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 890-92 (lst Cir. 1979) . 
••• 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1356, 1801-1866 (West Supp. 1979) . 
••• Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 
Stat. 629 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343) . 
•• , 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(l) (1976). The wording quoted here was not changed by the 1978 
amendments. 
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tary to regulate oil and gas activities so as to harmonize the com-
peting interests in the various resources of the OCS .• 82 The court 
rejected the defendants' argument that the permissive language 
of section 5(a)(1) merely empowered, rather than commanded, 
the Secretary to consider the interests of the fisheries,·83 reason-
ing that the word "may" in a statute can be treated as imposing a 
duty where the statute confers a power to be exercised for the 
benefit of the public!8. The court considered such an interpreta-
tion especially appropriate here, since the Secretary's power to 
enter leases was also phrased in discretionary terms·811 and there-
fore did not mandate "the singleminded exploitation of oil and 
gas resources. ".88 
The court of appeals found additional support for its interpre-
tation of the Secretary's duty from other sources. First, the court 
invoked the seldom-used "public trust" doctrine, which is based 
on the common law notion that the Secretary of the Interior is 
the guardian of the people and therefore is bound to see that 
none of the public domain is wasted .• 87 The court reasoned that 
the duty to protect the fisheries would be in keeping with that 
doctrine .• 88 Second, the court of appeals viewed its interpretation 
of the Secretary's duty as consistent with the policies of NEPA,.88 
which require a careful weighing of the benefits to be gained from 
the exploitation of one resource against the harm that may occur 
to others!70 FinllDy, the court considered the Secretary's duty to 
••• Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 889 (1st Cir. 1979) . 
••• Id. at 889-90 . 
••• Id. at 890. See United States ex rei. Siegel v. Thoman, 156 U.S. 353, 359 (1895) . 
••• Section 8(a)(1) of the OCSLA states in part that U[tjhe Secretary is authorized to 
grant to the highest responsible qualified bidder or bidders by competitive bidding, under 
regulations promulgated in advance, any oil and gas lease on submerged lands of the outer 
Continental Shelf .... " 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337(a)(1) (West Supp. 1979) (emphasis added). 
Other subsections of section 8 refer repeatedly to the discretionary nature of the various 
aspects of the Secretary's authority to grant leases . 
••• Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 890 (1st Cir. 1979). 
487 Id. See Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 181 (1891). When the 
government holds a resource that is available for the free use of the general public, the 
courts will frown upon any attempt to reallocate the resource to more restricted uses or to 
subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine 
in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 490 
(1970) . 
••• Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 890 (1st cir. 1979) . 
••• 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976). This section declares a congressional policy to "use all prac-
tical means" to preserve man's environment. 
470 Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 891 (1st Cir. 1979). Although many courts 
have recognized that NEPA may establish some substantive requirements, in recent years 
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be reinforced by the enactment in 1976 of the Fishery Conserva-
tion and Management Actm (Fishery Act), since a major purpose 
of Congress in passing the statute was to protect the fisheries on 
Georges Bank.·72 Although the responsibility for implementing 
the Fishery Act lies with the Department of Commerce rather 
than with Interior,·'78 the court reasoned that the statute never-
theless reflects a federal interest in protecting the OCS fishery 
resources equal to that in developing the mineral resources under 
the OCSLA .• '7. Therefore, the Secretary must give effect to both 
policies by construing them so as to minimize conflict between 
them. 4'7 II These conflicting policies, the court continued, could best 
be reconciled not by giving mineral development absolute priority 
over the fisheries, but rather by balancing the interests in the two 
resources in such a way that the fisheries would not be seriously 
harmed by oil and gas activities.4'7· 
The court of appeals regarded the 1978 OCSLA amendments as 
spelling out the nature of the Secretary's duty to the fisheries.·'7'7 
Congress had included in the amendments several provisions set-
ting up environmental safeguards, such as an oil spill liability 
fund,·'78 a fishermen's gear compensation fund,·'79 and authoriza-
tion to cancel leases where a severe and long-lasting threat to the 
the emphasis has increasingly been placed on NEPA's procedur~ requirements. See text 
at notes 123-70, supra. Therefore the court of appeals could only find support of a supple-
mental nature in NEP A, and its decision would have been open to challenge if it had 
based its interpretation of the Secretary's duty primarily on NEP A . 
... Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976 & 
Supp. II 1978». 
m Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 891 (1st Cir. 1979). Because Georges Bank is 
such a productive fishing ground, it has been overfished by international fishing fleets for a 
number of years. The severe depletion of fish stocks was a major factor in Congress' deci-
sion to enact the Fishery Conservation and Management Act in order to regulate fishing 
activities and thereby allow the fisheries to return to normal levels of productivity. See 
Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1043 (1st Cir. 1977) . 
... See 16 U.S.C. § 1802(20) (1976). 
m Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 891 (1st Cir. 1979). 
no [d. The court cited Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 
235, 250 (1970), for the proposition that, where conflicting federal policies exist, the stat-
utes must be construed so as to give effect to both policies as far as possible. Massachu-
setts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 890-91 (1st Cir. 1979). 
478 Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 891 (1st Cir. 1979). 
477 [d . 
... Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 302, 
92 Stat. 672 (1978) (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1812). 
no [d., § 402, 92 Stat. 686 (1978) (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1842). 
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environment was found to exist.480 According to the court, those 
provisions indicated that the Secretary must consider and protect 
other resources while exploiting the mineral resources!81 The 
court regarded the provisions as establishing specific methods of 
minimizing or eliminating conflicts with other resources.481 The 
amendments thus indicated that, although Congress sought to ex-
pedite exploitation, it also intended to avoid serious damage to 
renewable resources.483 
The court made it clear that the Secretary's duty to protect the 
fisheries arises at the time of the lease sale. The court stated that 
the Secretary's duty "includes the obligation not to go forward 
with a lease sale in a particular area if it would create unreasona-
ble risks in spite of all feasible safeguards,"484 but that if the 
damage to fishing would not be significant "the Secretary may 
determine that leasing should proceed even if some harm may re-
sult."486 Consequently, while the Secretary need not prevent harm 
that is "of no major consequence,"488 he must avoid an unreason-
able risk of harm to the fisheries, and he must do so beginning at 
the time of the lease sale. 
A major difficulty, however, arose from the court of appeals' ef-
forts to delineate the extent of the Secretary's duty and the 
power of the courts to review the Secretary's efforts to comply 
with that duty. The court described the Secretary's duty in strong 
terms that indicated a significant substantive obligation "to exer-
cise due diligence that the resources be in fact protected. "487 At 
the same time, though, the court suggested that a reviewing 
court's role in determining whether the Secretary had complied 
with his obligation to the fisheries would be a narrow one,488 sug-
••• Id., § 204, 92 Stat. 637 (1978) (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2» . 
••• Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 891-92 (1st Cir. 1979) . 
••• Id. at 891. 
•• a In its decision in Round One enjoining the lease sale, the district court also found 
support for the Secretary's duty in the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1451-1464 (1976). Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1138, 1140 (D. Mass. 
Jan. 28, 1978). The CZMA establishes a national policy to preserve, protect, develop and 
restore the resources of the country's coastal zone. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (1976). Subsequent 
arguments concerning the Secretary's duty, however, were not based on the CZMA and the 
court of appeals did not mention the statute in discussing the Secretary's duty . 
... Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 889 (1st cir. 1979) . 
••• Id . 
••• Id . 
••• Id. at 890 . 
... Id. at 892. 
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gesting that the Secretary, rather than the court, had the task of 
balancing the competing interests,489 and that "the Secretary 
must determine which interest must give way, and to what de-
gree."490 Consequently, in Round Two the plaintiffs were able to 
argue that the court of appeals had set a very high standard of 
care for the Secretary, a standard which the Secretary had not 
met and which implied a strict standard of judicial review.491 At 
the same time, the defendants could argue that it was the Secre-
tary's responsibility to make the ultimate decision whether to 
proceed with the lease sale after considering the competing inter-
ests,492 and that the court could not interfere with that decision 
unless it was irrational or in violation of the law.493 Nevertheless, 
even though the court of appeals was squarely confronted with 
conflicting interpretations of the Secretary's duty, it failed to ad-
dress the issue directly. 
B. The Extent of the Secretary's Duty 
Although in Round One the court of appeals recognized that 
the Secretary of the Interior had a duty to avoid unreasonable 
risks to the Georges Bank fisheries, in Round Two the court ad-
dressed only one aspect of that duty, even though the plaintiffs 
had raised extensive arguments concerning other specific aspects 
of the duty.494 In Round Two the court held that the Secretary 
was not obligated, prior to conducting the lease sale, to promul-
gate new regulations necessary to define best available and safest 
technology (BAST),49& which the 1978 OCSLA amendments re-
quire lessees to use on all new OCS drilling operations, prior to 
conducting the lease sale.49B The court did not address questions 
... [d. at 889. 
'.0 [d . 
•• , CLF Brief II, supra note 101, at 43-57; Mass. Brief II, supra note 104, at 19-26 . 
••• Brief for the Federal Appellees at 35-37, CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. 
Cas.) (BNA) 1049 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Fed. Brief I) . 
••• Brief in Support of Federal Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 10-12, 
Massachusetts v. Andrus, 481 F. Supp. 685 (D. Mass. Nov. 5, 1979) [hereinafter cited as 
Fed. Brief II) . 
••• See CLF Brief II, supra note 101, at 43-62; Mass. Brief II, supra note 104, at 26-29 . 
••• CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1054 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979) . 
••• Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 208, 
92 Stat. 655 (1978) (to be codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b)); cf. Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)(I)(A), 1311(b)(2)(A) (West 1978) (requiring the use of the best practi-
cable control technology currently available and the best available technology economi-
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concerning other aspects of the Secretary's duty, such as whether 
the safeguards which the Secretary claimed to have taken actually 
provided any additional protection for the fisheries, and whether 
despite those safeguards the risk to the fisheries remained unrea-
sonable. The court also did not attempt to clarify whether the 
reviewing court should adopt a strict or a deferential standard of 
review in determining whether the Secretary has complied with 
his duty;m Each of these aspects of the Secretary's duty raises 
questions about the extent to which the Secretary must consider 
the effects of OCS drilling operations on the Georges Bank 
fisheries, and the extent to which those requirements can be 
enforced. 
1. The Standard of Review 
A threshold issue affecting the consideration of all other as-
pects of the Secretary's duty to protect the fisheries is the stan-
dard of review to be applied by the courts. Since the standard of 
review determines the level of scrutiny the court will use in re-
viewing the agency action or decision, a limited standard of re-
view would make it more difficult for parties to challenge the Sec-
retary's actions for a failure to comply with his duty, while a 
broad standard of review would subject the Secretary's actions to 
a more searching examination. In defining the Secretary's duty in 
Round One, the court of appeals appeared to establish a high 
standard of care for the Secretary, stating that his duty includes 
an obligation not to conduct a particular lease sale "if it would 
create unreasonable risks in spite of all feasible safeguards,"488 
and to refuse to permit drilling activities that pose too great a 
threat to a fishery."88 At the same time, however, the court of ap-
peals suggested that a limited standard of review would be 
cally achievable) . 
•• 7 The standard of review adopted by the court was not clear. The court was consider-
ing an appeal of the district court's decision denying a preliminary injunction and stated 
that the proper standard was whether the district court's decision was "clearly erroneous 
or clearly the result of an error of law." CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) 1049, 1050 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1979). At the same time, however, the court indicated 
that it was deciding two issues on the merits, ruling that the lease sale would not violate 
the ESA and that the Secretary was not required to promulgate BAST regulations prior to 
conducting the lease sale. [d. at 1055 n.7. Presumably a more searching standard of review 
was invoked to decide those two issues, but the court gave no indication of that . 
••• Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 889 (1st Cir. 1979) . 
••• [d. at 889. 
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adopted, stating that the task of balancing the competing inter-
ests "is committed to the Secretary, and so long as he carries it 
out rationally and in conformity to the law, the courts may not 
intervene. "600 
A limited standard of review, however, is inadequate if the Sec-
retary's duty is to have any practical significance. The reviewing 
court must be able to examine the merits of the Secretary's deci-
sions in order to determine whether any risk to the fisheries that 
remains after all feasible safeguards have been taken is unreason-
able. It is not sufficient for the court simply to determine whether 
the Secretary made a decision in a reasonable manner601 or 
whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence in 
the record,602 because such a limited determination does not con-
sider whether the Secretary's decision is correct, but rather fo-
cuses on the procedural aspects of the decision. The Secretary 
may have acted in a reasonable manner in reaching his decision, 
and yet the risk involved may remain unreasonable because the 
threatened harm is too great or too immediate. Conversely, if the 
risk is in fact reasonable but the Secretary refuses to conduct the 
lease sale, then the Secretary's decision is unreasonable, even 
though he may have followed correct procedures and created an 
adequate record. In either case, the court cannot determine 
whether the Secretary's decision is correct without first evaluating 
the nature of the risk to ascertain whether it remains unreasona-
ble. Only after the court has determined whether the risk is rea-
sonable can it determine whether the decision itself was reasona-
bly made. A narrow standard of review prevents the court from 
making such a determination because a narrow standard does not 
allow the court to examine the nature of the risk or the propriety 
of the decision itself. 
In Round Two the court of appeals did not discuss the appro-
priate standard of review for determining the Secretary's compli-
000 Id. at 892. 
0.1 If the applicable statute does not establish a higher standard of review, then under 
the traditional standard for the review of agency action a reviewing court is to determine 
only whether an agency's decision was reasonable, and not whether it was right. B. 
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 609 (1976). 
0.1 In reviewing agency findings of fact, a court is to determine whether those findings 
are supported by substantial evidence in the record. The standard is a deferential one -
the court is to determine the reasonableness, not the rightness, of the agency's findings. Id. 
at 592-95. In eLF v. Andrus, however, the court was not reviewing findings of fact, but 
rather whether the Secretary had complied with his substantive statutory duties. 
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ance with his duty. The district court interpreted the Round One 
court of appeals decision as indicating that the appropriate test is 
whether the Secretary's decision was arbitrary or capricious. loa 
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard, however, is too limited, 
because it does not lend itself easily to a searching review of 
ageny action. II04 While in theory the standard is flexible and per-
mits a review of substantive as well as procedural compliance,IIOIl 
in practice the standard is a deferential one, under which the re-
viewing court engages in a presumption of regularity toward the 
agency's decisionll06 and does not substitute its judgment for that 
of the agency.1I07 
Undue deference to the agency, however, is inappropriate when 
the agency's obligation is substantive. Here, the Secretary is obli-
gated to see that the fishery resources are in fact protected.II08 
The Secretary's duty requires more than adherence to proper pro-
cedures. Instead the Secretary must avoid a threat of serious 
harm to the fisheries. lIoe The courts can insure that the Secretary 
has complied with his duty only by conducting a searching and 
careful inquiry into the recordlilo and by drawing an independent 
conclusion as to whether the risk remains unreasonable and 
therefore whether the Secretary's decision was proper. The defer-
ence usually shown to agencies under the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard precludes such a thorough examination of the 
Secretary's actions; consequently this standard is not adequate to 
'.3 Massachusetts v. Andrus, 481 F. Supp. 685, 692 (D. Mass. Nov. 5, 1979). The "arbi-
trary and capricious" standard has been codified in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976) . 
... See, e.g. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I, 34-35 & n.74 (D.C. Cir. 1976) . 
••• See NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Greater Boston Television 
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) . 
.... Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) . 
•• 7 [d. at 416. Courts often prefer to adopt a deferential standard in reviewing agency 
action because agencies, and not the courts, are presumed to have expertise, and thus a 
special competence, in their areas of resonsibility. See FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 
404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972). Courts presume that the agency's expertise will usually lead to a 
correct decision, whereas the courts, with their lack of expertise, would be less likely to 
reach a correct decision on their own. See NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 
1979). But see Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,36 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (although the standard 
for reviewing agency findings of fact is a deferential one, the reviewing court must still use 
close scrutiny for even the most complex technical matters in order to understand the case 
and properly perform its reviewing function). 
'.8 Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 890 (1st Cir. 1979). 
'.0 [d. at 891. 
&1. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). 
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determine the Secretary's compliance with his duty, and a stricter 
standard of review is necessary. 
2. All Feasible Safeguards 
While the court of appeals has not resolved the issue of the 
standard of review, it did specify in Round One the two essential 
factors that the reviewing court must examine in determining 
whether the Secretary has met his duty to protect the fisheries: 
whether he has taken all feasible safeguards and, if so, whether 
the remaining risk to the fisheries is unreasonable. lUI The court of 
appeals clearly indicated that these factors are to be considered 
at the time of the lease sale and that, if the risk remains unrea-
sonable, the Secretary's duty requires him not to conduct the 
sale. 1HZ The court's view of the lease sale in Round One as the 
point at which the Secretary's duty under the OCSLA attaches 
stands in sharp contrast to the court's view in Round Two that 
the lease sale is not a proper time to invoke the provisions of the 
Endangered Species Act. IUS Since the obligation to insure against 
jeopardizing endangered species and the duty to protect the 
fisheries entail similar responsibilities, the court's effort to en-
force the two obligations at different times creates a fundamental 
inconsistency. Although the court's analysis in Round Two im-
plies that the court may no longer consider the time of the lease 
sale significant for the Secretary's duty,1I1. nevertheless the court 
has not directly rejected its Round One view that the lease sale is 
the appropriate time to examine the Secretary's actions. 
Although the court of appeals in Round One suggested that the 
Secretary must implement all feasible safeguards,lIl11 in Round 
Two the court held that the Secretary was not required to adopt 
... Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 889 (1st Cir. 1979). 
0" Id. 
0 .. See CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1050-51 (1st Cir. 
Dec. 17, 1979). . 
0" The court refused to consider the lease sale as an irretrievable commitment of re-
sources in violation of section 7(d) of the ESA, see text at notes 302-10, supra, and, with-
out acknowledging its definition of the Secretary's duty in Round One, declared that "[w]e 
know of no authority which would support enjoining the lease sale until BAST regulations 
are promulgated." CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1051 
(lst Cir. Dec. 17, 1979). Thus, when confronted with its first opportunity to apply the 
Secretary's duty at the time of the lease sale, the court of appeals did not do so, suggesting 
that its view of the lease sale might have changed . 
... Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 889 (lst Cir. 1979). 
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the safeguard of promulgating regulations to define the best avail-
able and safest technology (BAST)&18 to be used on all oes drill-
ing operations. m The court agreed with the defendants' argu-
ment&18 that because of changing technology the Secretary's duty 
to develop the BAST regulations is an on-going process and that, 
since subsequently promulgated regulations would apply to pre-
existing leases, the lease sale need not be enjoined. &19 In rejecting 
the plaintiffs' argument that the failure to provide BAST regula-
tions before the lease sale violated the OeSLA, the court ignored 
the relevance of the Secretary's duty to the fisheries as defined in 
Round One,&lo and concluded its opinion by remarking that the 
plaintiffs would be free to argue on the merits that the Secretary 
had violated his duty to the fisheries. &21 
Yet the promulgation of BAST regulations would appear to be 
a perfect example of the type of safeguard that should be imple-
mented prior to the lease sale in order for the Secretary to fulfill 
his duty to the fisheries. That BAST regulations would provide 
additional protection is undisputed. &12 Furthermore, Interior had 
already had sufficient time to promulgate the BAST regulations, 
since more than a year had elapsed following the enactment of 
the OeSLA provision requiring the regulations. &28 Therefore the 
Secretary's argument that the regulations were in the process of 
being formulated and that they would be in place before explora-
tion begins&24 offers slim justification for refusing to delay the 
lease sale, when the court's definition of the Secretary's duty ap-
pears to encompass the promulgation of such regulations as a fea-
sible safeguard prior to conducting the lease sale.U & 
.'8 See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1347(b) (West Supp. 1979). 
017 CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1054 (1st Cir. Dec. 
17, 1979) . 
• '8 Intervenor Brief I, supra note 6, at 32-34 . 
• '9 CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1054 (lst Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979) . 
••• See note 514, supra . 
... CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1055 (lst Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979) . 
••• See Fed. Brief I, supra note 492, at 38-43 . 
••• The OCSLA Amendments of 1978 were enacted Sep. 18, 1978 . 
••• Fed. Memo III, supra note 422, at 6. 
••• Defendants also argued that the Secretary had provided other extraordinary safe-
guards that indicated the Secretary's effort to comply with his duty. Fed. Brief II, supra 
note 493, at 16-28. Prior to the lease sale the Secretary deleted twelve additional environ-
mentally sensitive tracts from the sale, established an advisory Biological Task Force to 
monitor the dangers of oil activity on Georges Bank, Boston Globe, Sep. 22, 1979, at 15, 
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3. Unreasonable Risks 
Even if the Secretary has taken all feasible safeguards, a deci-
sion to hold the lease sale is a violation of his duty if the risk to 
the fisheries remains unreasonable. &28 In order to determine 
whether the risk is unreasonable, the court must examine the in-
formation on which the Secretary based his decision. The court of 
appeals gave no indication in Round Two that it had conducted 
such an examination. Yet the record suggests that information 
sufficient to establish the reasonableness of the risk did not ex-
ist.&27 Consequently, the court should have enjoined the lease sale 
until the Secretary had performed an assessment of the risk suffi-
cient to determine its reasonableness. 
The court of appeals should have found the risk to the fisheries 
unreasonable on two grounds. First, insufficient information was 
available to determine the extent of the damage that will result 
from the chronic pollution associated with drilling operations. U8 
That information could be obtained by conducting further stud-
ies. Second, the Campeche blowout challenges previous assump-
tions that the risk of a major spill during exploratory operations 
is minimal.lI28 Because 'a spill like Campeche on Georges Bank 
would likely be catastrophic, &30 the court should have required 
col. 5, and adopted revised lease stipulations to authorize stricter operating standards. 44 
Fed. Reg. 66,150, 66,165-67 (1979). See text at notes 95-96, supra. The plaintifs argued, 
however, that the Secretary's efforts were not as significant as they might seem - the 
deletion of individual tracts from the lease sale would not eliminate the possibility of pol-
lution from other nearby tracts, the lease sale stipulations (which are additional require-
ments contained in individual leases) were not new, having been applied to the Beaufort 
Sea lease sale, and in any case the stipulations did not provide any assurance of additional 
protection, since they merely empowered, rather than required, the Secretary to enforce 
additional protective measures. CLF Brief II, supra note 101, at 38-42. Regardless of the 
effectiveness of these measures, the issue is not whether the Secretary took certain steps. 
The issue is whether he established all feasible safeguards, and if so, whether the risk 
remains unreasonable. Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 889 (1st Cir. 1979). Since 
promulgation of the BAST regulations is a feasible safeguard that has not been imple-
mented, the fact that the Secretary provided other safeguards does not resolve the issue of 
the Secretary's compliance with his duty . 
••• Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 889 (1st Cir. 1979). 
on See Sanctuary Issue Paper, supra note 39, at 35-65, FSES at 526-56. See text at 
notes 532-39, infra . 
••• Sanctuary Issue Paper, supra note 39, at 35-65, FSES at 526-56. 
••• See FES, supra note 6, at 6. 
••• Even a spill of only 37,500 barrels of oil, the maximum spill estimated for Georges 
Bank and barely equal to the amount of oil spilled in a single day in the Campeche inci-
dent, is estimated to threaten hundreds of millions of dollars in damage to the fishing 
industry. [d. at 871. 
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the Secretary at least to attempt to determine the causes of the 
blowout, so that he could consider its relevance to prior calcula-
tions of the probability of a major spill on Georges Bank.1I3l 
Oil exploration poses many dangers to Georges Bank that are 
still not fully understood or quantified.1I32 These dangers include 
the likely damage to the Georges Bank marine life resulting from 
chronic discharges produced by drilling operationsll33 and subse-
quent contamination of seabed sediments.1I3. The possibility of 
harm is increased by the area's circular currents, which might 
prevent those discharges from dispersing.lISl In addition, Interior 
considers major oil spills to be probable during the development 
phase of oil activity,lIS6 threatening the destruction of entire year 
classes of fishll37 and therefore the long-term commercial value of 
the fisheries.1I3S Furthermore, the contaminants contained in drill-
ing muds and injection fluids potentially have a long-lasting toxic 
effect, although no long-term studies to measure their impact 
have been completed.lIS9 The plaintiffs argued that, because of in-
sufficient information on the adverse effects of drilling on Georges 
Bank, the safeguards provided by the Secretary could not insure 
that the fisheries were in fact protected, that as a result the risk 
... [d. at 674 . 
••• See Sanctuary Issue Paper, supra note 39, at 36-44, FSES at 527-35; FES, supra 
note 6, at 864-85 . 
••• Sanctuary Issue Paper, supra note 39, at 40, FSES at 531. Over the estimated 
twenty-year life of the oil activities on Georges Bank, a total of 360,000 to 1,494,000 bar-
rels of oil are expected to be discharged into the waters of Georges Bank in the form of 
chronic low-level operational discharges from tankers and drilling platforms. NOAA Com-
ments, supra note 229, at 46, FSES at 328 . 
••• NOAA Comments, supra note 229, at 45, FSES at 328; FES, supra note 6, at 873 . 
••• Sanctuary Issue Paper, supra note 39, at 34, FSES at 525 . 
••• FES, supra note 6, at 674-77. 
&S7 Sanctuary Issue Paper, supra note 39, at 39, FSES at 530 . 
••• FES, supra note 6, at 871, 872 . 
• 8. See Sanctuary Issue Paper, supra note 39, at 54-62, FSES at 545-53; FES, supra 
note 6, at 857. The chronic discharges generated by drilling activity have several compo-
nents: formation water, drill muds and cuttings. Formation water is water contained in oil 
and gas reservoirs. Formation water contains petroleum, dissolved mineral salts, and traces 
of heavy metals, and is produced at a rate of between 20 percent and 150 percent of oil 
production. FSES, supra note 6, at 154-55. Cuttings are composed of shattered and pul-
verized sediments and underlying rock. [d. at 545. Drilling muds are complex commercial 
mixtures of chemicals used to cool and lubricate the drill bit, carry cuttings to the surface, 
and control downhole pressures. [d. Drilling muds contain such ingredients as "corrosion 
inhibitors, defoamers, emulsifiers, filtrate reducers, ilocculants, foaming agents, lost circu-
lation materials, lubricants, ... dispersants, viscosifiers, and weighting agents." [d. at 
545-46. The environmental effects of drilling muds are inconclusive and controversial. [d. 
at 546. 
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to the fisheries remained unreasonable, and that therefore the 
lease sale should not be permitted without further protection. lifO 
The Secretary's duty under the OCSLA to protect the fisheries 
and the requirement of the Endangered Species Act that an 
agency insure against jeopardy to endangered speciesll41 are simi-
lar in that both are prophylactic in nature. Both are intended to 
insure that the agency anticipate and avoid risks, rather than re-
act to harm after it happens.llf2 Although the duty to the fisheries 
contains an element of reasonableness not found in the ESA,II48 
the precautionary nature of the duty can only be given full effect 
if the courts interpret it to require that a lease sale be delayed 
when insufficient information is available to establish the reason-
ableness of the risk. Interior has admitted in its EIS that it lacks 
sufficient information to establish the extent of the threat to the 
Georges Bank environment. Iff For example, the EIS states that 
"[s]ubtle affects {sic], carcinogenicity, and synergistic affects (sic] 
of oil are three areas that need further research to accurately pre-
dict their affects (sic). "11411 In fact, further research is needed in 
order to make any reasonable predictions at all, much less accu-
rate ones. 
The EIS contains estimates that the potential damage to the 
fishing industry could be in the hundreds of millions of dollars,1I48 
suggesting that the risk to the fish themselves is also substantial. 
When the possible harm is so great, and the probability of its oc-
curring cannot be predicted, the only decision that would be con-
sistent with the Secretary's duty is to postpone the lease sale un-
til more is known about the nature and extent of the risk. Even 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the 
agency with technical expertise in marine fisheries, has criticized 
the Secretary for deciding to proceed with the lease sale when the 
•• 0 CLF Memo I, supra note 100, at 63-70 . 
... 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. II 1978) (amended 1979). See text at notes 260-71, 406-09, 
supra. 
Of' Under the OCSLA the Secretary is to avoid creating an unreasonable risk to the 
fisheries, and under the ESA he is to insure that endangered species are not likely to be 
jeopardized. Under both statutes the intent is to anticipate and thereby prevent harm, 
rather than to provide a remedy once harm has occurred . 
••• Under the OCSLA, the Secretary may proceed if insignificant damage is likely to 
occur, but the ESA does not sanction any harm that is likely to threaten the survival of a 
species . 
... FES, supra note 6, at 1255-58 . 
••• [d. at 1258 . 
••• FSES, supra note 6, at 150-51. 
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risk to the fisheries remains so potentially great.1i47 The delay re-
quired in order to obtain the necessary information may be sub-
stantial. Nevertheless the potential difficulty in obtaining that in-
formation should not be used to characterize the delay as 
unreasonable and thereby justify proceeding with the lease sale, 
because the only issue in determining the Secretary's compliance 
with his duty under the OCSLA is the reasonableness of the 
threat to the fisheries,1i48 not the reasonableness of any delay. 
Without adequate information, the risk to the fisheries is unrea-
sonable, and delay is not only reasonable, it is required. 
The Secretary's failure to study the Campeche blowout before 
holding the lease sale should also be considered a violation of his 
duty, even though the court did not find the lack of such a study 
to violate NEP A requirements.M9 The Secretary's duty to protect 
the fisheries is a substantive one, whereas NEP A is a statute 
whose requirements are essentially procedural. lilio Therefore even 
if a failure to analyze the blowout is not a procedural violation of 
NEP A, that failure can still violate the Secretary's duty to pro-
tect the fisheries. As long as the causes of the Campeche blowout 
are unknown, the defendants' claim that there is little risk of a 
major exploratory phase oil spilllilil is tarnished, and if the risk of 
an exploratory spill is not known, the risk to the fisheries cannot 
be determined. If the risk to the fisheries cannot be determined, 
the reasonableness of the risk certainly cannot be evaluated. 
Therefore proceeding with the lease sale before attempting to de-
termine the causes of the blowout violates the Secretary's duty to 
avoid unreasonable risk to the fisheries. 
In Round Two the court of appeals failed to face squarely the 
question of whether the Secretary had complied with his duty at 
the time of the lease sale. The failure to study the Campeche 
blowout and the uncertainty of what harm will result from the 
pollution associated with oil drilling operations are each sufficient 
to render the risk to the fisheries unreasonable. In spite of the 
risk, the Secretary did not provide the one obvious safeguard of 
... See Letter from Richard A. Frank, Administrator of NOAA, to James A. Joseph, 
Under Secretary of the Interior, Sep. 21, 1979, reprinted in CLF Memo II, supra note 196, 
at app . 
••• See Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 889 (1st Cir. 1979) . 
••• CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049,1054 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979). See text at notes 230-48, supra . 
••• Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). 
&&1 FES, supra note 6, at 6, 674. 
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promulgating BAST regulations before the lease sale. Thus the 
Secretary did not provide all feasible safeguards, and he con-
ducted the lease sale even though the risk to the fisheries re-
mained unreasonable, in violation of his duty as defined by the 
court of appeals in Round One. The court's failure to require that 
the Secretary comply with his duty cannot be justified in view of 
the court's clear indication in Round One that the lease sale is the 
point at which the Secretary's duty attaches. 
VI. THE ROLE OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN Conservation 
Law Foundation of New England, Inc. v. Andrus 
In addition to raising issues concerning the Secretary's compli-
ance with the requirements of NEPA,6II~ the OCSLA,II68 and the 
Endangered Species Act,1III4 CLF v. Andrus presents issues associ-
ated with using the preliminary injunction as a vehicle for litigat-
ing environmental issues. Rounds One and Two of the litigation 
have proceeded entirely on the basis of motions for preliminary 
injunctions, suggesting the significance of the preliminary injunc-
tion as a weapon in environmental cases. As CLF v. Andrus illus-
trates, environmental litigation often seeks to prevent the hap-
pening of an event that is perceived to threaten environmental 
harm and that will occur before a decision on the merits of the 
case can be reached.6II11 Injunctive relief provides a method of pro-
tecting the threatened environmental resource pending a final de-
cision by the courts on the issues. In Round Two the court of 
appeals refused to enjoin the lease sale,6II6 reasoning that the 
plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of 
their claims,6117 that the lease sale itself had not been shown to 
cause irreparable harm,1I116 and that the public interest and the 
equities of the case did not favor the plaintiffs. us The court's rea-
soning, however, raises questions concerning the nature of irrepa-
••• 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976) . 
••• 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1356, 1801-1866 (West Supp. 1979) . 
••• 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. II 1978), as amended by Act of Dec. 28, 1979, 
Pub. L. No. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225 . 
••• See Leshy, Interlocutory Injunctive Relief in Environmental Cases: A Primer for 
the Practitioner, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 639, 641 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Leshy] . 
••• CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1055 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979) . 
• 07 Id . 
••• Id. at 1054 . 
••• CLF v. Andrus, 617 F.2d 296, 298 (1st Cir. Nov. 6, 1979). 
1979] GEORGES BANK 277 
rable harm and balancing the equities when the development of 
oil and gas resources threatens the environment. In addition, the 
court's decision precluded the need to discuss the related issue of 
the extent of threatened harm that must be shown in order to 
justify injunctive relief. 
A. The Standards for Granting a Preliminary Injunction 
The two basic standards developed by the courts for consider-
ing requests for preliminary injunctions are based on the nature 
of injunctions as equitable remedies.6so The Supreme Court has 
said that the distinguishing feature of equity jurisdiction is flex-
ibility.lIsl As a flexible remedy the injunction is to be molded to 
the requirements of the particular case,IISI and the decision 
whether to grant injunctive relief is subject to the broad discre-
tion of the court. ISS 
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is generally to main-
tain the existing relationship between the contending parties, that 
is, to preserve the status quo. IIS• A court grants a permanent in-
junction when the moving party has proven its case on the merits 
of its claim,lIslI and the court's decision is therefore final. In con-
trast,· a court uses the preliminary injunction to provide tempo-
rary relief. The need for a preliminary injunction arises when the 
court has insufficient time to hear fully the issues in a case before 
the alleged harm will occur. 6SS Therefore the court will grant a 
preliminary injunction in order to maintain the status quo until a 
decision on the merits can be reached, thus preserving the court's 
ability to grant meaningful relief. IS? 
In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the 
courts are usually guided by one of two standards. The traditional 
standard developed by the courts requires a consideration of four 
elements: 1) whether the moving party is likely to succeed on the 
merits of its claim; 2) whether the moving party will suffer irrepa-
rable harm if relief is not granted; 3) whether the harm to the 
... See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) . 
... Id . 
... Id . 
... Id . 
••• Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1953) . 
••• Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 625 (D. Minn. 
1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974) . 
... Leshy, supra note 555, at 641. 
••• Id. 
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opposing party if relief is granted compels denial; and 4) whether 
the public interest lies with the granting of relief. IIG8 In applying 
this standard, courts have usually adopted a balancing test, 
weighing the equities to see which party has the stronger claim to 
the court's protection. 11GB 
Courts sometimes use an alternative standard, especially where 
the. circumstances of the case make a showing of likely success on 
the merits difficult.1I70 According to this standard, the court may 
issue a preliminary injunction even if the moving party cannot 
show probable success on the merits so long as the balance of 
hardships tips sharply in its favor. 1i7l Some courts have adopted a 
sliding scale, according to which the greater the differential be-
tween the relative harms threatened to the parties, the lesser the 
showing of likelihood of success on the merits required of the 
moving party.1I72 
There are potentially two levels of judicial review of a trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a preliminary in-
junction. Because of the immediacy of the circumstances sur-
rounding a request for injunctive relief, the trial court's decision 
will usually result in some hardship to the disfavored party, and 
because an appeal of the trial court's decision can take many 
months,1I73 the disfavored party will often request an injunction 
••• Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 625 (D. Minn. 
1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974) . 
••• See Charlie's Girls, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 483 F.2d 953, 954 (2d Cir. 1973). 
07. See West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232, 
235 (4th Cir. 1971) . 
• " See Charlie's Girls, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 483 F.2d 953, 954 (2d Cir. 1973) . 
••• See Exxon Corp. v. City of New York, 480 F.2d 460, 464 (2d Cir. 1973); Virginia 
Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The First Circuit, 
however, has been willing to use the alternative standard only in very limited circum-
stances. For example, in Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 595 F.2d 889 (1st Cir. 1979), the 
court enjoined a newspaper's attempt to publish transcripts of FBI wiretaps without re-
quiring a showing of probable success on the merits because the status quo would be ut-
terly destroyed and the FBI irreparably harmed since no meaningful review would be pos-
sible absent a preliminary injunction. [d. at 890. In CLF v. Andrus, 617 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 
Nov. 6, 1979), however, the court refused to adopt the alternative standard in reviewing 
plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction pending appeal, because the plaintiffs had 
not shown that conducting the lease sale would "constitute the kind of massive, irretriev-
able alteration of the status quo contemplated by Providence Journal." [d. at 297. Thus 
the First Circuit has not been willing to apply the alternative standard as freely as some 
other circuits. 
... In Round One of CLF v. Andrus, the court of appeals dissolved the injunction issued 
by the district court after a delay of almost thirteen months. 
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pending the outcome of the appeal,1I74 if the moving party is ap-
pealing, or a stay of the trial court's injunction,1I711 if the chal-
lenged party is appealing. 
The standard of review is not necessarily the same for each 
level of review. When reviewing the appeal itself, the appellate 
court is guided by a narrow standard of review. The trial court's 
decision will be overturned only if the trial court has abused its 
discretion or committed a clear error of law.1I7• By comparison, 
when considering a motion for a preliminary injunction (or a stay) 
pending appeal, some courts will apply the same standard used 
by. the trial court,1I77 while others will apply the narrower stan-
dard invoked when considering the appeal itself, granting the mo-
tion only if the lower court abused its discretion or committed a 
clear error of law.1I78 Under the latter standard, a preliminary in-
junction is usually easier to obtain from the trial court than from 
the appellate court.1I78 
In eLF v. Andrus the district court applied the traditional 
four-pronged standard in both rounds, granting a preliminary in-
junction in Round One,1I80 but denying injunctive relief in Round 
TWO.1I81 In both rounds the court of appeals applied the narrower 
standard of review to determine whether the district court had 
abused its discretion or committed a clear error of law, both on 
the motions for a preliminary injunction or a stay pending ap-
peal,IISS and on the appeals themselves.1I8s In Round One, however, 
... See, e.g., CLF v. Andrus, 617 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. Nov. 6, 1979) . 
... See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1147 (1st Cir. Jan. 30, 1978) . 
... See CLF v. Andrus, 14 Envir. Rep. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1050 (1st Cir. 
Dec. 17, 1979). For example, in one case challenging the adequacy of the environmental 
impact statement prepared for a lease sale, the appellate court vacated a preliminary in-
junction granted by the district court on the grounds that the alleged deficiencies in the 
statement did not violate the requirements of NEP A, and that therefore the trial court 
had committed a clear error of law. County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 
1368, 1386-87 (2d Cir. 1977) . 
... See, e.g., Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 
1958). 
'7. See Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1147 (1st Cir. Jan. 30, 1978); West 
Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232, 235 (4th Cir. 
1971) . 
... Leshy, supra note 555, at 669 . 
• 10 Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas; 1138, 1139 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 1978). 
,., Massachusetts v. Andrus, 481 F. Supp. 685, 689 (D. Mass. Nov. 5, 1979) . 
••• Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1147 (1st Cir. Jan. 30, 1978); CLF v. 
Andrus, 617 F.2d 296, 298 (1st Cir. Nov. 6, 1979) . 
... Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 882 (1st Cir. 1979); CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVJR. 
REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1050 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 1979). 
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the court of appeals applied that standard rather loosely, because 
of the change in circumstances caused by the enactment of the 
1978 OCSLA amendments.184 In Round Two the court of appeals 
applied the same standard strictly to most issues,181 yet also re-
solved two issues on the merits,186 suggesting a more searching 
review of those issues. This dual standard of review applied by 
the court in Round Two makes it difficult to determine the 
weight that should be attributed to its decision.167 Nevertheless, 
the court's decision raises questions about its consideration of ir-
reparable harm, the equities of the case, and the nature of the 
public interest. 
B. The Appropriateness of Enjoining the Lease Sale 
In Round Two of eLF v. Andrus the court of appeals upheld 
the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction, finding that 
the district court had not abused its discretion in concluding that 
the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of prevailing on the mer-
its.188 In addition, the court of appeals questioned whether the 
lease sale itself would cause irreparable harm to the plaintiffs,l6e 
reasoning that the filing of the suit acted as a lis pendens on the 
lease sale.leO According to the doctrine of lis pendens, which is 
usually invoked when title to property is in question, any party 
acquiring an interest in the property during the pendency of the 
litigation takes that interest subject to the court's final decision in 
the suit and is bound by it.lel In this case, the court of appeals 
regarded the suit as putting the potential lessees on notice that 
... See text at notes 477-83, supra. The amendments were enacted after the court of 
appeals had heard arguments on the appeal but before the court announced its decision. 
See text at notes 76-88, supra . 
• 1. CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1051, 1054 (1st Cir. 
Dec. 17, 1979) . 
••• Id. at 1055 n.7. 
... For example, while the court of appeals indicated that its conclusion that the lease 
sale did not constitute an irretrievable commitment of resources in violation of section 
7(d) of the ESA was a decision on the merits, the North Slope Borough v. Andrus court 
found that decision inapplicable because it was reached in the context of a request for a 
preliminary injunction. 486 F. Supp. 332, 354 & n.n (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1980) . 
... CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1055 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979) . 
••• Id. at 1054 . 
••• Id. 
... "The purpose of a lis pendens is to notify prospective purchasers and encumbranc-
ers that any interest acquired by them in the property in litigation is subject to the decree 
of the court." Beefy King Int'.! v. Veigle, 464 F.2d 1102, 1104 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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the court might declare the lease sale invalid.1I92 Therefore the les-
sees would not later be able to claim a right to compensation for 
the loss of their leases, and consequently the court was unper-
suaded that irreparable harm would occur as a result of the lease 
sale.1I93 
The court's use of the lis pendens doctrine, however, does not 
insure that the lease sale will not cause irreparable harm, and cre-
ates additional problems. At first glance,· the doctrine appears to 
offer a practical solution to the problem of how to handle chal-
lenges to projects in their early stages when irreparable harm 
does not appear to be imminent.1I94 Yet the court's use of the doc-
trine is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, it places plaintiffs 
seeking to challenge future lease sales in the "Catch-22" situation 
of having to file a suit challenging the lease sale in order to invoke 
the doctrine and avoid irreparable harm even though the court 
has held that the plaintiffs cannot win such a challenge on the 
major a.rguments they have raised. Second, it imposes additional 
burdens on the plaintiffs' resources. Third, it will force a trial on 
the merits in cases that may not otherwise proceed beyond the 
attempt to obtain a preliminary injunction. Finally, it overlooks 
other aspects of the lease sale that would justify an injunction if 
the doctrine were not invoked. 
The court of appeals' use of the lis pendens doctrine creates 
logical inconsistencies, not only for eLF v. Andrus, but even more 
so for future lease sale challenges. The court adopted the lis 
pendens concept in order to avoid finding that the lease sale 
would cause irreparable harm.1I911 Yet the doctrine is applicable 
only to the extent that the challenge to the lease sale remains 
undecided and the lessees' rights remain suspect. In this case, 
however, the court has given every indication that the lease sale 
does not impose on the Secretary the statutory obligations alleged 
by the plaintiffs, deciding two central issues against the plaintiffs 
on the merits.1Ige To the extent that the court has settled the 
question of the validity of the lease sale, justification for invoking 
••• CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049,1054 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979) . 
••• [d. The court subsequently modified the language of the opinion, deleting all refer-
ences to the issue of compensation. See note 328, supra . 
••• See Leshy, supra note 555, at 647-49. See text at notes 632-38, infra . 
••• CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1054 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979) . 
... [d. at 1055 n.7. 
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the lis pendens doctrine ceases to exist.1I97 
More importantly, the court's use of lis pendens renders its ap-
plicability to .future cases questionable. Plaintiffs seeking to chal-
lenge OCS drilling activities in other areas as a violation of the 
Endangered Species Actll98 will have difficulty challenging the 
lease sale as violating the ESA because of the court's ruling in 
this case.1I99 Therefore they will have to challenge some later stage 
of the project, such as the Secretary's approval of exploration 
plans. Yet if the plaintiffs want to avoid irreparable harm as a 
result of the lease sale by invoking the lis pendens doctrine, they 
must file a suit challenging the lease sale and the Secretary's 
forthcoming decision prior to the lease sale in order to give the 
lessees notice that the validity of the leases is suspect, even 
though they cannot win a challenge to the lease sale, and even 
though the Secretary has not yet decided whether to approve the 
exploration plans. Consequently the plaintiffs would be faced 
with the possible dismissal of their suit for a lack of ripeness. Ac-
cording to the ripeness doctrine, judicial resources should be re-
served for controversies that are real and imminent, and therefore 
courts will not consider a case involving uncertain and contingent 
future events that may not occur as anticipated.80o If the alleged 
violation is the Secretary's approval of exploration plans in viola-
tion of the ESA, but the suit is filed before the lease sale, when 
the Secretary cannot have approved the exploration plans,801 the 
conduct being challenged is not imminent and therefore the issue 
is not ripe. Consequently the suit might well be dismissed,801 and 
••• The court of appeals was struggling to find support for its decision that the lease sale 
would not cause irreparable harm. Lis pendens is applicable only as long as the validity of 
the lease sale is in dispute. Yet the court decided on the merits that the lease sale did not 
violate the ESA and that the Secretary did not have to promulgate BAST regulations 
before conducting the lease sale, and its lengthy discussion of the NEP A claim suggests 
that no NEP A violation will be found. Since the major challenges to the lease sale appear 
all but settled, the validity of the lease sale has essentially been resolved, and the court 
has adopted a distorted view of the state of the proceedings in order to invoke lis pendens 
and find a lack of irreparable harm . 
••• 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. II 1978), as amended by Act of Dec. 28, 1979, 
Pub. L. No. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225 . 
... See also North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 354-57 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 
1980) . 
••• Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) . 
•• , Only after obtaining drilling rights by purchasing a lease does the lessee submit ex-
ploration plans for the Secretary's approval. 
••• A lack of ripeness does not necessarily preclude judicial review, because the court 
will also consider the hardship to the parties that would be caused by withholding review. 
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the protection of the lis pendens doctrine would be lost, since the 
suit would have to be refiled after the lease sale had occurred, and 
no suit would have been pending at the time of the lease sale to 
give notice to the lessees. As a result, the court of appeals in CLF 
v. Andrus has based its decision on the availability of a doctrine 
that may not be applicable in future cases and was not appropri-
ate in this case.803 
A second difficulty with the court's use of the lis pendens doc-
trine to avoid finding irreparable harm from the lease sale is the 
burden placed on the plaintiffs' legal resources. Parties seeking to 
protect environmental values are frequently citizens' groups suf-
fering from a lack of adequate legal resources,80. and courts have 
been willing to recognize the financial burdens of environmental 
litigants.801 For example, although a party seeking an injunction 
is normally required to post a security bond to cover damages and 
costs incurred by a party later found to have been wrongfully en-
joined,808 the bond is typically nominal in environmental cases 
brought by non-profit environmental organizations,807 and was 
waived in CLF v. Andrus. 808 
For the court to drain the plaintiffs' resources further by im-
posing additional legal obstacles is to threaten plaintiffs with the 
denial of a remedy to which they otherwise might be entitled sim-
ply because their resources might not be sufficient to survive the 
process. Under NEPA,809 plaintiffs must seek an injunction before 
the lease sale in order to insure that the EIS prepared for the 
lease sale fulfills NEP A's purpose of fostering informed decision-
making,810 because if the adequacy of the EIS is insured only af-
ter the lease sale the decision may have been based on inadequate 
information, and may therefore have been incorrect. 8ll Yet, be-
See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967). 
••• The lis pendens doctrine is even less appropriate since the First Circuit modified its 
opinion. See note 328, supra . 
••• The case names in environmental litigation often include such citizens' groups as the 
Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund. CLF is another of these organizations . 
••• See Leshy, supra note 555, at 671-75 . 
••• FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c) . 
•• 7 Leshy, supra note 555, at 672 . 
••• Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1138, 1146 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 1978) . 
••• 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976) . 
• ,. Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1285 (1st Cir. 1973); see Jones v. District of Columbia 
Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1974) . 
... See Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 512 
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cause the court of appeals was not persuaded that the lease sale 
would cause irreparable harm,811 the plaintiffs are forced to seek 
injunctive re~ief at some later stage of the project, such as the 
Secretary's approval of exploration plans, in order to protect 
Georges Bank from harm. If the plaintiffs cannot afford the addi-
tional time and expense of returning to court, then they have 
been deprived of a judicial forum for their challenge. Because the 
court invoked the lis pendens doctrine even though its applicabil-
ity was questionable and irreparable harm might otherwise have 
been found, the resulting burden to the plaintiffs renders the 
court's use of the doctrine inappropriate. 
'rhe court's use of lis pendens also creates a tactical roadblock 
for the plaintiffs because it presumes a continuation of the suit to 
a trial on the merits. Many environmental plaintiffs, however, do 
not intend to proceed to the merits, because a preliminary injunc-
tion is often sufficient to force the challenged agency to provide 
adequate protection for environmental resources,818 and a trial on 
the merits is therefore unnecessary. Yet if those plaintiffs are de-
nied a preliminary injunction, they must continue with subse-
quent, more expensive814 stages of the litigation in order to insure 
that the resources are protected, thus incurring additional 
burdens. 
The court of appeals adopted the lis pendens analysis from an-
other court in a similar case. In North Slope Borough v. An-
drus,8111 the court refused to enjoin the Beaufort Sea lease sale'l' 
even though the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits of their allegations that the Secretary had vio-
lated several statutes, including NEPA, the ESA, and the OC-
SLA.817 The North Slope court reasoned that no irreparable harm 
would result from the lease sale because the suit acted as a lis 
(D.C. Cir. 1974) . 
• 11 CLF v. AndrUs, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049,1054 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979). 
... For example, after the plainti1fs obtained a preliminary injunction halting construc-
tion of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, President Nixon decided to scrap the·project. See 
Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 570-71 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1974) . 
• ,. Particularly in NEPA cases, where the EIS provides a basis for preliminary review, it 
is often unnecessary to engage in the expensive discovery process in order to obtain in-
junctive relief . 
• 11 486 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 1979) . 
... [d. at 332 . 
• ,7 [d. at 329-30. 
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pendens on the sale.818 The situation in North Slope differed 
from CLF v. Andrus, however, in that both parties were prepared 
to proceed immediately to the merits of the case.818 Consequently 
the delay in obtaining final relief was minimal, the parties were 
not confronted with the necessity of seeking additional injunctive 
relief, and the parties were not forced to proceed with a trial that 
otherwise might not be necessary. In contrast, the parties in CLF 
v. Andrus were not prepared to proceed with a trial on the mer-
its.820 The plaintiffs had not begun the expensive discovery pro-
cess, preferring to await an opportunity for preliminary relief that 
might eliminate the need for a trial. Consequently the plaintiffs 
were confronted with the additional burdens of delay and expense 
not present in North Slope, and the court's assumption that a 
decision on the merits would be quickly forthcoming may have 
been as misplaced in Round Two. as it was in Round One. 
Part of the court's justification for dissolving the original 
Round One injunction was its view that the district court could 
"proceed expeditiously to the merits,'ISII a view that proved to be 
unfounded.811 The court reiterated its optimistic view in Round 
Two,823 even though the preliminary status of the case suggested 
otherwise. Since the parties were not prepared to proceed expedi-
tiously to trial, and the plaintiffs were therefore faced with pro-
longed delay and significant additional expense following the de-
nial of a preliminary injunction, the court's use of lis pendens to 
deny injunctive relief serves to frustrate the plaintiffs' efforts to 
utilize effectively both their resources and the judicial process.8" 
... North Slope Borough v. Andrua, 486 F. Supp. 326, 331 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 1979) . 
• ,. Id. In fact, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment only six 
weeks later. 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1980), clarified, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. 
Cas.) (BNA) 1001 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, i98O) . 
••• Conversation with Douglas I. Foy, Attorney for CLF (Feb. 20, 1980) . 
•• , Massachusetts v. Andrua, 594 F.2d 872, 887 (1st Cir. 1979). 
••• More than a year after the court's decision in Round One, there is still no prospect 
for a trial on the merits in the near future, if at all. The plaintiffs have not yet decided 
whether to proceed to trial, or even whether to engage in preliminary discovery efforts. 
Conversation with Douglas I. Foy, Attorney for CLF (Feb. 20, 1980) . 
••• CLF v. Andrua, 14 ENVIR. REp. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049, 1054 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979) . 
••• The court's approach cannot be justified by an argument that the plaintiffs should 
always be prepared to proceed to trial on the merits if necesaary. Environmental plaintiffs 
can frequently obtain the desired relief by seeking a preliminary injunction, and courts 
have encouraged that approach by exercising their equitable discretion and granting re-
quests for such relief frequently. It would be foolish for plaintiffs to conduct expenaive 
discovery efforts to prepare for trial if adequate relief could be obtained without doing BO. 
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If the court of appeals had not invoked the lis pendens doc-
trine, it would have had ample grounds for finding that the lease 
sale would cause irreparable harm, even though the lease sale was 
not an irretrievable commitment of resources in violation of the 
Endangered Species Act. tllli The court of appeals could have 
found irreparable harm by viewing the lease sale as a possible vio-
lation of the Secretary's duty to protect the fisheries. In Round 
One the court had defined the Secretary's duty as including an 
obligation not to conduct the lease sale if unreasonable risk to the 
fisheries existed in spite of all feasible safeguards. tlitl If the risk 
from OCS oil and gas activities is unreason~ble, as the lack of 
sufficient information to judge the risk suggests, holding the lease 
sale violates the Secretary's duty. Because the Secretary's duty is 
precautionary in nature, intended to prevent not only harm but 
also the risk of harm, a violation of his duty should be considered 
irreparable harm sufficient to support a preliminary injunction. tin 
A finding of irreparable harm at the time of the lease sale could 
also be justified because of the precautionary purposes of the 
ESA. The ESA requires the agency to insure that no endangered 
species is likely to be jeopardized,tlu and prohibits an irretriev-
able commitment of resources until the agency has demonstrated 
that jeopardy is unlikely.tllB The Secretary cannot presently 
demonstrate that jeopardy is unlikely because sufficient informa-
tion is not available.tlao The compensation provisions of the OC-
SLA, indicating that the lessees should be entitled to compensa-
tion if exploration plans are disapproved based on a threatened 
ESA violation, support a conclusion that the lease sale constitutes 
irreparable harm because of the expense that will be incurred if 
Depending on the basis for denying an injunction, the plaintiffs can proceed with trial 
preparations if the court finds a likelihood of success on the merits, as in North Slope 
Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 1979), or drop the suit to conserve 
their scarce legal resources if preliminary relief is adequate or the court finds success on 
the merits unlikely. Judicial resources are valuable as well, and should not be wasted . 
••• See text at notes 302-10, supra . 
••• Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 889 (1st Cir. 1979) . 
... The violation of a statute can constitute irreparable harm per se, sufficient to justify 
injunctive relief. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 477 F.2d 1033, 1037 
(8th Cir. 1973) . 
••• Act of Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4, 93 Stat. 1226 (to be codified at 16 
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2» . 
••• 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (Supp. II 1978). 
••• FSES, supra note 6, at 652. 
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compensation is required.631 Furthermore, the sizable investment 
required for pre-exploration activities following the lease sale also 
supports a finding that the lease sale is an irretrievable commit-
ment in violation of the ESA, and therefore causes irreparable 
harm. 
Finally, because massive projects such as OCS drilling activities 
have a tendency to gain momentum once begun,8li the lease sale 
itself should be considered irreparable harm. Injunctive relief is a 
flexible remedy, to be used in a manner that best effectuates the 
purposes of the remedy.811 Courts have recognized that it is easier 
to stop large projects in their early stages.814 Following the lease 
sale and the initial investments by the lessees, the Secretary will 
acquire a natural interest in keeping the project going. The Secre-
tary may be less likely to halt post-lease sale activities because of 
the burden that would impose on the lessees. Because of the mas-
sive investments required in drilling activities, any unanticipated 
delays are very expensive.8111 The cost of taking preventive action 
in the middle of such a project may dissuade both the Secretary 
and the courts from intervening. The Tellico Dam project in TV A 
U. Hill818 provides the classic example. In that case the district 
court refused to halt the construction of the dam,887 even though 
the snail darter would be wiped out, because, in the eyes of the 
court, the cost of stopping the project outweighed the benefit of 
saving the species.818 The possibility of a similar reluctance to 
halt drilling activities offers ample justification for finding irrepa-
rable harm sufficient to support an injunction. 
. Because sound reasons existed for the court of appeals to find 
irreparable harm at the time of the lease sale, because a trial on 
.81 See text at notes 311-28, supra . 
• s, See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 356 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 1980); 
1979 H.R. CONF. REP., supra note 337, at 13, 1979 CONGo & AD. NEWS at 4781. 
.s. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) . 
• s. See, e.g., Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489, 497 (2d Cir. 1975) . 
• s. In the litigation challenging Lease Sale No. 40 in the Baltimore Canyon area off the 
New Jersey coast, the lessees paid over a billion dollars for their leases, money on which 
they could earn no interest until the case was decided, resulting in the loss of "staggaring 
[sic] sums." Supplemental Brief of Intervenors-Appellants Atlantic Richfield Companyet 
al. at 18, Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979). In addition, once drilling 
activities have begun, the drilling equipment will be in place and cannot be used anywhere 
else on a temporary basis if activity is ordered halted . 
• s. 437 U.S. 153 (1978) . 
•• 7 Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) . 
••• [d. at 760-63. 
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the merits was not imminent, because the plaintiffs will be forced 
to bear additional and perhaps fatal financial burdens, because 
the lease sale is an appropriate time to grant an injunction, and 
because the plaintiffs in similar suits will be confronted with 
problems of ripeness, the court's use of the lis pendens doctrine 
was unwise. In addition, the court's refusal to find irreparable 
harmese precluded the necessity of determining whether the de-
gree of harm to Georges Bank posed by the drilling activity would 
be sufficient to support the grant of a preliminary injunction.e40 
The issue will likely arise, however, if an injunction is sought at a 
later stage of the project, and may arise in challenges to other 
lease sales. 
C. What Degree of Threatened Harm Qualifies as 
Irreparable? 
Some courts may have difficulty finding irreparable harm in 
cases like CLF v. Andrus, where it is difficult to prove the nature 
and extent of .the harm that will occur absent injunctive relief. 
Even though the harm is difficult to quantify, however, there is 
substantial justification for terming it irreparable, because of its 
threatened magnitude and the preventive nature of the applicable 
statutes. 
The defendants in CLF v. Andrus argued that any harm 
threatened to the Georges Bank environment was purely specula-
tive,641 but that argument is misleading. The speculative element 
is not the possibility of harm, but rather the extent of the harm. 
Defendants have admitted that the harm to Georges Bank is 
likely to be substantial. 4141 The environmental impact statement 
... CLF v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. (Envir. Rep. Cas.) (BNA) 1049,1054 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 
1979). 
"0 The party requesting a preliminary injunction must demonstrate that without in-
junctive relief he will be irreparably harmed. 
The key word in this consideration is irreparable. Mere injuries, however substantial, 
in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are 
not enough. The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will 
be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a 
claim of irreparable harm. But injury held insufficient to justify a stay in one case may 
well be sufficient to justify it in another, where the applicant has demonstrated a 
higher. probability of success on the merits. 
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (emphasis in 
original). . 
... Fed. Memo III, supra note 422, at 36 . 
... See, e.g., FES, supra note 6, at 871-72; FSES, supra note 6, at 150-51. 
------ ------ --- --
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prepared for the lease sale describes several unavoidable impacts 
of the project: the reduction of feeding efficiencies, pJlOtosynthetic 
activity, and primary production as a result of increased turbidity 
in the areas of operations;'48 a substantial reduction in the area 
on Georges Bank available for fishing because of drilling platform 
and pipeline obstructions;'·· chronic pollution from the discharge 
of toxic by-products during drilling;"' and the potential destruc-
tion of substantial percentages of several commercial species of 
fish as a result of large oil spills that are considered likely to oc-
cur.'·' The EIS estimates that the commercial losses could be in 
the tens of millions of dollars per year.'·? In addition the EIS ad-
mits that the long-term effects of oil spills and chronic low-level 
pollution, and especially the synergistic effects of the pollutants, 
are not well understood.'u Thus there is no question that the pol-
lution will occur and that the harm will be significant. The only 
remaining question concerns the extent of the harm and the 
probability that it will be catastrophic. 
The situation in CLF v. Andrus is similar in some respects to 
that encountered in Reserve Mining Co. v. United States,"' 
where a taconite processing plant was dumping allegedly carcino-
genic tailings into Lake Superior. In that case the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit stayed the injunction granted by the 
district court860 because the plaintiffs had not proved that the as-
bestos-like fibers in the tailings posed a "demonstrable hazard to 
the public health."861 CLF v. Andrus, however, presents a 
stronger case for finding irreparable harm. In Reserve Mining the 
fibers in the tailings were structurally similar to asbestos and 
therefore suspect as a carcinogen, but their carcinogenic qualities 
... FES, supra note 6, at 1255. Because chronic drilling discharges may substantially 
increase the turbidity of the waters on Georges Bank, the rate of photosynthesis will de-
crease. As a result the feeding efficiencies (the rate at which nutrients can be ingested) of 
plankton are reduced, and therefore primary production, or the rate at which the plankton 
can reproduce to provide food for higher levels of the food chain, will also be reduced . 
... FSES, supra note 6, at 146-48 . 
... FES, supra note 6, at 638-40, 654, 880-82. See Sanctuary Issue Paper, supra note 39, 
at 54-62, FSES at 545-53 . 
... FSES, supra note 6, at 150-51. 
... [d. 
... FES, supra note 6, at 1258 . 
... 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974) . 
• ao United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974) . 
.. , Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1084 (8th Gir. 1974). 
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remained undemonstrated,6112 a factor militating against an in-
junction, while in CLF v. Andrus pollution is certain to occur and 
the adverse effects are already demonstrated to a significant de-
gree-it is only the extent of their impact that cannot be shown. 
Any doubts about the actual extent of the harm likely to occur 
on Georges Bank should be resolved in favor of the environment, 
for several reasons. The fisheries are a major source of food, not 
only for the New England region but for several other countries 
as well. 6113 The pollution resulting from drilling activities on 
Georges Bank will contaminate the fish in the area,6114 which in 
turn will be harvested by commercial fishing fleets. Therefore the 
pollution of Georges Bank poses a threat to public health, satisfy-
ing the requirement established in Reserve Mining. 61111 Courts 
have recognized that uncertainties should be resolved in favor of 
the public health. For example, in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld an EPA order re-
quiring annual reductions in the lead content of leaded gaso-
line.6116 The court reasoned that a provision in the Clean Air 
Act,6117 authorizing the EPA to regulate gasoline additives posing 
a "danger" to the public health,6118 permitted the EPA to assess 
the risk of harm and to prevent the harm from happening.8119 The 
court recognized that environmental questions are especially 
prone to uncertainty, and that the courts have a special interest 
in favor of protecting the public health, even in areas where cer-
••• [d. at 1083 . 
••• Sanctuary Issue Paper, supra note 39, at 24, FSES at 515. Among those countries 
fishing on Georges Bank are East and West Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union. See 
Maine v. Kreps, 563 F.2d 1043, 1046 n.3 (1st Cir. 1977) . 
... Not only will many fish be killed by an oil spill, but others will become tainted with 
an oily taste, reducing their "marketability," FSES, supra note 6, at 151. Furthermore, 
because of the potential carcinogencity of chronic pollution, the threat to the fish is a 
threat to the public health as well. Sanctuary Issue Paper, supra note 39, at 62, FSES at 
553. 
••• Two recent incidents demonstrate a more direct threat to the public health than that 
presented by the contamination of commercially harvested fish. On March 24, 1980, a 
drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico exploded, killing two people and injuring nine, with five 
others missing and presumed dead. Boston Globe, Mar. 25, 1980, at 3, col. 5. Three days 
later, a "hotel" platform in the North Sea collapsed during a severe storm, killing more 
than a hundred crew members. [d., Mar. 28, 1980, at 1, col. 2 . 
... 541 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976) . 
•• 7 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1976) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West 
Pamph. 1978» . 
... [d. § 1857f-6c(c)(1)(A) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7545(c)(1)(A) (West Pamph. 
1978» . 
••• Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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tainty does not exist.880 The court interpreted "danger" to consist 
of "reciprocal elements of risk and harm, or probability and se-
verity,"881 so that health could be endangered either by a lesser 
risk of greater harm, or by a greater risk of lesser harm.881 In CLF 
v. Andrus, the lesser harm is not a risk, it is a foregone conclu-
sion, and the greater harm is clearly a risk-it is only the magni-
tude of that risk that is not known. Thus the harm that is 
threatened by drilling activities on Georges Bank qualifies under 
either definition of danger, and therefore should be sufficient to 
constitute irreparable harm. 
The argument for finding irreparable harm in CLF v. Andrus is 
even more compelling when the nature of the Secretary's statu-
tory obligations is considered. The Endangered Species Act is a 
preventive statute, setting the highest standards' for the protec-
tion of endangered species.888 The Secretary's duty under the OC-
SLA to protect the fisheries also demands a high standard of pro-
tection.884 As the court declared in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 
reasonable concerns about threats to the environment long pre-
cede certainty,8811 and "[a]waiting certainty will often allow for 
only reactive, not preventive, regulation,"888 a result that would 
be inconsistent with statutes that "demand regulatory action to 
prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than certain that harm 
is otherwise inevitable."887 Allowing the Secretary to proceed with 
the development of Georges Bank oil and gas resources when that 
development will admittedly pose substantial risk of severe harm 
would frustrate the requirements of the ESA and the Secretary's 
duty to protect the fisheries. The Secretary's statutory obligations 
thus provide reinforcement for considering the harm to Georges 
Bank irreparable. 
Because of the substantial threat of extensive harm posed by 
drilling operations to the Georges Bank environment and the pre-
ventive nature of the applicable statutes, the court of appeals has 
ample justification for terming the harm irreparable and therefore 
sufficient to support a preliminary injunction. Even if the harm is 
••• Id. at 24 . 
•• , Id. at 18 . 
••• Id. 
... See text at notes 259-79, supra. 
... See text at notes 453-86, supra . 
... Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1976) . 
••• Id . 
•• , Id. 
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deemed irreparable, however, the court must still weigh that 
harm against the harm to the other. party, and consider where the 
public interest lies. 
D. Balancing the Equities and Considering the Public 
Interest 
To an extent that is unusual in environmental litigation, the 
public interest in CLF v. Andrus lies with both parties to the 
suit.888 In addition, the relative injuries that are threatened to 
each side are also shared by the general public. As a result the 
case presents the court with an unusually difficult task in balanc-
ing the harms and determining on which side the public interest 
predominates.888 Not surprisingly, the court of appeals struggled 
with the task in Round Two. The result was unsatisfactory be-
cause the court did not distinguish between the differences in the 
quality of the loss threatened to each side and between the differ-
ences in the elements of the public interest. 
Both sides in the Georges Bank dispute appear to be 
threatened with significant harm.t''7O On closer examination, how-
ever, important differences between the harms can be distin-
guished. The threat to the plaintiffs is the substantial impairment 
or destruction of an irreplaceable but otherwise indefinitely re-
newable food supply that supports an established commercial 
fishing industry.8'71 On the other hand, the loss threatened to the 
defendants is the continued lack of a presently available, reliable 
oil supply for the United States due to the delay in oes explora-
tion efforts.8'72 
The court of appeals appeared to consider these harms equally 
significant.8'73 The court's view, however, lacks perspective in two 
ways. First the court did not distinguish the national concerns for 
... See Leshy, supra note 555, at 657-58. 
... For a general discussion of balancing the equities and the public interest, see Win-
ner, The Chancellor's Foot and Environmental Law: A Call for Better Reasoned Deci-
sions on Environmental Injunctions, 9 ENVT'L L. 477, 484-510 (1979). 
'7. Although the threatened injury to the plaintiffs provided the basis for the original 
injunction in Round One, the delay caused by the protracted litigation became a signifi-
cant factor in the denial of an injunction in Round Two, where the court of appeals found 
the threat of further delay a harm to the defendants that it could not ignore. CLF v. 
Andrus, 617 F.2d 296, 298 (1st Cir. Nov. 6, 1979) . 
... Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1138, 1145 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 1978) . 
• 7. CLF v. Andrus, 617 F.2d 296, 298 (1st Cir. Nov. 6, 1979). 
'7. Id. 
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protection of the environment and development of oil supplies 
from the local concerns of a large Georges Bank fishing industry 
and a small Georges Bank oil field. Even if oil and the environ-
ment have similar significance on a national level, that does not 
mean that they should be given equal weight in each local situa-
tion where they conflict. If the threat in a particular case is to an 
environmental resource of special importance to a region and the 
competing energy resource is relatively small, as is the case on 
Georges Bank,6"" then in that case the environmental concerns 
should predominate.671 Second, the court did not consider the 
long-term perspective in weighing the relative harms. The court 
considered the short-term energy needs of the country important, 
but did not appear to weigh the long-term value of the 
fisheries.6"6 By comparison, in deciding to grant an injunction in 
Round One, the district court considered the long-term value of 
the fisheries and found that it far outweighed the importance of a 
small oil field that could be depleted in twenty years6.,., because 
the fisheries, if protected, could last for centuries and provide an 
essentially inexhaustible food supply.6'18 
Furthermore, as the district court noted, the issue is not 
whether oil production will be prohibited entirely on Georges 
Bank.6'19 Rather, the question is whether a delay of relatively 
short duration, whether a few months or a few years, in the devel-
opment of the petroleum resources of Georges Bank is reasonable 
compared to the possible destruction of an irreplaceable and 
abundantly productive existing resource.eeo Since it takes five to 
six years following a lease sale for an area to begin producing 
••• The amount of oil that may lie beneath Georges Bank can only be estimated, but 
there is only one chance in twenty that a large find will be made. Boston Globe, Dec. 16, 
1979, at 29, col. 2. The most probable find is predicted to be 123 million barrels, or enough 
to satisfy national needs for eight days. Id., Nov. 15, 1979, at 24, col. 1. 
••• On the other hand, since man's activities in general, and, OCS drilling activities in 
particular, often threaten the environment to some degree, environmental considerations 
in a particular location might not prevail if the threat to the environmental resource were 
not unusual and the countervailing developmental interest were strong, such as where an 
especially large oil field had been found . 
••• Compare CLF v. Andrus, 617 F.2d 296, 298 (1st Cir. Nov. 6, 1979), with Massachu-
setts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1138, 1145 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 1978) . 
... Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1138, 1145 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 1978) . 
••• Id . 
••• Id . 
• 80 Id. 
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oil,881 Georges Bank will not help solve the short-term oil supply 
problem. The actual harm to the nation is questionable in any 
case, since the rising price of oil will make the Georges Bank 
reserves even more valuable in the future.881 
In addition, the court of appeals' concern88S for the two-year 
delay of the lease sale884 caused by the litigation in eLF v. An-
drus is not totally justified. Courts have acknowledged that delay 
is an expected element in any agency's consideration of environ-
mental factors,8811 and that "the spectre of a national power crisis 
... must not be used to create a blackout of environmental con-
sideration" by agencies.888 Furthermore, the initial delay of the 
lease sale in Round One of the litigation is directly attributable to 
Interior's failure to fulfill the requirements of NEPA.887 It is 
hardly equitable to deny injunctive relief because of the delay 
that has already occurred, when the agency that benefits from 
such a denial bears a significant portion of the responsibility for 
that delay. In any case, delay in the development of a minor oil 
reserve can hardly be equated with the possible destruction of a 
valuable food source in balancing the relative harms, and thus the 
harm that would occur to the defendants if an injunction were 
granted does not balance the harm that could occur to the plain-
tiffs following the denial of an injunction. 
The court of appeals similarly failed to recognize the distinc-
tions between opposing aspects of the public interest. In order to 
.. , Id . 
... Testimony of Robert Howarth, Ph.D., Marine Biologist at Woods Hole Oceano-
graphic Institute, before the Bureau of Land Management, concerning Lease Sale No. 42 
(June 20, 1979), reprinted in FSES, supra note 6, at 387-88. Because petroleum is becom-
ing increasingly scarce, its social as well as economic value will increase over time. Further-
more, future higher prices for petroleum would benefit not only the oil companies, but also 
the country, since the petroleum would have a greater effect in the future on the country's 
balance of payments . 
... CLF v. Andrus, 617 F.2d 296, 298 (1st Cir. Nov. 6, 1979) . 
... The lease sale was originally scheduled for Jan. 31, 1978, and was finally held Dec. 
18,1979 . 
••• See Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489, 497 (2d Cir. 1975) ("compliance with NEPA 
invariably results in delay and concomitant cost increases, and Congress has implicitly 
decided that these costs must be discounted"). 
- Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1971) . 
... Interior initially prepared an inadequate EIS. Massachuetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. 
Rep. Cas. 1138, 1141 (D. Ma88. Jan. 28, 1978). Therefore the delay that occurred because 
of Interior's preparation of a supplemental EIS is attributable to the defendants. Plaintiffs 
can hardly be considered responsible for any delay that results from their efforts to seek 
the Secretary's compliance with his statutory duty. 
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determine where the public interest lies, courts will often look to 
existing statutes as congressional expressions of the public inter-
est.ess In eLF v. Andrus the court of appeals found the concern 
for protecting the environment expressed in various environmen-
tal statuteseS9 to be balanced by the interest in expediting oes oil 
exploration suggested in the OeSLA.890 The public interest rested 
on both sides of the case, and the court balanced the country's 
goal of preserving the environment with its need for reliable en-
ergy sources.891 In doing so, the court failed to recognize that the 
special importance of a resource such as the Georges Bank 
fisheries could outweigh the interest in developing an oil resource 
that will not likely make a significant contribution to the coun-
try's energy needs. Since Georges Bank is a renewable resource 
with the potential to remain productive indefinitely,e91 but is 
threatened with destruction by the development of a relatively 
minor energy source that will be depleted in about twenty years, 
the court has sacrificed the substantial public interest in protect-
ing a unique and invaluable natural resource to the development 
of an oil and gas resource that offers little hope of enhancing the 
public interest in establishing reliable energy sources. 
The court's refusal to enjoin the Georges Bank lease sale sug-
gests that injunctive relief may be difficult to obtain in future 
challenges to lease sales. on non-NEPA grounds. The court's ques-
tionable use of the lis pendens doctrine to avoid attributing irrep-
arable harm to the lease sale places a heavy burden on environ-
mental plaintiffs that may discourage efforts to provide adequate 
environmental safeguards in other oes drilling projects. In addi-
tion, the court's failure to acknowledge that the threat to the 
Georges Bank fisheries outweighs any potential contribution from 
Lease Sale No. 42 to the nation's energy supply suggests that the 
court's perception of the equities and the public interest in envi-
ronmental cases may be changing, so that environmental values 
... See, e.g., West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 
232, 236 (4th Cir. 1971); Leshy, supra note 555, at 657 . 
... See note 247, supra . 
••• 617 F.2d 296, 298 (1st Cir. Nov. 6, 1979). See also Massachusetts v. Andrus, 481 F. 
Supp. 685, 689 (D. Mass. Nov. 5, 1979). OCSLA § 3(3) declares it to be the policy of the 
United States that "the outer Continental Shelf. . . should be made available for expedi-
tious and orderly development, subject to environmental safeguards .... " 43 U.S.C.A. § 
1332(3) (West Supp. 1979) . 
•• , CLF v. Andrus, 617 F.2d 296, 298 (1st Cir. Nov. 5, 1979) . 
••• Massachusetts v. Andrus, 11 Envir. Rep. Cas. 1138, 1145 (D. Mass. Jan. 28, 1978). 
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may increasingly be sacrificed in a time of· growing demand for 
dwindling non-renewable resources. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc. v. An-
drus, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit heard a challenge 
to the sale of Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil drilling rights on 
Georges Bank, an area noted for its uniquely productive fishing 
grounds. The court faced two rounds of litigation, both on re-
quests for preliminary injunctive relief. In the first, because the 
1978 amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OC-
SLA) promised significant additional environmental safeguards, 
the court dissolved a district court injunction that had blocked 
the planned sale of leases to several oil companies by the Depart-
ment of the Interior. In the second, the court found that Interior 
could conduct the lease sale lawfully and therefore refused to 
overturn the district court's denial of an injunction, thus allowing 
the sale to proceed. In the process, the court first proffered, and 
then withdrew, an opportunity for the strict enforcement of envi-
ronmental laws in lease sale challenges. 
In Round One, the court of appeals carefully evaluated Inte-
rior's efforts to comply with the requirements of the National En-
vironmental Policy Act (NEP A) and, in addition, recognized for 
the first time that the Secretary of the Interior has a duty under 
the OCSLA and other statutes to protect the nation's fisheries 
while sponsoring OCS oil and gas exploration and development. 
In Round Two, however, the court conducted a superficial exami-
nation of Interior's supplemental environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) before refusing to find a NEPA violation. In addition, 
the court held that the lease sale did not constitute an irretriev-
able commitment of resources in violation of the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA) and that, in spite of the Secretary's duty to 
provide all feasible safeguards for the Georges Bank fisheries, he 
was not required to promulgate best available and safest technol-
ogy (BAST) regulations prior to the lease sale. Furthermore, the 
court refused to find that the lease sale would cause the plaintiffs 
irreparable harm, so that injunctive relief was not appropriate at 
the time of the lease sale. 
The court's decision in Round Two portends several environ-
mentally inauspicious trends. First, the court's failure to scruti-
nize the substance of the supplemental EIS suggests a continuing 
1979] GEORGES BANK 297 
erosion of NEP A's significance in contributing to the protection 
of the environment. Second, the court's refusal to find the lease 
sale an irretrievable commitment of resources, even though the 
compensation provisions of the OCSLA indicated otherwise, sig-
nifies a continued judicial temptation to enforce the terms of the 
ESA less strictly than the Supreme Court's decision in TVA v. 
Hill would suggest, and thus the recent amending of the critical 
language in section 7(a)(2) of the ESA may well lead to the evis-
ceration of the ESA. Third, the court's failure to enforce the Sec-
retary's duty to protect the fisheries by requiring BAST regula-
tions prior to the lease sale indicates that the duty will be difficult 
to enforce and therefore will provide little, if any, additional pro-
tection for the environment. Fourth, the court's adoption of the 
lis pendens doctrine in a strained effort to avoid finding irrepara-
ble harm, and its use of an implied contractual condition of legal-
ity to support its conclusion of no irretrievable commitment hints 
that even the threat of serious damage to a remarkably produc-
tive environmental resource will not be sufficient to dissipate the 
pressure for rapid development of additional non-renewable en-
ergy sources. 
While the effect of the court's decision on future environmental 
litigation cannot be accurately predicted because of the prelimi-
nary nature of the proceedings, nevertheless the court appears to 
have shifted from the high standard of environmental protection 
suggested in Round One to substantial deference to agency deci-
sions in Round Two in spite of the significant substantive re-
quirements of the applicable statutes, indicating that efforts to 
protect the environment may face increasingly difficult obstacles. 
Even environmental resources with substantial and demonstrable 
long-term value may continue to give way to the short-range ex-
ploitation of competing non-renewable energy resources. 
